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ABSTRACT
In this-Article Professor Vorspan examines the role of the
English courts during World War I, particularly the judicial
response to executive infringements on individual liberty.
Focusing on detention, deportation, conscription, and
confiscation of property, the Author revises the conventional
depiction of the English judiciary during World War I as
passive and peripheral. She argues that in four ways the judges
were activist and energetic, both in advancing the government's
war effort and in promoting their own policies and powers.
First, they were judicial warriors, developing innovative legal
strategies to legitimize detention and other governmental
restrictions on personal freedom. Second, they relentlessly
preserved their own institutional power and authority,
consistently affirming the right to review government conduct
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through the writ of habeas corpus. Third, in stark contrast to
their treatment of individual liberty, they vigorously upheld
property rights against executive power. Finally, they suffused
their decisions with a particular wartime moral ideology based
on both national origin and traditional concepts of individual
"character." Their success in achieving these priorities while
failing to protect individual liberty offers the troubling
contemporary lesson that maintaining jurisdiction to review
governmental conduct will not safeguard rights during
"wartime" without a staunch judicial commitment to the
substantive value of personal freedom.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During World War I the English government imposed severe
"emergency" limitations on individual freedom based on a presumed
interest in national security, justifying them under both enabling
legislation and as an exercise of inherent executive power. In
particular, the government for the first time pursued a policy of wide-
scale preventive detention not only of aliens but of citizens. To
prosecute the wars against terrorism and Iraq, the government of the
United States in recent years has adopted similarly restrictive
domestic policies. The English experience during the first global war
of the twentieth century thus resonates with our own, and it offers
some deeply troubling lessons.
This Article suggests that maintaining a judicial process to
determine the legality of executive conduct will not by itself
guarantee the preservation of individual liberty. The English courts
during World War I were adept at conserving their formal authority
to establish limits on the executive. Indeed, they decided every
significant wartime case pursuant to habeas petitions and found
every issue presented to be justiciable. In similar fashion, last year
the United States Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the
courts to review executive detention.' But asserting the principle of
reviewability constitutes no more than an essential first step, since
judicial power and process can be wielded to any substantive purpose.
The decisions on the merits during World War I-especially those
concerning internment, deportation, and conscription-were hardly
1. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, - U.S. __ , 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Rasul v. Bush,
- U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct.
2633 (2004). Analogously, the House of Lords declared last December that indefinitely
detaining foreign nationals suspected of terrorism without legal process was
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. A. v. Sec'y of State,
[2004] U.K.H.L. 56 (H.L.).
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reassuring in the balance they struck between state interests and
individual liberty.
In addition to being instructive on current issues, the wartime
cases point to the need for a reappraisal on historical grounds of the
role of the English courts during World War I. The conventional
understanding of the judiciary posits its total capitulation during
that conflict to executive infringements on individual liberty. As
historians of English civil liberties have contended, the judges'
deference to the executive during the First World War constituted a
"total abdication of their role."2 A primary argument of this Article is
that the depiction of a supine and passive judiciary, one that was
largely peripheral to wartime developments, is inadequate and
incomplete. An exhaustive examination of cases decided during the
war suggests a more nuanced and indeed more unsettling view.
Although the judges were hardly protective of personal freedom, they
were not simply cowed and deferential, bowing to the will of an
overbearing executive. Rather, they were active, energetic, and
vigilant both in advancing the government's war effort and in
promoting their own policies and powers.
First, even when the judges ruled on behalf of the government,
they did so aggressively and creatively. In the areas of internment,
deportation, and conscription, for example, they interpreted
legislation audaciously, reshaping statutes to sanction executive
detention and other favored wartime strategies. Further, the judges
complemented their exercises in statutory analysis with a bold
elaboration of common law principles, expanding prerogative powers
in novel ways to enhance the government's legal authority. Deploying
innovative and questionable legal devices, members of the bench
during World War I were judicial warriors, enthusiastically
advancing executive and military policies that went well beyond both
parliamentary intent and common law precedent.
Second, the judges staunchly promoted their own institutional
power, formally asserting their authority to establish the parameters
of executive conduct. The traditional "individual rights" framework
that scholars have applied to judicial behavior during World War I-
that is, the emphasis on substantive results in conflicts involving civil
liberties between individuals and the state-has obscured another
important perspective. Viewing judicial opinions through the prism of
institutional powers, it is apparent that in derogating from individual
2. R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 230 (1976); see, e.g., K.D. EWING
& C.A. GEARTY, THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES: POLITICAL FREEDOM AND THE
RULE OF LAW IN BRITAIN, 1914-1945, at 89 (2000) (observing that the "courts fell into
line behind the administration"); A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE
ODIOUS: DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL IN WARTIME BRITAIN 6-7 (1992) (referring to the
"strength of the British judicial tradition of faithfully supporting the executive in cases
involving security"); see also sources cited infra note 69.
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rights, the courts at the same time buttressed and amplified their
own autonomy and authority. Contrary to the conventional wisdom,
they did not view executive actions as "non-justiciable." Indeed,
perhaps the most salient characteristics of the judiciary during World
War I were its eagerness to assert jurisdiction through the writ of
habeas corpus and its reinforcement of the reviewability of all issues.
Although substantive decisions in civil liberties cases uniformly
favored the government, in rendering them the judges sustained and
even accentuated their formal institutional powers.
Third, in stark contrast to their stance in liberty decisions, in
property cases the judges were notably "activist," moving beyond
formal assertions of power to uphold individual property claims
against the executive. They repeatedly invalidated governmental
efforts to levy taxes, requisition land without paying adequate
compensation, and interfere with litigation seeking to recover
property. Again, they skillfully employed every available mechanism
to attain -their objectives, generally either finding the regulatory
framework to be ultra vires the enabling legislation or adapting
common law precedent to invalidate exercises of the royal
prerogative.
Finally, the judges imposed on the law their own particular
moral ideology, suffusing their decisions with a bellicose moralism
that treated a litigant's personal "worthiness" as an important factor
in shaping their decisions. They created a new hierarchy of wartime
respectability that blended patriotic criteria such as national origin
and military service with more conventional Victorian determinants
of "character." Natural-born English citizens, naturalized British
subjects, foreign allies, enemy aliens, and Irishmen existed on a
moral continuum, with the "genuinely" English at the top of the
hierarchy and the Irish-though ostensibly equal subjects of the
Crown-at the bottom. Persons situated at different positions on the
hierarchy received differential treatment from the courts, with the
Irish faring even worse than enemy aliens.
The judges, therefore, were activist in four respects. They
vigorously prosecuted the war, safeguarded their institutional power,
protected private property, and promoted a particularized wartime
morality. In other words, they were warrior judges with their own
distinctive substantive and jurisdictional agenda.
Part II of this Article explores the legal background relevant to
this inquiry into judicial conduct, investigating the legal bases for
expanded executive authority during the war. It discusses both new
enabling legislation, such as the Defense of the Realm Acts, and
traditional common law sources of power, such as the royal
prerogative. In Part III the Article examines aggressive legal
strategies that the courts employed to assist the war effort in the
spheres of internment, deportation, and conscription. Part IV
demonstrates that despite the pro-government nature of the decisions
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in personal freedom cases, the judges nevertheless preserved their
formal control over the executive by maintaining the vitality of
habeas review, establishing the justiciability of all wartime legal
issues, imposing in certain instances a requirement of
"reasonableness" on the government, and requiring adequate factual
predicates to buttress administrative policy. Parts V and VI explore
the two areas in which the judiciary most resolutely charted its own
independent course. The former demonstrates that the courts
adopted a wholly different approach to property rights than to
personal liberty, invalidating governmental intrusion on individuals
in the contexts of compensation, taxation, and judicial access. The
latter examines the pervasive moralism that informed the courts'
wartime decisions, identifying ways in which they ruled not according
to principles of law but rather according to the moral status of the
litigants before them.
Finally, the Conclusion emphasizes the need for historians to
treat judicial behavior during World War I more comprehensively,
moving beyond a narrow focus on personal liberty to examine issues
of judicial strategy, institutional power, and public morality. It also
suggests that even in a relatively open and democratic society,
staunch judicial affirmation of powers of review may nonetheless fail
to protect individuals from unnecessary infringements on their
personal freedom. 3
II. LEGAL SOURCES OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY IN WARTIME
During World War I the English government enjoyed
unprecedented control over virtually every aspect of social, economic,
and political life. 4 This authority was based both on new emergency
3. This Article, which explores developments in substantive law and focuses
particularly on the judicial response to executive infringements on personal freedom, is
part of a larger study of the relationship between war and law in England during World
War I. A second article will discuss the effect of the war on legal procedures and
institutions, including the creation of new administrative tribunals and military courts,
limitations on procedural rights in the traditional criminal justice system, and the
evolution of common law rules regarding access to civil justice.
4. In the words of one commentator, the new powers made martial law
"superfluous." David R. Lowry, Terrorism and Human Rights: Counter-Insurgency and
Necessity at Common Law, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 49, 52 (1977); see, e.g., EWING &
GEARTY, supra note 2, at 43-62 (describing restrictions on civil liberties during the
war); SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 6-7 (characterizing war time changes to the British
constitution as causing "a decline in the status of both Parliament and the courts");
CHARLES TOWNSHEND, MAKING THE PEACE: PUBLIC ORDER AND PUBLIC SECURITY IN
MODERN BRITAIN 55-79 (1993) (describing the rise of executive authority in domestic
affairs); JOHN WILLIAMS, THE OTHER BATTLEGROUND: THE HOME FRONTS, BRITAIN,
FRANCE AND GERMANY, 1914-18, at 23 (1972) (noting that war legislation effectively
put Britain under martial law).
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legislation and the traditional power of the royal prerogative. The
most significant source of executive power in wartime was the
Defense of the Realm Acts (DORA), which delegated capacity to the
government to promulgate regulations having the force of statute. 5
The first iteration of DORA was introduced into the House of
Commons on August 7, 1914, three days after war was declared, and
it passed through all the required stages without debate and in a
breathtaking five minutes. As a contemporary observer in the United
States noted, it was passed with "lightening speed, without a word of
protest."'6 It empowered the government ("His Majesty in Council") to
issue regulations "as to the powers and duties of the Admiralty and
Army Council" for securing the "public safety and defence" of the
realm. 7 Moreover, it authorized the trial by court-martial of persons
contravening specified regulations "as if such persons were subject to
military law and had on active service committed an offence."'8 The
Home Secretary, Reginald McKenna, issued a statement in the House
of Commons reflecting the government's relatively modest objectives
in the early stages of the war. It would be "extremely desirable in
cases of tapping wires or attempts to blow up bridges," he proclaimed,
"that there should be an immediate Court to consider the offence of
the offenders."9
During the following nine months DORA was amended by three
major pieces of additional legislation, all of which dramatically
expanded governmental powers. The second installment, enacted a
mere three weeks later, extended trial by court-martial to anyone
violating regulations designed to secure military areas or "prevent
the spread of reports likely to cause disaffection or alarm."10 This
amendment also authorized the executive to issue regulations
suspending various legal restrictions on the acquisition or use of
5. Defense of the Realm Act, Aug. 8, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 29; Defense of the
Realm (No. 2) Act, Aug. 28, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 63; Defense of the Realm
Consolidation Act, Nov. 27, 1914, 5 Geo. 5, c. 8; Defense of the Realm (Amendment)
Act, Mar. 16, 1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 34; Defense of the Realm (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, Mar.
16, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 37; Defense of the Realm (Amendment) (No. 3) Act, May 19,
1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 42 (collectively known as DORA).
6. Harold Bowman, Martial Law and the English Constitution, 15 MICH. L.
REV. 93, 93 (1916).
7. DORA, Aug. 8, 1914, § 1. There was no requirement that the regulations be
approved by Parliament.
8. Id. The specified regulations were those designed (1) to prevent persons
from communicating with the enemy or obtaining information for any purpose
calculated to jeopardize the success of military operations; and (2) to secure the safety
of any means of communication and of railways, docks, or harbors. Id. § 1(a), (b).
9. 65 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Aug. 7, 1914) 2192.
10. DORA (No. 2) Act, Aug. 28, 1914, § 1(a).
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land." Like the original DORA, the House of Commons passed the
revised statute in a single sitting and without a division. 12
In November 1914 Parliament enacted an ostensibly
consolidating measure, the Defense of the Realm Consolidation Act,'
3
which in fact contained new substantive provisions affording the
government even wider regulatory powers. Whereas prior legislation
had authorized regulations "as to the powers and duties of military
authorities" for securing safety and defense, the new act allowed the
government to regulate for safety and defense directly. 14 In addition,
unlike the earlier amendment prescribing trial by court-martial only
for violators of certain specified regulations, this Act established a
military trial for anyone offending against regulations of any type.'
5
Persons convicted by court-martial of an offense "committed with the
intention of assisting the enemy" were subject to the death penalty.' 6
The courts-martial and death penalty proposals were vigorously
resisted in the House of Lords by judges such as Lords Loreburn,
Parmoor, and Halsbury. Lord Loreburn, for example, complained that
the bill proposed "to place the life of the British subject at the mercy
of a military Court-Martial, even though the Court of Assize may be
sitting within fifty yards."17 Similarly, Lord Parmoor remarked: "This
matter is one of extreme gravity and importance. I do not believe
there is any precedent for taking away the rights of a British subject
as regards ordinary trial by a jury directed by a skilled Judge.' 8 The
bill, he continued, tampered with the "great root principles on which
our justice has been established over centuries of time."'19 According
to the Earl of Halsbury, "the liberty of the subject was not so trifling
11. Id. § 1(c).
12. EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 44. There was, however, some disquiet
that authorizing the government to try persons by court-martial for spreading false
reports would inhibit criticism of the government. See, e.g., 66 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th
ser.) (Aug. 26, 1914) 88; EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 44-45.
13. DORA Consolidation Act, Nov. 27, 1914, 5 Geo. 5, c. 8.
14. Id. § 1(1). This change was apparently intended to deal with the concern
that the language of the first two Acts was inadequate to support the regulations
promulgated under them. See EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 46; SIMPSON, supra
note 2, at 6 (stating that the Consolidation Act made clear that Parliament was
expanding rather than clarifying executive powers).
15. DORA Consolidation Act, Nov. 27, 1914, § 1(1). The new Act also
empowered courts of summary jurisdiction to hear minor offenses. Id.
16. Id. § 1(4).
17. 18 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (Nov. 27, 1914) 207; see EWING & GEARTY,
supra note 2, at 48. This question, Lord Loreburn objected, "was never even ventilated
in the House of Commons." 18 PARL. DEB., H.L. at 216. Lord Bryce commented that
"while the Courts are available, surely some further reason should be given to us than
has been given for such an extraordinary departure as this from all historical
precedent." Id. at 209.
18. Id. at 210.
19. 18 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (Feb. 4, 1915) 451.
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a matter that it can be swept away in a moment because some of us
are in a panic.
20
In the face of this judicial determination, the government agreed
to introduce legislation restoring jury trial, and it additionally
conceded that in the interim it would not seek the death penalty. 2 1
Fulfilling this commitment, a fourth major piece of DORA legislation
enacted in March 1915 reinstituted trial by jury for British
subjects. 22 A person charged with a non-summary offense was to be
informed of the general nature of the charge "as soon as practicable
after arrest" and had six days to request a civil court with a jury.2 3 In
the event of "invasion or other special military emergency," however,
the King could suspend the jury trial provision by royal
proclamation.2 4 The Act retained the original scheme of courts-
martial for non-British subjects, though the executive could at its
option try an alien in civil court. 25 Additional amendments
significantly augmented the executive's power in other respects,
especially in regard to eminent domain and interference with private
business. 26
DORA spawned a voluminous and comprehensive code of
regulations. Although Regulation 1 promised that the "ordinary
avocations of life and the enjoyment of property" 27 would be affected
as little as possible, the proliferating regulations soon filled a manual
of hundreds of pages and conferred on the authorities a formidable
array of powers. One group of regulations, for example, authorized
20. 18 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (Nov. 27, 1914) 208.
21. Id. at 220-24.
22. DORA (Amendment) Act, Mar. 16, 1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 34, § 1(1). For the
debates in the House of Commons on restoring jury trial, see 70 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th
ser.) (Feb. 24, 1915) 287-332; 70 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 2, 1915) 670-759.
23. DORA (Amendment) Act, Mar. 16, 1915, § 1(2). Lord Bryce approvingly
observed that the government was now "doing what they can to restore those ancient
safeguards for the liberty of the subject which are one of the oldest and most treasured
parts of our Constitution." 18 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (Mar. 11, 1915) 695.
24. DORA (Amendment) Act, Mar. 16, 1915, § 1(7). Such a proclamation was
issued only in Ireland during the Easter Rebellion, and it was never revoked during the
war. See, e.g., R. v. Governor of Wormwood Scrubs Prison ex parte Foy, 36 T.L.R. 432
(K.B. 1920); SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 26. The government defeated an amendment
that would allow courts-martial only when the civil courts were unavailable. See
Bowman, supra note 6, at 100-01.
25. DORA (Amendment) Act, Mar. 16, 1915, § 1(1); see Bowman, supra note 6,
at 103.
26. DORA (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, Mar. 16, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 37. The
government could "regulate or restrict the carrying on of work in any factory or
workshop," id. § 1(1)(d), and "take possession of any unoccupied premises" to house
workers producing war material. Id. § 1(1)(e). A further amendment allowed the
government to take control of the sale and supply of intoxicating liquors. DORA
(Amendment) (No. 3) Act, May 19, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo 5, c. 42.
27. CONSOLIDATED REGULATIONS, DEFENCE OF THE REALM MANUAL Reg. 1 (5th
ed. 1918) [hereinafter DORA CONSOL. REGS.].
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the government to interfere with private ownership of property, 28
while others permitted it to close pubs, 29 clear areas, 30 and impose
curfews. 3 1 Further regulations created unprecedented powers to
intern civilians. Most prominently, Regulation 14B permitted
preventive detention even of British subjects whenever it appeared
"expedient in view of the hostile origin or associations of any
person." 32
The government also implemented a variety of constraints on
freedom of assembly, speech, and the press. One regulation
empowered officials to prohibit assemblies and processions, 33 and
another made it an offense "to cause mutiny, sedition, or disaffection
among any of His Majesty's forces or among the civilian
population."34  Still others targeted the press, barring the
unauthorized collection and communication of military information
35
as well as the dissemination of statements or reports likely to "cause
disaffection" or to "prejudice the recruiting, training, discipline, or
administration of any of His Majesty's forces. ' 36 An additional set of
provisions allowed the police to stop and search vehicles, engage in
surveillance of private meetings, and arrest without warrant persons
who acted "in a manner prejudicial to the public safety."37
Many commentators, both at the time and subsequently,
characterized DORA's unprecedented delegation of legislative
authority to the administration as a constitutional revolution. In
1915 the Tory leader Bonar Law declared the new governmental
powers to be "revolutionary,"38 and Lloyd George agreed that DORA
certainly was "a very strong measure."39 According to the press baron
Lord Riddell, in just "a few lines" DORA had eradicated Magna
Charta and the Bill of Rights.40 Toward the end of the war, Lord
Scrutton, a judge on the Court of Appeal, commented ruefully on the
novel use of government powers:
Before the war it would have been thought incredible that a British subject
should be retained in custody for years without any public formulation of a
28. Id. at Reg. 2.
29. Id. at Reg. 10.
30. Id. at Reg. 9.
31. Id. at Reg. 13.
32. Id. at Reg. 14B.
33. Id. at Reg. 9A.
34. Id. at Reg. 42.
35. Id. at Reg. 18.
36. Id. at Reg. 27(b), (c). Other regulations directed at the press were
Regulation 51A (providing for the seizure and destruction of prohibited documents on
warrants issued by magistrates) and Regulation 56(13) (providing for the prosecution of
press offenses with the approval of the Director of Public Prosecutions).
37. Id. at Regs. 51B, 52, 55.
38. 71 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Apr. 29, 1915) 866.
39. Id.
40. LORD RIDDELL'S WAR DIARY, 1914-1918, at 41 (1933).
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charge against him or public trial of his guilt. But Parliament thought it right
in times of war and supreme national danger to give wide powers to the
executive, who have exercised them in such a way that such results have
followed.
4 1
Modern historians have similarly treated the cascading regulatory
waves as a "revolutionary" phenomenon. Not since the reign of
George III, one observed, has there been anything "even remotely
comparable to the extraordinary powers exercised by the government
under these emergency regulations. '4 2 A.W.B. Simpson, author of the
definitive study of executive detention in wartime, bluntly declared
that during World War I the Defense of the Realm Acts "radically
altered the British constitution."43
If DORA constituted a revolution, however, it was one that
confronted little parliamentary or popular opposition. Most
contemporaries viewed it as acceptable under prevailing emergency
conditions. "England has herself been forced to be despotic," declared
a typical commentator in 1915.44 "I state the inconsistency, but in no
critical spirit; the situation is clearly abnormal. ' 45 The justification
for the temporary suspension of constitutional safeguards was an
"overweening necessity, honestly proclaimed by the Government and
patriotically acquiesced in by the people. '46 Other observers insisted
that the responsibility for stifling civil liberties lay with the
Germans. As the Times Literary Supplement observed in 1917, "[w]e
have not gagged our Press because we disliked our freedom, nor
penalized conscience because we believed in persecution and felt no
shame in oppression, but because to this extent the Prussian has
triumphed. ' 47 That is, German tactics had left the British no
alternative but "to stoop to conquer, and to borrow his weapons in
41. T.E. Scrutton, The War and the Law, 34 L.Q. REV. 116, 129 (1918); see also
T. BATY & J.H. MORGAN, WAR, ITS CONDUCT AND LEGAL RESULTS 73 (1915) (describing
DORA as "unprecedented in character"); WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 23 (commenting
that "the traditional freedoms of Britons were signed away at the stroke of a pen");
Sidney W. Clarke, The Rule of DORA, 1 J. Soc'Y COM. LEGIS. & INT'L L. (3d ser.) 36, 36
(1919) (observing that a "bloodless revolution" had occurred).
42. See BARTON L. INGRAHAM, POLITICAL CRIME IN EUROPE 295 (1979).
43. SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 6.
44. Lindsay Rogers, The War and the English Constitution, [1915] THE FORUM
27, 30. John Simon, the former Home Secretary, recalled in 1920 that both public
opinion and Parliament "generally recognized as inevitable the claim of the Authorities
to interfere drastically in the interests of national defense with individual rights." Sir
John Simon, Introduction to LESLIE SCOTT & ALFRED HILDESLEY, THE CASE OF
REQUISITION xv (1920); see Bowman, supra note 6, at 97 ("The people of Great Britain,
it would seem, had put their seal of approval upon what was done by Parliament.").
45. Rogers, supra note 44, at 1.
46. Id.
47. A Parable of the War, TIMES LITERARY SUPP., Aug. 2, 1917, at 1. The author
was A.F. Pollard, Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of London. See
SAMUEL HYNES, A WAR IMAGINED: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND ENGLISH CULTURE 172
(1991).
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order to beat him. ' 48 Although there was some opposition to DORA,
mainly from left-wing academics and the fledgling National Council
for Civil Liberties, 49 critics were in a small minority.50
While DORA underpinned most of the regulations promulgated
during the war, other statutes also conferred regulatory authority.
The Aliens Restriction Act (ARA), 51 passed on the second day of the
war, permitted the Home Secretary to issue regulations compelling
aliens to register with the government, 52 prohibiting them from
landing or embarking in the United Kingdom, 53 and requiring or
barring their residence in specified areas.54 Further, ARA empowered
the government to issue orders for the deportation of non-British
citizens. 55 Subsequent regulations promulgated under ARA imposed
surprisingly detailed limitations on the activities and free movement
of resident aliens.56
48. A Parable of the War, supra note 47, at 30.
49. The most outspoken academic commentary was provided by T. Baty and
J.H. Morgan, who observed, for example, that "never in our history has the Executive
assumed such arbitrary power over the life, liberty, and property of British subjects."
BATY & MORGAN, supra note 41, at 112. The National Council of Civil Liberties
complained in 1917 of the widespread sacrifice of basic principles, including free press,
free speech, freedom from surveillance, habeas corpus, trial by jury, and public trial.
"NORTH BRITON" [JOHN CLIFFORD], BRITISH FREEDOM 1914-1917 (1917).
50. As one scholar remarked, the surprising thing was the "alacrity with which
the English surrendered practically the totality of their cherished liberties to the
discretion of Government officials during an emergency." INGRAHAM, supra note 42, at
295; see, e.g., RIDDELL, supra note 40, at 41 ("The drastic and unique provisions of
[DORA] have not attracted the attention they deserve."); TOWNSHEND, supra note 4, at
57 (observing that "whatever DORA may have done, it had popular sanction"); Clarke,
supra note 41, at 36 (noting that "[o]f the phenomena exhibited during the four years of
warfare, none is more remarkable than the docility with which the people of this
country submitted to the abrogation of many of their most cherished rights").
51. Aliens Restriction Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 12 [hereinafter ARA].
52. Id. § 1(1)(f).
53. Id. § 1(1)(a), (b).
54. Id. § 1(1)(d), (e). The Act further authorized the government to take any
other measure "necessary or expedient with a view to the safety of the realm," id.
§ 1(1)(k), and it prescribed a penalty for violations of the regulations of a fine not
exceeding £100 or imprisonment for up to six months. Id. § 1(2). In addition, the Act
provided that the burden of proving that a person was not an alien should rest upon the
person, id. § 1(4), thus reversing the old English rule that the burden of proof rested
upon the person charging the disability. See Arnold D. McNair, British Nationality and
Alien Status in Time of War, 35 L.Q. REV. 213, 229 (1919) (referring to the section as a
"very drastic provision").
55. ARA § 1(1)(c); see SHARPE, supra note 2, 117-20 (discussing deportation
cases and the use of habeas corpus).
56. For example, an alien was required to obtain a permit to possess articles
such as firearms, telephones, motorcycles, automobiles, photographic apparatus, maps,
charts, or pigeons. Moreover, government consent was necessary to circulate any
newspaper printed wholly or mainly in the language of an enemy state, and the Home
Secretary could order a chief of police to close any club frequented by enemy aliens. An
alien could not travel more than five miles from a registered place of residence without
a permit, and travel was limited to twenty-four hours except in special circumstances.
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Other legislation supplemented DORA in transforming British
economic life. The Trading with the Enemy Acts 57 prohibited
commercial or financial contact with the enemy, while the Munitions
of War Act 191558 transferred war production to a single coordinated
authority and suspended the right to strike. Finally, two new statutes
dealt with military service. A 1915 act mandated a compulsory
national register of all males between the ages of fifteen and sixty-
five,5 9 and another act the following year introduced military
conscription for the first time in British history.
6 0
In addition to its broad statutory authority, the executive also
enjoyed common law prerogative powers. Declaring war was a
prerogative power, and apart from statute the Crown had inherent
authority to intern prisoners of war and to deport enemy aliens.
6 1
Further, the government claimed substantial prerogative rights to
confiscate private property.
62
Such were the monumental powers that the government wielded
during the war. For the fate of English civil liberties, the critical
question was how judges would demarcate the legitimate boundaries
of executive authority. As will be shown, in the area of personal
freedom the courts extended state power not only beyond
As to curfew, in London in 1915 male enemy aliens were ordinarily restricted to their
registered places of residence between 9 P.M. and 8 A.M. Offenders of "unsatisfactory
character" and second offenders were interned. See, e.g., J.C. BIRD, CONTROL OF ENEMY
ALIEN CIVILIANS IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1914-1918, at 200-02, 227-28 (1986); 1 JAMES
WILFORD GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 64-65 (1920) (discussing
regulations promulgated to control enemy aliens); James W. Garner, Treatment of
Enemy Aliens, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 27, 29 (1918) (explaining the reasons behind the
restrictive policy toward enemy aliens). A strictly enforced regulation promulgated in
October 1914 prohibited enemy aliens from changing their names. BIRD, supra, at 231.
57. Trading with the Enemy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 87; Trading with the
Enemy Amendment Act, 1914, 5 Geo. 5, c. 12; Trading with the Enemy (Extension of
Powers) Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 98; Trading with the Enemy Amendment Act, 1916,
5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 105; Trading with the Enemy (Amendment) Act, 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5, c.
31. The provisions of the Acts were so stringent that they cast doubt on the propriety of
a physician treating an enemy patient. See Rogers, supra note 44, at 29.
58. Munitions of War Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 54; Munitions of War
(Amendment) Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 99.
59. National Registration Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 60.
60. Military Service Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104; see infra Part III.A.2.
61. See R. v. Superintendent of Vine Street Police Station ex parte Liebmann,
[1916] 1 K.B. 268 (examining the courts' authority to imprison an enemy alien civilian
as a prisoner of war); R. v. Commandant of Knockaloe Camp ex parte Forman, 34 T.L.R.
4 (K.B. 1917) (articulating the Crown's power to hold enemy aliens as prisoners of war);
see also LORD MCNAIR & A.D. WATTS, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR 95, 98 (1966)
(discussing the royal prerogative in relation to a writ of habeas corpus sought by a
prisoner of war); SHARPE, supra note 2, at 113; Lowry, supra note 4, at 52 n.35 ("the
actual declaration of war is a prerogative power as are the powers to intern and deport
aliens").
62. See infra Part V.
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parliamentary intent but at times even beyond the wishes of the
government itself.
III. JUDICIAL WARRIORS AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
Despite the unavailability of constitutional judicial review,6 3 the
English courts enjoy formidable theoretical powers to circumscribe
the executive. They can determine whether government regulations
and orders-either on their face or as applied in individual cases-
are beyond the scope of the enabling instruments.6 4 Even in matters
in which the government enjoys broad discretion, they can evaluate
whether the executive has acted within lawful limits.65 Judges can
also exercise interpretive functions, construing statutes and
regulations to establish the intent of the enacting bodies. 66 Finally,
they can scrutinize whether actions taken pursuant to the royal
prerogative are in line with judicial precedent and viable in light of
arguably pre-emptive statutory developments. 67  These review
63. The English courts enjoy no authority to invalidate legislation or
administrative action for violating positive individual constitutional rights. See, e.g.,
A.W. BRADLEY & K.D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 18, 96 (12th
ed. 1997); Eric Barendt, Fundamental Principles, in ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW 3, 40 (David
Feldman ed., 2004); Rachel Vorspan, "Freedom of Assembly" and the Right to Passage
in Modern English Legal History, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 921, 940 (1997) (noting the
lack of a positive constitutional statutory right to freedom of assembly under British
law).
64. See, e.g., HILAIRE BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
1007, 1017 (3d ed. 2000); BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 63, at 94-95; 0. HOOD PHILLIPS
& PAUL JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 595-99 (6th ed. 1978)
("The courts have jurisdiction at common law to determine ... whether the purported
exercise of a power is authorized by law."); WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 39 (7th ed. 1994) ("If administrative action is in excess of power
(ultra vires), the court has only to quash it or declare it unlawful"); Barendt, supra note
63, at 41.
65. See, e.g., BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 63, at 773; PHILLIPS & JACKSON,
supra note 64, at 599-601 ("Even where a discretion seems unfettered the courts will
interfere where it has been exercised in a way which thwarts or frustrates the objects
of the Act conferring the power."); SHARPE, supra note 2, at 89 (observing that the
judges "can control the exercise of executive discretion when they wish to do so by
defining the lawful limits of the power granted"); WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 64, at
384 (stating that the courts can limit the executive's exercise of its discretionary
power); Paul Craig, Fundamental Principles in Administrative Law, in ENGLISH PUBLIC
LAW 689, 708 (David Feldman ed., 2004).
66. See, e.g., BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 63, at 18 (noting that judges "have
the task of interpreting enacted law in cases where the correct meaning of the Act is
disputed"); PHILLIPS & JACKSON, supra note 64, at 596; A.W. Bradley, The
Constitutional Position of the Judiciary, in ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW 333, 345 (David
Feldman ed., 2004).
67. See, e.g., BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 63, at 280-82 (discussing the effect
of statutes on prerogative powers); WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 64, at 384 (stating
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functions afford the judiciary considerable flexibility in choosing
whether and when to protect individuals from excessive intrusions on
their individual liberties.
In domains of personal liberty such as internment, exclusion,
deportation, and conscription, 68 the wartime courts not only failed to
limit the government but enhanced executive powers in bold,
creative, and occasionally self-contradictory ways. That the courts
opted to support the state's war policies at the expense of individual
liberties is hardly a new observation. 69 Scholars have not fully
recognized, however, the assertiveness, vehemence, and doctrinal
inventiveness with which the judges pursued this course. Indeed, the
judiciary went well beyond the intention of Parliament-and
occasionally even the policies of the government itself-in developing
innovative and often questionable legal strategies to expand
executive powers.
that it is "for the court to determine the legal limits of the prerogative"); Barendt, supra
note 63, at 12-14, 41.
68. This Article focuses on physical deprivations of personal liberty and does
not address restrictions on freedom of speech and the press. There were virtually no
reported cases challenging government infringement on civil liberties during the war,
doubtless because of the perceived unlikelihood of success, the fact that most such
cases were disposed of summarily in magistrates' courts, and the unavailability of the
writ of habeas corpus. The main reported civil liberties cases were Ex parte Norman,
114 L.T.R. 232 (K.B. 1916), upholding a DORA regulation authorizing in camera
proceedings to determine whether materials seized in a press raid should be destroyed,
and Norman v. Matthews, 32 T.L.R. 303 (K.B. 1916), rejecting the argument that
DORA Regulation 27, which barred the dissemination of statements "likely to cause
disaffection," was ultra vires for preventing the expression of political opinions. In the
latter case Mr. Justice Lush observed that the court "could not construe an Act passed
for securing the safety of the Realm with the same scrupulous nicety as, for instance, a
taxing Act." Id. at 304.
69. The authors of a recent book on English civil liberties have complained that
"the higher judiciary in Dublin and London were consistently loyal to the executive."
EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 350. They also noted that the World War I judges
"exploded the myth of an independent judiciary standing as a bulwark between the
executive and the citizen." Id. at 83; see, e.g., SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 25 (observing
that "[flrom 1917 onwards British judges have, with the rarest exceptions, consistently
upheld the progressive erosion of British liberty in the name of good government");
TOWNSHEND, supra note 4, at 65, 78 (referring to the "paralysis" of judicial standards
and the "wartime complaisance of the judiciary"); DAVID WILLIAMS, NOT IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY IN DEMOCRACY 187 (1965) ("In time of war
considerable indulgence has been allowed to the executive."); Lowry, supra note 4, at
53-55 (commenting on "judicial abnegation regarding the protection of civil liberty"); see
also George J. Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National Courts
During Periods of Emergency, 5 H.R.L.J. 1, 28 (1984) (observing that in wartime the
British courts "will not question the acts of the government").
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A. Construing Emergency Statutes: Warmaking Beyond
Parliamentary Intent
The courts interpreted wartime statutes audaciously and
broadly, reversing the narrow canons of construction they had
previously applied -in civil liberties cases. They inferred massive
governmental powers from legislative silence, purposefully selected
certain statutory provisions to control others, facilitated
governmental efforts to achieve indirectly what legislation
prohibited, interpreted regulations to impose minimal standards of
conduct on the administration, and manipulated a variety of
technicalities to extend the scope of restrictive legislation to
unanticipated factual situations.
1. Internment: Drawing Unprecedented Inferences from Silence
World War I was the first time in English history that the
government adopted a policy of extensive internment of civilians.7 0
During the first nine months of the war, even without announcing a
formal internment policy, the government preventively detained
almost twenty thousand of the seventy-five thousand enemy aliens
present in the country. 71 In the spring of 1915 an outbreak of "spy
mania"72 and the sinking of the Lusitania 73 generated pressure to
70. Before World War I "[tihere were no instances of wholesale internment."
GARNER, supra note 56, at 56. In 1920 Garner explained that the change in policy was
due to the extreme bitterness between the antagonists and the presence of large
numbers of enemy aliens in the territories of the various belligerents. Id. at 59.
71. See 76 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Nov. 24, 1915) 313. According to the
Home Secretary, Herbert Samuel, at the beginning of the war there were seventy-five
thousand German and Austrians in Britain, not including ten or eleven thousand
British-born wives of aliens. Of these, twenty-one thousand were repatriated and
thirty-two thousand were interned; of the twenty-two thousand uninterned, ten
thousand were women and 5,500 were friendly or elderly aliens, leaving only 6,500
able-bodied German and Austrian enemy aliens. 83 PARL DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (June 29,
1916) 1068-71.
72. See CHRISTOPHER ANDREw, HER MAJESTY'S SECRET SERVICE: THE MAKING
OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 177-81 (1987). Although the number of
actual spies was very few, in the popular mind "many thousands of imaginary agents
remained at liberty plotting imaginary acts of sabotage." Id. at 177.
73. More than a thousand people perished when the Germans torpedoed the
Lusitania off the Irish coast in May 1915, fueling a wave of anti-German sentiment in
England. See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 65-66. As an example of pro-internment
hysteria, a resolution at a huge public demonstration in London after the sinking
protested "any kith and kin of German mutilators, poisoners, and murderers of men,
women, and children being any longer allowed to be at large in the English islands."
Quoted in Garner, supra note 56, at 40. Fearing "riots, fires, and spread of disease
germs and poisoned water," the demonstrators demanded "that the government take
immediate steps to intern or deport all alien enemies, male or female, whatever their
nationality, naturalized or otherwise." Id. Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, recalled in
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detain all male aliens still at large.74 On May 13, 1915, Prime
Minister Herbert Asquith announced that all male enemy nationals
of military age would be interned under the government's prerogative
powers. 75 Eventually, more than thirty thousand male aliens were
placed in detention camps. 76
In June 1915 the government invoked DORA to promulgate
Regulation 14B, which extended the scope of detention to naturalized
and natural-born British subjects. Regulation 14B permitted the
internment of any person "of hostile origin or associations" whenever
a competent military officer considered such action "expedient" for
securing the public safety or defense.77 John Simon, the Home
Secretary, justified the regulation to the House of Commons on the
ground that the state must have the power to deal with dangerous
individuals, regardless of whether they were naturalized or even
natural-born. 78 Under the DORA scheme, 216 people were interned
and another forty were restricted in their movements. 79 Although the
his memoirs that in the spring of 1915 the Home Office was too indulgent to aliens. See
1 DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, WAR MEMOIRS 220-21 (1933); ANDREW, supra note 72, at 181.
74. See 83 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (July 29, 1916) 1049 (containing criticism
of the Home Office for not interning a sufficient number of aliens).
75. 71 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (May 13, 1915) 1841-42.
76. John Simon reported in November 1915 on the success of the policy
announced the previous May. The number interned had risen from 19,569 on May 13,
1915, to 32,440 on November 22, 1915. 76 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Nov. 24, 1915)
313. In February 1918 twenty-nine thousand civilian aliens remained in detention. See
103 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Feb. 19, 1918) 601.
77. DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 27, at Reg. 14B. The regulation was
promulgated pursuant to the DORA (Consolidation) Act, Nov. 27, 1914, 5 Geo. 5, c. 8, §
1(1), which authorized the Home Secretary to issue regulations directly "for the public
safety and defence of the realm." Regulation 14B provided that the minister could issue
an order requiring an individual "either to remain in, or to proceed to and reside in,
such place as may be specified in the order ... or to be interned in such place as may be
specified in the order." DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 27, at Reg. 14B. In the case of
any person who was not an enemy alien, the order had to expressly provide for due
consideration by an advisory committee of "any representations he may make against
the order." Id. The advisory committees were to be "presided over by a person who
holds or has held high judicial office." Id.
78. 72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (June 17, 1915) 851-52. The reason for
interning naturalized citizens, stated Herbert Samuel, Home Secretary the following
year, was that it was impossible to draw any definite line between Germans who had
been naturalized and those who had not. Although "a man may change his nation, he
does not always thereby change his nature." 80 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 2,
1916) 1242.
79. See SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 5. Executive detention lasted until the formal
end of the war on August 31, 1921. According to Simpson, very little is known about the
administration of 14B since all records were subsequently destroyed. Id. at 16-17.
Statements by ministers in the House of Commons indicated that in February 1916
there were 36 detainees in custody, 19 of whom were naturalized persons of "hostile
origins" and 17 natural-born British subjects. See 80 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Feb.
17, 1916) 220; 80 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Feb. 21, 1916) 410. The following month
the number had risen to 69: 8 of British origin, 7 natural-born British of German
origin, 1 natural-born subject of uncertain origin, 6 German women who were British
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number of Regulation 14B detainees was small, these internments
provoked the sharpest legal controversy of the war.
In the test case of R. v. Halliday ex parte Zadig,8 0 a naturalized
British subject challenged Regulation 14B as ultra vires the Defense
of the Realm Act. Arthur Zadig, the petitioner, was a railway
contractor who had been born in Breslau of German parents but
became a naturalized British subject in 1905.81 He was interned in
October 1915 on the basis of "hostile origins and associations."8 2 After
being detained in Islington for eighteen months, he petitioned the
King's Bench for a writ of habeas corpus. A newly founded Habeas
Corpus Defense Fund, organized by H.W. Massingham, editor of The
Nation, invited subscriptions to finance Zadig's case.83 As the
petitioner's counsel later recounted, Zadig was considered suitable to
bring a test case because he was in law a British citizen and in fact a
"harmless person."8 4
The lawsuit contended that Regulation 14B was on its face ultra
vires because DORA did not authorize executive detention in express
terms. Statutes affecting the liberty of the subject must be strictly
construed, Zadig argued, and it was illegitimate to infer from silence
that Parliament approved a scheme of preventive detention.8 5 Zadig's
by marriage, 17 naturalized Germans, 2 naturalized Austrians, and 28 who were not
British subjects. See 80 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Feb. 21, 1916) 16; 80 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 2, 1916) 1245. In February 1917 there were 74 British internees,
31 of whom were British born, see 90 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Feb. 27, 1917) 1845,
and in October 1917 there were 123 detainees, see 98 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Oct.
29, 1917) 1175. Eight months later, in June 1918, 67 British subjects were in detention,
49 of whom were of hostile origin. See 106 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (June 6, 1918)
1731. In April 1919 there remained still 66 detainees, of whom 41 were British, see 114
PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Apr. 14, 1919) 2555, and in March 1920 there remained 102
internees, see 127 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 31, 1930) 1237. Regulation 14B was
used more extensively in Ireland; the government detained 3,430 men and 79 women
following the Easter Rebellion of 1916, eventually transferring 1,841 of them to
England. See SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 17-18.
80. [1917] A.C. 260 (H.L.).
81. FRANCIS W. HIRST, THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR TO GREAT BRITAIN 109
(1934).
82. Halliday, [1917] A.C. at 267.
83. HIRST, supra note 81, at 110.
84. Id. Indeed, Zadig's attorney reported that he was released from custody
only two weeks after the decision. Id. at 115.
85. Halliday, [1917] A.C. at 261. Zadig further argued that since DORA
expressly gave British subjects a right to jury trial for breach of the regulations, it was
illogical to conclude that Parliament intended to nullify this provision by providing the
executive with the option of indefinite preventive detention. Id. The government
responded that the statute was preventive as well as punitive. Id. at 263-64. It pointed
to the fact that the Act authorized punishment of persons committing offenses against
regulations designed:
(a) to prevent persons communicating with the enemy or obtaining information
for that purpose or ... (c) to prevent the spread of false reports or reports likely
to cause disaffection to His Majesty or to interfere with the success of His
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theory was, in fact, well-grounded. Before the war the courts had
often endorsed a canon of construction dictating that statutes
implicating personal liberty should be narrowly interpreted,8 6 and
even during the war judges continued to affirm this rule. In R. v.
Secretary of State for Home Affairs ex parte Duke of Chateau
Thierry,8 7 for example, Chief Justice Reading contended that courts
"must not, particularly when dealing with personal liberty, strain the
language, and must be careful only to interpret the law reasonably
and naturally according to the language used. s88 Similarly, in In Re
Boaler8 9 Lord Justice Kennedy stated that statutes encroaching on
personal or property rights were "subject to a strict construction," and
he insisted that restrictions on such rights required more than "words
of general import."90
There was also evidence that Parliament did not contemplate
preventive detention, insofar as it intended anything specific at all.91
Majesty's forces . . .or (e) otherwise to prevent assistance being given to the
enemy or the successful prosecution of the war being endangered.
DORA Consolidation Act, 1914, 5 Geo. 5, c. 8, § 1(1)(a), (c), (e) (emphasis added). That
is, the government argued that the word "prevent" authorized executive detention, as
only in that way could the preventive objectives of the statute be effectuated. The lower
court, the Court of Appeal, and the House of Lords all accepted this argument, finding
that the provisions for punishment did not restrict what the government could do by
way of prevention. R. v. Halliday ex parte Zadig, [1916] 1 K.B. 738, 742, 744; Halliday,
[1917] A.C. at 276, 307.
86. In an important pre-war statement, Lord Halsbury declared in Cox v.
Hakes, 63 L.T.R. 392, 396-97 (H.L. 1890): "It is the right of personal freedom in this
country which is in debate, and I for one should be very slow to believe, except it was
done by express legislation, that the policy of centuries has been suddenly
reversed .. ". Pre-Halliday legal commentators agreed that infringements on civil
liberties could not be inferred from silence. Criticizing Regulation 14B when it was first
promulgated, the Solicitors' Journal doubted "whether there is power to interfere with
naturalized British subjects or neutrals unless it is expressly given by statute," adding
that as Parliament was sitting, "there would be no difficulty in getting statutory
authority for the regulation, if it is really required." The New Defence of the Realm
Regulations, 59 SOLIC. J. & WKLY. REP. 555, 557 (June 19, 1915). The Journal again
criticized the appropriateness of such a broad construction the following year. "It is a
principle of construction with regard to taxing Acts that they must be construed
strictly. It would seem to be a fortiori with regard to statutes interfering with personal
liberty." Comment, The Internment of British Subjects, 60 SOLIC. J. & WKLY. REP. 233,
233 (Jan. 29, 1916).
87. [1917] 1 K.B. 552.
88. Id. at 556. Applying that rule of construction, he concluded that there was
no power to make the deportation order at issue. Id.
89. [1915] 1 K.B. 21.
90. Id. at 34-35; see id. at 37 (Lord Scrutton stating that "unless its language
clearly convinces me that this was the intention of the Legislature I shall be slow to
give effect to what is a most serious interference with the liberties of the subject").
91. In the spring of 1916 an MP observed of DORA that few of his colleagues
were "taking any interest" in the passage of the measure. 80 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Cir.)
(Mar. 2, 1916) 1269. In the House of Lords, Lord Loreburn similarly noted with respect
to the first two DORA Acts that they "were passed in August when nobody was here,
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In March 1916, a member of Parliament objected to Regulation 14B
on the ground that at the time of DORA's passage it was "commonly
understood that all British subjects were to have legal access to the
Courts"; the government therefore could not issue regulations that
"make that resort in the end impossible. ' 92 Another member agreed
that the House of Commons "had no idea whatever" when it enacted
the DORA Amendment Act that it was "surrendering an immemorial
liberty."93 Indeed, he contended, the internment regulations are
"altogether apart from the intentions of Parliament. ' 94
Nonetheless, at no level of the judiciary did Zadig's argument
persuade the court. In the King's Bench, where five judges heard the
matter because of the importance of the case, the entire bench
rejected the application summarily. The judges made it clear that
they personally believed that internment was a necessary device for
winning the war. Mr. Justice Rowlatt's attitude was typical. "It seems
to me perfectly obvious," he observed, "that the control of the
movements of persons of hostile origins or association, and, if
necessary, the restriction of their liberty, is one of the most obvious
measures which may have to be taken in time of war for the public
safety. '95 The Court of Appeal rendered an equally cursory judgment,
concluding implausibly that DORA's general language about "safety
and defense" expressed Parliament's intention to allow internment
with "irresistible clearness."96
Zadig's advocacy fared no better in the House of Lords. Lord
Wrenbury voiced the view that there was no ground to support the
contention that express words were required when the liberty of the
subject was affected.9 7 Similarly, Lord Atkinson flatly rejected the
established canon that "statutes invading the liberty of the subject
should be construed after one manner, and statutes not invading it
and it was all done in a hurry." 18 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (Nov. 27, 1914) 216. Lord
Riddell, the press baron, objected that the legislation had taken place so rapidly that
"the measures have not been properly discussed." RIDDELL, supra note 40, at 41.
92. 80 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 2, 1916) 1256.
93. Id. at 1269.
94. Id.
95. R. v. Halliday ex parte Zadig, [19161 1 K.B. 738, 742. The judge refused to
infer any limitations on the general opening language referring to "public safety and
defense":
It is said that the words of the section must be read with a limitation because
they are followed by particular provisions authorizing regulations as to special
modes of trial and special punishments. But I can see nothing in those
provisions to restrict the broad generality of the opening part of the section.
Id.
96. Id. at 745.
97. R. v. Halliday exparte Zadig, [19171 A.C. 260, 307.
[VOL. 38..261
20051 JUDICIAL POWER IN ENGLAND DURING WORLD WAR 1 281
after another. 9 8 The general words in the statute about public safety
and defense, he observed, were "wide" and "new," and to construe
them narrowly only because they implicated the liberty of the subject
would be to "treat them as of none effect."99 He then articulated the
true basis of his decision: however "precious" the personal liberty of
the subject might be, it must be "sacrificed to achieve national
success in the war."1 00 Announcing a novel and troubling canon of
legislative construction in cases involving personal liberty, the House
of Lords thus firmly upheld the internment scheme.
Lord Shaw, the lone dissenter, pointed to the strained and
unprecedented character of the majority's analysis. To infer such
sweeping powers from general words without specific statutory
language, he declared, was tantamount to repealing the Magna
Charta, the Habeas Corpus Act, and the Bill of Rights-"laws and
liberties fundamental to British citizenship."'1 1 Parliament would not
have based such a "far-reaching subversion of our liberties"'01 2 on
mere implication, and the internment scheme was simply a "violent
exercise of arbitrary power."'1 3 The majority's method of statutory
construction, Lord Shaw charged, was a radical departure from
longstanding practice and precedent:
[T]he expanded construction adopted by the Courts below appears to me
in every one of these particulars to be inconsistent with those principles
of interpretation which have long been recognized. It is, I humbly think,
not simple, but strained. It is repugnant to the rest of the Act. It
operates repeal of statutes on an important and vast scale. It leads to
startling and absurd results and to an upheaval of constitutional
right.
1 0 4
98. Id. at 274. Similarly, Lord Swinfen Eady stated in the Court of Appeal: "It
is said that the general words of a statute ought not be construed so as to take away
the rights of the subject. But in the present case the language of the statute is free from
ambiguity and no assistance is to be obtained from any such rule." Halliday, [1916] 1
K.B. at 745.
99. Halliday, [1917] A.C. at 275.
100. Id. at 271.
101. Id. at 299.
102. Id. at 278. Moreover, he reasoned, since the jury trial provision in the
statute paid "meticulous regard" to judicial procedures, it was improbable that
Parliament had intended to allow the government to avoid such scrupulous protections
by the simple expedient of internment. Id. at 283-85. Lord Shaw also noted that during
the argument he had asked the Attorney General "why, on the same principle and in
exercise of the same power, may [a person] not be shot out of hand," and the Attorney
General had replied that "the graver result seemed to be perfectly logical." Id. at 291.
103. Id. at 277.
104. Id. at 303. He also observed that "[tihe construction I have ventured to
propose appears to me to be not unreasonable, but to square with every familiar and
accustomed canon. I think that the judgment of the Courts below is erroneous, and is
fraught with grave legal and constitutional danger." Id. at 305.
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Contemporary legal commentators agreed with Lord Shaw, insisting
that internment was undoubtedly beyond the scope of DORA. 0 5 In
the service of their pro-war activism, therefore, virtually every
member of the judiciary was willing to disregard longstanding
principles of statutory interpretation to authorize the detention of
British subjects, even though DORA contained detailed provisions
regarding trial by jury and did not specifically mention a right to
detain.
Another telling-and even less credible-inference from silence
appeared in a later detention case, R. v. Inspector of Cannon Row
Police Station ex parte Brady.10 6 In upholding an Irishman's
detention in England under a variant of Regulation 14B, the court
went beyond Halliday's finding that general statutory language could
support a specific internment policy. The Brady court ruled that a
statute's express authorization of detention in Ireland was equally
applicable to England. It reasoned that the statute's silence on
whether the term "Ireland" included England implied that "Ireland"
must be read to mean England as well.
Brady involved the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act
(ROIA),10 7 enacted in 1920 to deal with developing civil unrest in
105. See, e.g., Note, Lord Shaw's Judgment, 61 SOLIC. J. & WKLY. REP. 454, 454
(May 12, 1917). The Journal further observed:
We do not know if we were the first to question the validity of Regulation 14B,
under which a British subject can be imprisoned for an indefinite period
without being brought to trial and without-so far as we are aware-having
any charge formulated against him; but we took exception to the regulation
immediately it was made, and we have never doubted that it was really outside
the scope of the Defence of the Realm Acts.
Id. That it was technically intra vires had to be accepted as good law, "but a perusal of
Lord SHAW'S judgment shews how strong is the case on the other side." Id.; see Note,
Imprisonment on Suspicion, 61 SOLIC. J. 438 (1917) (criticizing the decisions in the
Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal). Similarly, the Law Quarterly Review
predicted that once the war was over, Lord Shaw's dissent would prove to be not
"unfounded." Note, 33 L.Q. REV. 205, 206 (July 1917). Nonetheless, there was little
popular disapproval of the decision. Justice of the Peace observed that although
detention without trial in peacetime would have caused an uproar, in "present
circumstances this decision will be greeted by the vast body of the British public with
great satisfaction." Note, The Internment of British Subjects, 80 J.P. 61, 61 (Feb. 5,
1916).
106. 37 T.L.R. 854 (K.B. 1921).
107. Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 31 [hereinafter
ROIA]. ROIA provided:
(1) Where it appears to His Majesty in Council that, owing to the existence of a
state of disorder in Ireland, the ordinary law is inadequate for the prevention
and punishment of crime or the maintenknce of order, His Majesty in Council
may issue regulations under the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914.
. . for securing the restoration and maintenance of order in Ireland.... (4) Any
such regulations may apply . . . either generally to the whole of Ireland or to
any part thereof...
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Ireland. The Act authorized the government to issue regulations
under the DORA Consolidation Act 1914 that might "apply either
generally to the whole of Ireland or to any part thereof."'10 8 In short
order the administration promulgated a regulation extending the
scope of detention to persons acting in a manner "prejudicial to the
restoration or maintenance of order in Ireland."'0 9 The authorities
used this new regulatory power extensively, interning three thousand
detainees by June 1921.110 One widely used strategy was to arrest
Irishmen in England and deport them to Ireland, where jury trial
was not available because Ireland had been under martial law since
the Easter Rebellion of 1916.111
One such detainee was Edward Brady, who had resided in
England for four years. A member of Sinn Fein, Brady was arrested
in Cheshire in June 1921 for "acts prejudicial" and detained in
London pending deportation to Ireland. Before his removal he sued in
habeas, claiming that the ROIA was limited to Ireland and that any
regulations authorizing detentions in England were ultra vires. The
court disagreed, obviously perceiving an imperative need to effectuate
governmental policy. As Mr. Justice Lawrence frankly stated, the
true issue was not law but expediency:
The purpose of the Act is to secure the restoration and maintenance of
order in Ireland, and for that purpose it has been thought necessary to
take certain executive action, free from the trammels of the ordinary
law, and, while one regrets that it should have been found necessary to
resort to that form of action, one must not shut one's eyes to the
necessities that arise for it.
112
To ensure that the point did not pass unnoticed, he added that it was
untenable that the "whole of England is open to persons acting in
Id. § 1(1), (4).
108. Id. § 1(4).
109. Id. § 1(1). Regulation 14B existed in Ireland in two forms, as it had also
been extended in 1918 to cover persons in Ireland suspected of "acts prejudicial"
against England in the war against Germany. See infra text accompanying notes 215-
17.
110. SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 28. Most internees obtained their release after
the creation of the Irish Free State on December 6, 1921. Id. at 29.
111. Id. at 18. During oral argument, Brady's counsel told the court that the
question was not a matter of mere academic interest because at least once a week the
Home Secretary arrested people in England and sent them to Ireland to be interned.
He argued that the government, in sending persons to a place where the right to jury
trial had been taken away by proclamation, had effected the "gravest invasion of
individual liberty that had ever occurred." Brady, 37 T.L.R. at 855.
112. R. v. Inspector of Cannon Row Police Station ex parte Brady, 125 L.T.R.
344, 346 (K.B. 1921).
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support of the disorder in Ireland without there being any power to
deal with them by executive action."113
To reach conspirators in England, however, the courts had to
rewrite the statute. The difficulty arose, as one judge in the King's
Bench acknowledged, from the "unfortunately phrased"114 section
specifying that the government's regulatory power extended to "the
whole of Ireland or to any part thereof." Conceding that the section by
its terms applied only to Ireland, Lord Bankes in the Court of Appeal
nonetheless reasoned that there was "nothing in that from which it
could be inferred that, under the Act, England was excluded."115
Using similar logic, Lord Warrington stated simply that "if it were
intended to restrict the effect of the statute to Ireland, such a
provision would be made in express terms. ' 116 Lord Scrutton, in a
solitary dissent, helplessly made the obvious point. If silence meant
inclusion, he protested, the Act might equally apply to Australia. 117
The court thus again exploited silence-even more aggressively in the
case of an Irishman than a naturalized German-to uphold what it
viewed as an essential policy of Irish control. It was patently clear
that the judges, not the legislature, were the source of the necessary
administrative powers.
2. Conscription: Policymaking Through Selective Construction
Decisions under the Military Service Act similarly revealed how
the courts manipulated statutory language to suit their strategic
purposes, in this case by treating draft exemptions so narrowly that
potential conscripts could not escape military service. To this end the
courts selectively enforced certain legislative clauses and provisions
113. Id. The Court of Appeal assumed it was obvious that persons in England
were actively plotting with people in Ireland. Brady v. Gibb, 37 T.L.R. 975, 976-77 (C.A.
1921).
114. Brady, 37 T.L.R. at 856 (per Lord Shearman).
115. Brady, 37 T.L.R. at 976.
116. Id. at 977.
117. Id. Lord Scrutton dissented because he employed the opposite presumption
and could not find express language that the Act applied. He observed:
[Blefore the liberty of the subject could be infringed, one must find in the Act of
Parliament dealing with the subject a clear expression of the Legislature to
that effect. At the beginning of the year 1914 it was inconceivable that an
officer of the Executive should be entitled to detain a British subject without
making some definite legal charge against him. Any Court would say that clear
words to that effect must of necessity appear in the statutes besides indicating
the act of restraint which might be justifiable.
Id. He also remarked that criminal charges against the appellant had been heard and
dismissed, which showed "how necessary it was that a British citizen, charged with an
offence, should have an opportunity of meeting it in open Court." Id.
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over others in evident disregard of parliamentary-and, indeed, even
governmental-intent.
The Military Service Act 1916,118 introducing conscription to
England for the first time in the nation's history, was presented to
Parliament on January 5, 1916 and passed its third reading three
weeks later. 119 Every male British subject "ordinarily resident" in
Great Britain between the ages of eighteen and forty-one was
"deemed" to be enlisted for the period of the war.120 The Act provided
for exemptions if a conscript suffered from financial problems,
domestic hardship, or ill-health; performed necessary war work; or
held a "conscientious objection to the undertaking of combatant
service."'121 The term "conscientious objector" thus made its first
linguistic appearance. 122
New administrative agencies known as military service tribunals
awarded the certificates of exemption, which could be "absolute,
conditional, or temporary."'123 A conscript whose application to the
local tribunal was rejected had the right to appeal first to an Appeal
Tribunal and then to a Central Tribunal. 124 If the draftee did not
obtain a certificate, he was not subject to imprisonment; rather, when
he failed to report for service he was arrested, charged before a
magistrate, transferred to the military authorities, and enlisted as a
soldier for the duration of the war. 125 During World War I two types
118. Military Service Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104.
119. Only thirty-eight MPs voted against the measure. See, e.g., JO VELLACOTT,
BERTRAND RUSSELL AND THE PACIFISTS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR 32 (1980). Vellacott
explained how potential opponents were brought on board: Labour was bought off by a
commitment not to undertake industrial conscription, the Irish members by a provision
exempting Ireland from the Act, and Liberals by the conscience clause. Id. at 31.
120. Military Service Act, § 1(1)(a).
121. Id. § 2(1)(a)-(d).
122. See ARTHUR MARWICK, BRITAIN IN THE CENTURY OF TOTAL WAR: WAR,
PEACE AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 1900-1967, at 70 (1968).
123. Military Service Act § 2(1), (3).
124. Id. § 2(7). Most of the 16,000 objectors eventually accepted some kind of
alternative service. See, e.g., J.M. BOURNE, BRITAIN AND THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1918, at
212-13 (1989); JOHN W. GRAHAM, CONSCRIPTION AND CONSCIENCE: A HISTORY, 1916-
1919, at 348 (1922). A leaflet of the Friends' Service Committee in 1919 claimed that
5,600 conscientious objectors had been court-martialed, 3,300 accepted non-combatant
service, 3,000 were engaged in medical or similar work, and 4,000 undertook other
work of national importance. See F.L. CARSTEN, WAR AGAINST WAR: BRITISH AND
GERMAN RADICAL MOVEMENTS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR 68-69 (1982). The 1,500
"absolutists" were treated very harshly, "being subjected to a dismal treadmill of arrest,
court-martial, imprisonment (with hard labour), release, arrest, court-martial,
imprisonment and so on." MARWICK, supra note 122, at 70.
125. During debate on the bill on January 18, 1916, the Prime Minister stated
that persons who did not choose to go. before the tribunal would not be subject to
imprisonment. The scheme of the bill was "automatic enlistment of the unmarried for
military service without the necessity of haling a man before a criminal tribunal." THE
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF CONSCRIPTION IN GREAT BRITAIN 135 (Richard C. Lambert
ed., 1917) [hereinafter PARL. HIST.].
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of conscripts challenged their denial of exemption in the courts:
conscientious objectors, expressly excused by the Act, and persons
claiming they did not meet the statutory criterion of being a "British
subject."
a. Conscientious Objectors
Britain was the first major war power to adopt a conscience
exemption, followed only by the United States later in the war.12 6
When Prime Minister Asquith first brought up the matter in the
House of Commons, he was greeted with contemptuous laughter. 12 7
Pacifist organizations, however, supported by a group of Liberal and
Labour MPs, exerted sufficient pressure to secure the exemption in
an amendment to the Act. 12 8
In carrying out their obligations to adjudicate exemption claims,
the tribunals had difficulty in applying the conscience clause because
of an ambiguity in its phrasing. The relevant clause provided: "Any
certificate of exemption may be absolute, conditional, or temporary,
as the authority by whom it was granted think best suited to the
case, and also in the case of an application on conscientious grounds,
may take the form of an exemption from combatant service only."'129
This wording was open to two interpretations: either exemption from
combatant service was the sole exemption available to conscientious
objectors, or it was an additional alternative to the options of
"absolute, conditional, or temporary." The language led to
inconsistencies, with many tribunals refusing to grant absolute
exemption to those applying on conscience grounds. 130
126. See, e.g., Keith Robbins, The British Experience of Conscientious Objection,
in FACING ARMAGEDDON 691, 693 (Hugh Cecil & Peter H. Liddle eds., 1990). On
conscientious objection generally, see R.J.O. ADAMS & PHILIP P. POIRIER, THE
CONSCRIPTION CONTROVERSY IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1900-1918 (1987); CARSTEN, supra
note 124; MARTIN CEADEL, PACIFISM IN BRITAIN, 1914-1945: THE DEFINING OF A FMTH
(1980); GRAHAM, supra note 124; THOMAS C. KENNEDY, THE HOUSE OF CONSCIENCE: A
HISTORY OF THE No-CONSCRIPTION FELLOWSHIP, 1914-1919 (1981); E. SYLVIA
PANKHURST, THE HOME FRONT (1932); JOHN RAE, CONSCIENCE AND POLITICS: THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR TO MILITARY SERVICE, 1916-
1919 (1970); KEITH ROBBINS, THE ABOLITION OF WAR: THE 'PEACE MOVEMENT' IN
BRITAIN, 1914-1919 (1976); BERTRAND RUSSELL, JUSTICE IN WAR TIME (1917); WE DID
NOT FIGHT: 1914-18 EXPERIENCES OF WAR RESISTERS (Julian Bell ed., 1935); Lois
Bibbings, State Reaction to Conscientious Objection, in FRONTIERS OF CRIMINALITY 57
(Ian Loveland ed., 1995).
127. ROBBINS, supra note 126, at 78, 693. He replied, however, that the
provision was in accordance with British traditions. Id. at 78.
128. See, e.g., MARWICK, supra note 122, at 70-71; ROBBINS, supra note 126, at
692-93.
129. Military Service Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104, § 2(3).
130. See PARL. HIST., supra note 125, at 164; RAE, supra note 126, at 31;
Bibbings, supra note 126, at 61-64.
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Nonetheless, the latter interpretation was manifestly the more
plausible one. That an exemption "may take" rather than "shall take"
the form of an exemption from combatant service surely implied that
the other alternatives-absolute, conditional, and temporary-
remained open. Even more compelling, the government stated during
debate on the bill that absolute exemption was available, 131 and it
subsequently made strenuous efforts to correct any confusion on this
score. On March 23, 1916, the President of the Local Government
Board wrote to all tribunals expressly to correct the misimpression
that absolute exemption was not an option, 132 and four days later he
held a conference of tribunal chairmen to reiterate this official
position. 133 The tribunals continued to act erratically, however, and it
eventually fell to the King's Bench to resolve the issue in April 1916.
Frank Parton, a law student, had applied to the Chertsey local
tribunal for a conscience exemption. 134 When the tribunal exempted
him from combatant service only, he invoked the two-tiered appellate
review process. 135 The Croydon Appeal Tribunal affirmed the local
tribunal on the ground that Parton remained dependent on his
father, the managing director of a munitions works.136 Tribunal
members reasoned that since Parton's income partly derived from the
manufacture of munitions, he did not deserve an exemption from
non-combatant service. 13 7 When the Central Tribunal denied Parton's
further appeal, insisting that his exemption from combat was
conditional on his undertaking ambulance work, Parton applied to
the High Court for writs of mandamus and certiorari. 138
At the oral argument, Mr. Justice Darling's antagonism was
apparent. He accused Parton of having "the same objection to saving
life as to taking it,"'1 39 and further charged him with hypocrisy: "How
does he reconcile it with his conscience to take advantage of the
131. Sir John Simon stated in the House of Commons in May 1916 that the
power of local tribunals to grant absolute exemption "was most expressly stated by the
Government when the Bill was carried." PARL. HIST., supra note 125, at 329. Although
the Cabinet's view at the time of drafting was ambiguous, the government
subsequently made clear that it accepted absolute exemption. See RAE, supra note 126,
at 31.
132. See GRAHAM, supra note 124, at 67, 83; RAE, supra note 126, at 119. Walter
Long, president of the Local Government Board, stated in the House of Commons in
February 1916 that instructions had been issued "which make the matter quite clear"
that absolute exemption was available. 80 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Feb. 21, 1916)
412; see also 81 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 23, 1916) 353; PARL. HIST., supra note
125, at 204.
133. See RAE, supra note 126, at 119.
134. R. v. Central Tribunal ex parte Parton, 32 T.L.R. 476, 476 (K.B. 1916).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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protection given to his life and property, which finally depends on
force?" 140 Casting aside any pretense of partiality, he then declared:
"He ought really to be an outlaw, ought he not?"141 Not surprisingly,
the judge's ruling mirrored his hostility. Despite the government's
unequivocal and well-publicized policy of allowing objectors to apply
for absolute exemption, he announced that this category was open
only to persons applying on the basis of occupation, hardship, and
health. He offered no analysis, suggesting that the correct
interpretation of the statute was perfectly obvious. Nor did he ever
refer to the government's widely circulated contrary interpretation.
"There was no right," the judge declared flatly, "to object on
conscientious grounds to military service. ' 142 Relying by his own
admission on "common sense" rather than statutory language or
ministerial construction, he concluded that "it was unreasonable to
give a right to object to one form of service in order to obtain
exemption from all other forms."'1 43
Parton was a warrior's decision out of line with the intentions of
both Parliament and the government. Indeed, Parliament
immediately rejected it, enacting a second Military Service Act in
May 1916 providing unequivocally that objectors were eligible for all
statutory forms of exemption. 144 Nonetheless, Parton's influence was
pervasive, and many local tribunals continued to rule that objectors
were eligible only for exemption from combatant duties. 145 The King's
Bench thus played a significant role in the recruitment campaign.
b. Dual Nationals
The courts deprived dual nationals of relief from military service
as well, disregarding an explicit statutory provision recognizing their
right to declare alienage upon becoming adults. The Military Service
Act 1916 provided that every "male British subject" of a certain age
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 477.
143. Id. Another judge agreed, but the third judge, while concurring in the
result, said he was not prepared to hold that the tribunal had no power to grant
absolute exemption in the case of the conscientious objector. Id. Mr. Justice Darling,
although perhaps the most virulently anti-German member of the judiciary, see
ANDREW, supra note 72, at 189, was not alone in his attitude toward conscientious
objectors. Even Lord Scrutton, one of the judges most sympathetic to civil liberties, was
antagonistic. See Scrutton, supra note 41, at 131 (suggesting that conscientious
objectors were anarchistic).
144. Military Service Act (Sess. 2), 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 15. The new language
stated: "It is hereby declared that the power to grant special certificates of exemption
in the case of an application on conscientious grounds .. .is additional to and not in
derogation of the general power conferred by that Act to grant an absolute, conditional,
or temporary certificate in such cases." Id. § 4(3); see GRAHAM, supra note 124, at 73.
145. GRAHAM, supra note 124, at 300; Bibbings, supra note 126, at 65.
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was deemed to have enlisted for the duration of the war. 146 The
question was how this provision interrelated with the British
Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 191414 7-passed, significantly,
after war broke out-which enabled any natural-born subject, who at
his birth or during his minority became also the subject of a foreign
state, to make a declaration of alienage upon attaining his majority
and in so doing "cease to be a British subject."'148
In the course of the war, the courts eviscerated the option
supposedly available to dual nationals to declare alienage and
thereby become ineligible for British military service. Successively,
they blocked the escape route for a minor drafted before he had the
opportunity to declare alienage, a conscript who reached adulthood
while serving in the army and attempted to declare alienage at that
time, an adult soldier who had successfully declared himself the
national of a neutral country, and a draftee who was concededly an
enemy alien. In reaching these decisions, the courts applied
provisions of the Military Service Act selectively while arbitrarily
dismissing relevant provisions of the British Nationality Act. The
consequence was that anyone who was a dual citizen when drafted
was required to serve in the army for the duration of the war,
regardless of any change or attempted change in his citizenship.
Sawyer v. Kropp,149 the first case to reach the courts, concerned
a minor of German parentage who was born in London and
"ordinarily resident" in Great Britain. At the time of the litigation,
Kropp's father was serving in the German army.150 A metropolitan
police magistrate refused to convict the young man for failing to
appear for military service, concluding that army service would
preclude him from making a declaration of alienage upon coming of
age.151 In the magistrate's view, it would be "contrary to all principles
of law and equity" to take advantage of his infancy before he had the
opportunity to make an alienage declaration. 152 Kropp's lawyer
pointed out to the court that since his client was a German national
under German law, if he served in the British army he would be
guilty of high treason in Germany. 153
The Divisional Court showed little sympathy. Acknowledging
that Kropp had the right to cease being a British subject upon coming
of age, it applied a literal interpretation of the clause in the Military
146. Military Service Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104, § 1(1).
147. British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 17.
148. Id. § 14(1).
149. 85 L.J.K.B. 1446 (1916).
150. Id. at 1446.
151. Id. at 1446-47.
152. Id. at 1447.
153. Id.
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Service Act that "British subjects were deemed to have enlisted.'1 54 It
found that since Kropp had not yet attained his majority, he was still
a British subject when drafted and therefore validly conscripted: "The
respondent is a British subject, and is liable to serve, and we cannot
enter into the consequent inconveniences."'155 The court thus reduced
taking up arms against one's father and committing treason against
one's country to mere "inconveniences" of no legal consequence. 156
In R. v. Commanding Officer of 30th Battalion ex parte
Freyberger,157 the judiciary went one step further, denying the right
to declare alienage not to a soldier who might declare foreign
citizenship in the future but to one whose right had already matured.
Freyberger was a dual subject of Britain and Austria who was called
up in 1916. Upon turning twenty-one in 1917, he made a declaration
of alienage and claimed a discharge from the army. When the
military refused, he applied for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing in
the King's Bench that he had become a British soldier only subject to
his right to declare alienage upon attaining his majority. The words
and meaning of section 14 of the British Nationality Act, he
contended, were "quite plain and unambiguous.' 158
Revealingly, Lord Reading agreed that, "taken literally,"'159
section 14 of the British Nationality Act gave the applicant a right to
cease being a British subject after he came of age, and he
acknowledged that he reached his conclusion "notwithstanding
section 14 of the Act of 1914."160 Stymied by the express statutory
language, the judge based his decision on a surprising alternate
source-"general" principles of British and international law. The
British Nationality Act, he insisted, rather than being interpreted by
its own express terms, should be read "subject to the general
principle of British law, which is also a rule recognized in
international law, that a subject cannot divest himself of his
allegiance to the Crown by becoming a naturalized subject of an
enemy State during a period of war."16 1 Despite the court's
attribution of such a "general principle" to British law, there was no
credible authority for it. Indeed, the only case the court cited in
support of the proposition was R. v. Lynch, 162 a 1903 decision holding
that a wholly British subject could not adopt enemy nationality in the
154. Military Service Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104, § 4(3).
155. Kropp, 85 L.J.K.B. at 1447-48.
156. Indeed, Mr. Justice Atkin stated somewhat illogically that there was "no
inconvenience at all" because "until he has made [his] declaration ... he remains a
British subject." Id. at 1448.
157. [1917] 2 K.B. 129 (C.A.).
158. Id. at 131.
159. Id. at 132.
160. Id. at 133.
161. Id. at 132.
162. [1903] 1 K.B. 444.
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middle of the Boer War. The situation in Lynch was not remotely
analogous to that of a person already a citizen of an enemy state who
had an express statutory right to "cease being a British subject" and
embrace only his enemy status.
The Court of Appeal denied Freyberger the right to declare
alienage under a different but equally unconvincing analysis. It found
that even if he could divest himself of British nationality and become
an alien, he was still statutorily obligated to serve in the British
army.163 Rather than relying on international law, Lord Swinfen
Eady pointed to the language in the Military Service Act that
specified that British subjects were deemed enlisted "for the period of
the war."'164 Even assuming that the petitioner could become an alien,
that did not mean that he was entitled to a discharge from the army,
as "[t]he Act does not so provide."'165 Thus, in contrast to Halliday
and Brady, the court interpreted a statute's silence about a particular
option-the right to a discharge based on alienage-to mean that the
option was not available. Freyberger, the court concluded, was a
British subject when the Military Service Act was passed and was
required to remain in the army until the war was over. 16 6 The
decision ignored the fact that Parliament, in declaring only "British
subjects" eligible for conscription, had obviously not intended aliens-
certainly not enemy aliens-to serve in the British army. The Court
of Appeal thus advanced the war as it saw fit, even if it meant
disregarding parliamentary intent in two separate statutes. 167
The far-reaching implications of Freyberger were spelled out in a
case involving a Swiss dual national, Dawson v. Meuli,168 in which
the court ruled that even a valid declaration of alienage-that is, one
officially accepted by the British government-would not relieve a
163. Freyberger, [1917] 2 K.B. at 135.
164. Id. at 139.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. A question left open in Freyberger was whether in wartime a person of dual
nationality could become a subject of a neutral if not enemy state. Id. at 136. In 1917
this issue came before the High Court in Vecht v. Taylor, 116 L.T.R. 446 (K.B. 1917),
but the court managed to avoid deciding it directly. Moses Vecht, a British subject,
registered as a Dutch national in 1915. He intended his registration to be a declaration
of alienage, but he failed to do it in the correct statutory form. On November 8, 1916, he
was arrested for draft evasion, and a magistrate adjourned his case to November 15.
On November 9, apparently alerted to the formal problem with his earlier registration,
Vecht made a correct declaration of alienage. The High Court simply stated that
nothing the appellant had done after November 8 could be an answer to the charge; in
other words, he had been already been drafted and that was the end of the matter.
Although the court did not reach the question whether a person could become a citizen
of a friendly state in wartime, Lord Reading implied that Freyberger had decided the
question in the negative. Id. at 447. The issue was finally resolved in favor of the
military in Gschwind v. Huntington, [1918] 2 K.B. 420. See infra text accompanying
notes 174-80.
168. Dawson v. Meuli, 118 L.T.R. 357 (K.B. 1918).
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person from military service. Meuli had made his declaration of
alienage while serving in the reserves before being called up to active
service, and the court was forced to acknowledge that the Home
Office had registered him as an alien. 169 At the time of the litigation,
therefore, everyone accepted that Meuli held the status of a Swiss
national only.170 Nonetheless, adopting the reasoning in Freyberger,
the King's Bench ruled that a person who legally became a citizen of
another country could still not avoid the army. 171 According to Mr.
Justice Darling, the mere fact that a dual national ceased to be a
British subject did not mean that he had ceased to be a British
soldier: "A man may serve as a soldier in the army of a State to which
he owes no allegiance."' 172 The judge analogized Meuli's situation to
that of mercenaries, who were soldiers of the country that employed
them "although they were not subjects of it and owed no allegiance to
it." 1
7 3
In Gschwind v. Huntington,174 another case involving an adult
who had successfully registered as a Swiss subject, the court took the
final step. Unlike Meuli, however, Gschwind had not changed his
status while in the armed services; rather, he had made his
successful declaration of alienage in April 1917, a full seven months
before he received his call-up orders. 175 His attorney argued that he
was not liable for service since he was not a British subject when
conscripted.176 The court, however, found that the applicable date
was not the date of Gschwind's conscription but rather that of the
passage of the Military Service Act. 177 In the view of the court,
nothing made any difference-neither the Home Office's acceptance
of the declaration of alienage nor the nationality that the person
169. Id. at 359. Meuli had been born in England in 1892, the son of Swiss
parents. He had offered himself for enlistment twice in 1915 and on each occasion had
been rejected on medical grounds. He was called up for military service and placed in
the reserve as of October 1, 1916. On October 13 he made a declaration of alienage,
which was returned to him by the Home Office as registered on January 16, 1917. Upon
being called up for permanent service in October 1917, he failed to present himself. He
was in fact a member of the Swiss army and had paid 140 francs for a temporary
exemption expiring in 1918. The magistrates were of the opinion that he was not liable
for military service. Id. at 358.
170. Id. at 357-58.
171. Id. at 359.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. [1918] 2 K.B. 420.
175. Id. at 421.
176. Id. at 422. Gschwind's attorney distinguished Freyberger on the ground that
the petitioner in that case was an enemy and the declaration had never been accepted
by the Home Office, Vecht on the basis that the appellant had not made the declaration
until after he had been charged by a magistrate, and Meuli on the ground that the
respondent had not made his declaration until after he had been called up. Id. at 422-
23. The court rejected all these distinctions. Id. at 424-25.
177. Id. at 424.
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elected. 178 The Act, the judges pointed out, did not contain any
exceptions. 179 Thus, the courts progressed through a series of
increasingly ambitious rulings, eventually concluding that dual
nationals of every conceivable type were "British subjects" for
purposes of military service. Although the Home Secretary had
explicitly declared to Parliament in 1916 that "the Military Service
Act does not apply to aliens,"' 80 the position of the courts was that
even a person whom the government had officially recognized as an
enemy alien before being conscripted was required to serve in the
British army.
The military service cases, therefore, whether dealing with
conscientious objectors or dual nationals, disclosed the judiciary's
selective and quite purposeful use of statutory construction. To reach
their goals, the judges chose the least plausible interpretation of the
conscience clause and selected a provision of one statute (the Military
Service Act) to control another (the British Nationality Act).
Moreover, they applied varying and inconsistent canons of
construction, in some cases inferring additional powers from silence
while in others adopting narrow and literal interpretations of textual
language. On certain occasions they followed the parliamentary
language with a rigid exactitude, while at other times they looked
beyond express provisions to adopt constructions based on "general
principles" and "international norms." Although the Military Service
Act sought to fill the army with "British subjects" and the British
Nationality Act allowed dual nationals to shed that status, the courts
disregarded parliamentary intent to further their own independent
policy of channeling all available manpower into the military.
3. Deportation: Circumventing Parliamentary Restraints
In a third sphere implicating personal liberty-deportation-the
judges adopted yet another tactic to circumvent parliamentary intent.
Here, they enabled the government to accomplish an avowed political
objective despite ruling in the very same case that the applicable
statute proscribed it. R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs ex parte
Duke of Chateau Thierry'8s quite unabashedly allowed the Home
178. Id. at 423.
179. Id. The government, however, had stated something quite different in the
House of Commons. The Secretary of State for War declared in 1916 that a dual citizen
of neutral nationality would not be called up during his minority if he intended to adopt
the alien nationality exclusively, and that after reaching age twenty-one such a man
could avoid service by submitting within two months a declaration of alienage to the
Home Office. 86 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Oct. 25, 1916) 1141-42.
180. 85 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Aug. 23, 1916) 2673.
181, [1917] 1 K.B. 922 (C.A.).
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Secretary to do indirectly what the judges themselves declared was
impermissible for him to do directly.
Deportation orders, which emanated from the Home Office and
applied only to aliens, were based on section 1 of ARA.' 82 Neither the
statute nor its implementing regulations imposed any particular
requirements on the government. The Act simply authorized the
Home Secretary to issue an order "for the deportation of aliens,"
18 3
and the regulation stated merely that the Home Secretary "may order
the deportation of any alien."'1 84 Both, obviously, concerned removal
from the United Kingdom.
Chateau Thierry dealt with a French citizen seeking to avoid
service in the French army. The government had no particular
interest simply in removing him from England, since he was not
undesirable except for his attempt to skirt the draft of an allied
nation.185 As the Divisional Court noted, he was not a person "unfit"
to remain in the country "for any other reason than that he was
required to attend in France."'8 6 Indeed, he seems to have been a
gentleman well known in social circles in London.187 There was,
however, another factor. The government desired to effectuate a
treaty with France whereby each country would return subjects of the
other who were liable to military service. Chateau Thierry was a test
case; the Home Secretary wanted a legal opinion on whether, given
that the statute and regulation only allowed the minister to deport
"out" of the United Kingdom, a deportation order could lawfully
182. 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 1(1)(c).
183. ARA section 1(1) provided that in time of war or imminent national danger
His Majesty could "by Order in Council impose restrictions on aliens, and provision
may be made by the Order . . . (c) for the deportation of aliens from the United
Kingdom .. .[or] (k) for any other matters which appear necessary or expedient with a
view to the safety of the realm." Id. § 1(1)(c), (k).
184. Article 12 stated:
A Secretary of State may order the deportation of any alien, and any alien with
respect to whom such an order is made shall forthwith leave and thereafter
remain out of the United Kingdom.... Where an alien is ordered to be deported
under this Order, he may, until he can, in the opinion of the Secretary of State,
be conveniently conveyed to and placed on board a ship about to leave the
United Kingdom, and whilst being conveyed to the ship, and whilst on board
the ship until the ship finally leaves the United Kingdom, be detained in such a
manner as the Secretary of State directs, and, whilst so detained, shall be
deemed to be in legal custody.
Aliens Restriction (Consolidation) Order, 1914, art. 12, cl. 1-2.
185. R. v. Sec'y of State for Home Affairs ex parte Duke of Chateau Thierry,
[19171 1 K.B. 552, 552-53 (C.A.).
186. Id. at 556.
187. 90 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Feb. 7, 1917) 53.
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specify a particular port of arrival'18 8 The Divisional Court, looking
behind the order, found that its object was to deport Thierry to
France, and it quashed the direction as beyond the Home Secretary's
powers.1
8 9
The Court of Appeal agreed that deportation to a particular
country to implement a treaty with France was impermissible under
ARA, 190 but it refused to allow such a statutory prohibition to
obstruct the government from accomplishing its objective. Although
ARA did not authorize the Home Secretary to deport an alien to
France, the court reasoned, it did permit him to choose the ship on
which he would sail.191 The result, the court pointed out with
satisfaction, might be that an alien would have to "disembark in the
country to which it was desired that he should go.' 192 On its face the
order was "perfectly good,"' 93 since it only directed Chateau Thierry's
deportation; the fact that he would disembark in France was not an
"absolutely necessary consequence of the deportation order."'194 One
can imagine Lord Scrutton caustically observing, along the lines of
his dissent in Brady, that presumably the deportee could jump
overboard and swim to Australia. Thus, the Court of Appeal declined
to look behind a formal order obviously intended to effectuate
precisely what the court itself had ruled impermissible. As in their
exemption decisions, the judges ardently promoted the mobilization
effort.
4. Exclusion: Setting Minimal Standards
The exclusion cases revealed another judicial technique for
expanding executive powers-namely, manipulating legal standards
of review and burdens of proof. In excluding persons from certain
geographical areas, the courts held, the military authority need have
only a subjective belief that a person was dangerous. Further, the
188. [1917] 1 K.B. at 933 (C.A.) (Lord Pickford observing that the Attorney
General had asked the court to decide whether the Home Secretary had the power to
deport an alien to a specified destination).
189. Chateau Thierry, [1917] 1 K.B. at 556-57. The Divisional Court noted that
in form the order was correct, "but this Court must look behind the mere form" to
determine whether the intention was to deport the alien to a particular country. Id. at
555.
190. Chateau Thierry, [1917] 1 K.B. at 936-37. It is not clear why the court felt
itself unable to interpret the Act to encompass this objective, given the broad
deportation provisions of ARA and the courts' general ease in construing wartime
statutes affecting liberty in a manner that expanded governmental powers. Regardless,
the important point is that the courts concluded that deportation to a particular place
was unlawful under the statute but effectuated it anyway.
191. Id. at 937.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 932, 934.
194. Id. at 934.
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burden of proving that the officer did not have such an honest belief
rested on the person affected-a burden almost impossible to carry.
In the exclusion context, the courts interpreted not a statute but
a regulation, thus showing themselves eager to tell the government
what it properly meant to say. Based on DORA Regulation 14, the
exclusion power derived from the government's general competency
to regulate for the safety and defense of the realm. Applicable both to
aliens and British subjects, the regulation provided that if a person
"is suspected of acting, or of having acted, or of being about to act in a
manner prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the Realm,"
the person might be prohibited from "residing in or entering any
locality. 1 95 Exclusion orders issued from the local military authority
rather than the Home Secretary, and between 1914 and 1918 the
army removed or excluded a total of 612 people from particular
areas.
196
Rejecting even a general "reasonableness" standard, two
principal cases interpreted the regulation to require that the military
authority's suspicion of prejudicial acts be merely "honest." In R. v.
Denison 97 Herman Nagele, a dealer in human hair, sought to quash
an order removing him from the district where he resided. He had
been born in Germany but had settled in England at the age of
sixteen and married an Englishwoman in 1908.198 Twice he was
convicted and fined for failing to cover the roof area of his factory,
thereby breaching the DORA lighting regulations. 199 When the
military authority ordered him to leave his district and reside in one
of four other specified areas, Nagele challenged the order on the
ground that the regulation required a "reasonable" as well as
"honest" suspicion. 200 He contended that the court could not give
effect to the "startling" proposition that the legislature "had handed
over to a single man without appeal a power of this kind."
20 1
The King's Bench thought otherwise, interpreting the regulation
to require only a subjective belief on the part of the military
authority. In reaching this conclusion, it invoked the exigencies of the
military situation: "It was well to bear in mind that these regulations
195. DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 27, at Reg. 14. Once the military
authority suspected prejudicial acts, it must merely appear "desirable" that such
person be barred from a locality. Id.
196. See EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 55 n.78. It was used in particular to
exclude persons from Ireland, see 74 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Oct. 13, 1915) 1283; 90
PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Feb. 26, 1917) 1796, and to remove trade union leaders
from areas of active union activity such as Clydeside. See EWING & GEARTY, supra note
2, at 71; MARWICK, supra note 122, at 100.
197. 32 T.L.R. 528 (K.B. 1916).
198. Id. at 528.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 529.
201. Id.
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were made in pursuance of an emergency statute, passed for the
purposes of war, and designed to confer extraordinary powers during
the war."20 2 The court also noted without comment that it was the
applicant's burden to prove that the respondent did not honestly
suspect him.20 3 Dubious about this construction of the regulation, the
Solicitors'Journal quickly responded that it "clearly places individual
liberty too much at the mercy of military authority."20 4
The test established in Denison was approved by the Court of
Appeal in Ronnfeldt v. Phillips.20 5 Ronnfeldt, a Welsh coal exporter of
German parentage, was ordered to leave the Cardiff area within four
days because of suspected pro-German sympathies. 20 6 Ronnfeldt's
father had expressed satisfaction at a dinner about the sinking of the
Lusitania, and Ronnfeldt himself was rumored to have predicted that
"the Kaiser's head would soon be on the coinage of this country.
20 7
Although the trial judge thought that the military authority had
"very, very little ground for suspecting,"20 8 and the Court of Appeal
sympathized with Ronnfeldt for being displaced from his home and
business for four years, 20 9 both courts nonetheless concluded that he
had not met his burden of showing that the military authority did not
"honestly suspect. '2 10 In assigning the burden of proof, the lower
court simply observed that the burden "must be cast on the
plaintiff."'211 Lord Bankes in the Court of Appeal endorsed this
approach on the ground that "we are not living in ordinary times.
212
In a period of national peril, he explained, "[h]onest mistakes may be
made, and must be endured as one of the many misfortunes of this
lamentable war. '213
5. The Irish Rebellion: Manipulating Technicalities
Judicial decisions dealing with unrest in Ireland illustrated yet
another calculated technique employed by the courts to promote their
political agenda. To enhance the government's powers in Ireland, a
year after the Armistice the King's Bench linked the suppression of
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Note, Removal by Military Authorities Under Suspicion, 60 SOLIC. J. &
WKLY. REP. 505, 506 (May 27, 1916). It also commented that the Denison case well
illustrated the "growing tendency of the Executive Government towards the despotic
user of its regulation-making powers." Id.
205. [19181 W.N. 328 (C.A.).
206. Ronnfeldt v. Phillips, 34 T.L.R. 556 (K.B. 1918).
207. Id. at 557.
208. Id.
209. Ronnfeldt, [1918] W.N. at 329.
210. Id.; Ronnfeldt, 34 T.L.R. at 557.
211. Ronnfeldt, 34 T.L.R. at 557.
212. Ronnfeldt, [1918] W.N. at 329.
213. Id.
298 VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
domestic turmoil to success in a war already won. Relying on the
technicality that the war was not officially over, the court authorized
executive detention of an Irish rebel in 1920 on the ground that his
conduct might weaken England in its fight against Germany.2 1 4
In January 1920 the Chief Secretary for Ireland arrested Patrick
Foy, a twenty-year-old Dublin shop assistant, and interned him in
Wormwood Scrubs Prison in England on suspicion of "acts
prejudicial" under an amended Regulation 14B.2 15 The regulation
had been expanded in April 1918 to permit the internment of persons
suspected of acting "in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or
the defence of the Realm."216 This criterion, broader than "hostile
origins or associations," applied only where the operation of jury trial
had been suspended because of an "invasion or other special
emergency arising out of the present war"-that is, in Ireland. 217 The
peace treaty with Germany had been signed on January 10, but
treaties with three other enemy states were incomplete and thus the
war technically continued. 2 18 Foy's counsel, Sir John Simon, former
Home Secretary and architect of DORA, argued that Regulation 14B
was directed only at protecting the country from foreign foes during
wartime. It was, he contended, ultra vires to use it to suppress
internal rebellion during the war and a fortiori after it had been
won.
2 19
214. R. v. Governor of Wormwood Scrubs Prison ex parte Foy, 36 T.L.R. 432
(K.B. 1920).
215. Id. at 432-33.
216. The amended Regulation 14B provided:
In any area in respect of which the operation of section 1 of the Defence of the
Realm (Amendment) Act, 1915, is for the time being suspended, this regulation
shall apply in relation to any person who is suspected of acting, or having acted,
or of being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or the
defence of the Realm, as it applies in relation to persons of hostile origin or
association.
DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 27, at Reg. 14B(1)(6); see Foy, 36 T.L.R. at 433.
217. In April 1916, after the Easter rebellion, the King invoked the following
clause in the DORA Amendment Act: "In the event of invasion or other special military
emergency arising out of the present war, His Majesty may by Proclamation forthwith
suspend the operation of this section [allowing for jury trial], either generally or as
respects any area specified in the proclamation." DORA (Amendment) Act, Mar. 16,
1915, § 1(7). The Crown issued a proclamation reciting that "the present state of affairs
in Ireland is such as to constitute a special military emergency," and suspended the
operation of section 1 until it "sees fit to revoke" its proclamation." See Foy, 36 T.L.R. at
433. The court in Foy held that the proclamation would remain in force until the end of
the war and was not limited to the duration of the actual military emergency. Id. at
434.
218. The Termination of the Present War (Definition) Act, 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5, c.
59, had provided that the government could decide on what date the war ended. As of
Foy's internment, no such declaration had been made. The war officially ended on
August 31, 1921. See SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 31.
219. Foy, 36 T.L.R. at 433.
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Viscount Reading, Chief Justice of the King's Bench, rejected
Simon's position as too constricted. In his view DORA, which
empowered the government to defend the country against foreign
enemies, inevitably encompassed domestic disorder as well. 220 Acts of
rebellion, he declared, "have a tendency to weaken the forces of this
country."22 1 Invoking the war in a palpably false premise, he asked
rhetorically: "As the war still continues, how can we say that internal
disorder does not affect the realm in connexion with the foreign
foe?" 22 2 Moreover, he observed, the 1916 proclamation of martial law
in Ireland had never been rescinded.2 2 3 Since there was thus both a
state of war and a state of special military emergency "connected
with the original German acts," it would be untenable to hold that
either the martial law proclamation or the use of 14B was invalid.
22 4
In evaluating whether Foy's detention promoted national safety in
wartime, therefore, the court went beyond parliamentary intent to
find DORA applicable to an entirely unrelated emergency, and it did
so by disingenuously exploiting the technicality that England was
still at war.2 2 5
B. Stretching the Boundaries of the Royal Prerogative
In addition to construing statutes beyond legislative intent, the
warrior judges also demonstrated their activism by creatively
expanding the government's prerogative powers over aliens. Freed
from the trammels of controlling legislation, they augmented the
amorphous and historically contentious common law prerogative
powers of the Crown. 226 In particular, they assisted the government
220. Id. at 433-34.
221. Id. at 434.
222. Id. at 433.
223. Id. at 434.
224. Id.
225. See SHARPE, supra note 2, at 95. Another example of use of a technicality
occurred in R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs ex parte Duke of Chateau Thierry,
[1917] 1 K.B. 922 (C.A.), in which the court allowed the government to do something
impermissible-send a draft dodger to France-on the technical ground that the formal
order merely directed that the deportee be placed on board a ship. The courts were not
always sensitive to technicalities, however. In R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte
Sarno, for example, the court noted that although Sarno's case was not properly before
the court, "we do not think that we are bound to apply the rules with strict regard to
technicality." [1916] 2 K.B. 742, 749. The courts thus exploited or ignored technicalities
as their priorities dictated.
226. The prerogative was considered part of the common law. See, e.g., In re
Petition of Right, [1915] 3 K.B. 649, 659; Barendt, supra note 63, at 12. Judicial
suspicions of the prerogative in situations not involving aliens, deriving largely from
the use of the prerogative by the Stuarts in the seventeenth century, were pervasive
even in the twentieth. For example, in his very brief opinion in Halliday, Lord Dunedin
emphasized that the prerogative was not the basis of the decision. [1917] A.C. 260, 270
(H.L.). In dissent, Lord Shaw agreed:
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in implementing its alien internment policies. As noted, in 1914 the
government classified approximately seventy-five thousand persons
in Britain over the age of fourteen as enemy aliens, and it eventually
placed thirty-two thousand of them in detention camps.227 These
detentions were largely accomplished by means of the royal
prerogative. 228
Judicial rulings on the prerogative provided legal validation for
the state's alien internment policy. Before Halliday there was
concern that ARA did not confer sufficient power to authorize
detentions because it lacked an express provision permitting
internment of aliens not deemed a danger to the state.2 29 This
perceived weakness in statutory authority forced the government to
turn to the prerogative, but there it seemed to confront problems as
well. As the government's counsel conceded, "there is no authority in
the books for the proposition that the Crown by virtue of its
prerogative has the right to control the liberty of aliens, the reason
being that the necessity of so controlling them has never before
arisen. '2 30 To sustain the detentions, it was necessary for the courts
to find both that royal powers had not been pre-empted by ARA and
that the prerogative extended to alien civilians.
The courts rose to the challenge, rehabilitating and expanding
the prerogative in two cases involving alien internees, R. v.
Superintendent of Vine Street Police Station exparte Liebmann231 and
R. v. Commandant of Knockaloe Camp ex parte Forman.232
If once again, and ever so slightly, that prerogative gets into association with
executive acts done apart from clear parliamentary authority, it will be an evil
day: that way lies revolution. Do not let the thing which has been done-in my
opinion a violent thing-be associated for one moment with, or at any point be
said to be supported by, Royal prerogative.
Id. at 286; see, e.g., V. St. Clair MacKenzie, The Royal Prerogative in Wartime, 34 L.Q.
REV. 152 (1918) (expressing academic distrust of prerogative claims).
227. See supra note 7; see also ANDREW, supra note 72, at 181-82; BIRD, supra
note 56, at 6, 9. Aliens exempted from internment were women, older men, subjects of
friendly nations such as Poles and Czechs, long-term residents with strong British
family ties, and the infirm or mentally ill. See id. at 8-9.
228. During oral argument in Halliday, the attorneys for the Crown observed
that with one previous exception, the internees had been all enemy aliens interned
under the prerogative, and it had not therefore been necessary to establish the
lawfulness of Regulation 14B. R. v. Halliday ex parte Zadig, [1916] 1 K.B. 738, 739; see
68 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Nov. 12, 1914) 98 (Home Secretary remarking that the
detention of enemy aliens was accomplished pursuant to the prerogative); see also R. v.
Superintendent of Vine Street Police Station ex parte Liebmann, [19161 1 K.B. 268, 270
(Crown justifying the arrests under the prerogative and noting that the emergency
statutes were "immaterial").
229. BIRD, supra note 56, at 75.
230. Liebmann, [1916] 1 K.B. at 270.
231. Id.
232. 87 L.J.K.B. 43; 34 T.L.R. 4 (K.B. 1917).
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Liebmann, a German national, was interned in 1915; Forman, a
Czech national, was detained two years later.233 Both petitioned for
writs of habeas, challenging their detentions as unlawful exercises of
the prerogative. In both cases the courts first rejected the threshold
claim that ARA had pre-empted the prerogative and then stretched
the royal power to bring alien civilians within its reach by
reclassifying them as "enemy combatants" fully subject to the King's
command.23
4
Forman dealt with the preemption question most directly. The
petitioner's argument was that wartime emergency legislation
covered the field and the prerogative had therefore ceased to apply.2
35
The clause reserving royal powers in ARA, he pointed out, did not
refer to any power to intern:
Any powers given under this section, or under any Order in Council
made under this section, shall be in addition to, and not in derogation
of, any other powers with respect to the expulsion of aliens, or the
prohibition of aliens from entering the United Kingdom or any other
powers of His Majesty. 2 3 6
Under the canon of ejusdem generis, he contended, the statute did not
authorize the government to intern under the prerogative but only to
expel aliens or deny them admission. 237 The court rejected this
interpretation without explanation: "Counsel for the applicant
admitted the existence at one time of a prerogative to intern
prisoners of war, and it cannot be concluded that that prerogative has
been removed by recent legislation."238
233. Forman had come to London in 1912 and the following year married a
British subject, the daughter of a lieutenant-colonel. He claimed that he was wholly on
the side of the British and had taken a prominent part in the Czech national movement
led by Jan Masaryk. In November 1916, he was invited by Masaryk to take charge of
the Czech Press Bureau in the Strand. A few months later the police found two official
Press Bureau circulars in a letter sent from the Czech Press Bureau to the Bohemian
National Alliance in Chicago. Forman's exemption was canceled, and he was interned.
Forman's attorney submitted that he was an alien friend. The following colloquy
ensued. Mr. Justice Darling asked, "Why is he not an alien enemy?" Forman's attorney
replied that he had registered and that a non-combatant could not be made a prisoner
of war unless some charge was preferred against him. Mr. Justice Darling then
remarked that "[t]hese rules are only being observed on one side." The attorney
responded, "But we are on that side." Forman, 34 T.L.R. at 5. Alfred Liebmann came to
England in 1889. He obtained a formal discharge from German nationality in 1890 but
never became naturalized as an English citizen: In 1914 he registered as an alien
enemy and then applied to the police to cancel his registration. Liebmann, [1916] 1 K.B.
at 269.
234. Liebmann, [1916] 1 K.B. at 274-75; Forman, 34 T.L.R. at 6.
235. Forman, 87 L.J.K.B. at 46.
236. ARA, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 1(6).
237. Forman, 87 L.J.K.B. at 46.
238. Id. at 45. Liebmann also argued that if there was a prerogative power to
intern, ARA would have been unnecessary. Mr. Justice Bailhache "felt the force" of the
argument, and said he did not know why no express power to intern had been included
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Given longstanding suspicions of the prerogative, however, the
judges felt it incumbent to distinguish its use against aliens in the
twentieth century from its employment against citizens by the Stuart
monarchs in the seventeenth. 239 "I am well aware," Mr. Justice
Darling noted, "that the moment the word 'prerogative' is used there
is, as a result of what took place in the seventeenth century, a strong
feeling that any act which is deemed to have been done under it is
bound to be illegal. ' 240 The judges asserted, however-again without
elaboration-that there could be no similarity between the
prerogative recognized in the Aliens Restriction Act and the
"practically unlimited prerogative which once brought an unfortunate
monarch to the scaffold."'241
Beyond legitimizing the prerogative as a viable instrument of
alien control, the judges also broadened it beyond the parameters of
its historical use. The traditional power of the prerogative allowed
the executive only to intern enemy combatants as prisoners of war.242
As the court in Liebmann noted, there was no precedent, "except in
the case of a spy, which covers the case of a civilian subject of a Power
at war with this country."24 3 In an unprecedented ruling, the courts
recharacterized enemy civilians as "enemy combatants" and
"prisoners of war," thereby bringing them within the scope of royal
power.244 Mr. Justice Bailhache conceded that it was at first sight
"somewhat startling to be told that a civilian resident in this country,
interned by the police on the instructions of the Home Secretary, can
be accurately described as a prisoner of war. '245 Nonetheless, he
would take notice of "certain notorious facts," including the likelihood
that a German civilian in England posed greater danger to the realm
than a German soldier or sailor outside the country:
This war is not being carried on by naval and military forces only.
Reports, rumours, intrigues play a large part. Methods of
communication with the enemy have been entirely altered and largely
used. I need only refer to wireless telegraphy, signalling by lights, and
the employment, on a scale hitherto unknown of carrier pigeons. Spying
in the emergency legislation, but he thought the emergency legislation had reserved
the inherent power of the Crown to deal with alien enemies. Liebmann, [1916] 1 K.B. at
276.
239. Forman, 87 L.J.K.B. at 45.
240. Id.
241. Id. In Liebmann, the court made clear that its analysis of the prerogative
was not applicable to British subjects or friendly aliens. [1916] 1 K.B. at 276, 279.
242. See, e.g., R. v. Schiever, 2 Burr. 765, 97 Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B. 1759); Three
Spanish Sailors' Case, 2 Wm. Bl. 1324, 96 Eng. Rep. 775 (K.B. 1779); Furly v.
Newnham, 2 Doug. K.B. 419, 99 Eng. Rep. 269 (K.B. 1780). These cases held that
prisoners of war interned under the prerogative were not entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus to challenge their detentions.
243. Liebmann, [1916] 1 K.B. at 275.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 274.
[VOL. 38.:261
20051 JUDICIAL POWER IN ENGLAND DURING WORLD WAR 1 303
has become the hall-mark of German "kultur." In these circumstances a
German civilian in this country may be a danger in promoting unrest,
suspicion, doubts of victory, in communicating intelligence, in assisting
in the movement of submarines and Zeppelins-a far greater danger,
indeed, than a German soldier or sailor.
2 4 6
Exhibiting the prejudices that permeated the wartime judiciary, Mr.
Justice Low added that when dealing with the Germans, it was not
necessary to wait for the commission of hostile acts.247 In the context
of a war with people "who consider that the acceptance of hospitality
connotes no obligation and that no blow can be foul," it would "be idle
to expect the Executive to wait for proof of an overt act or for
evidence of an evil intent. '248 Thus, the alien detention cases
heightened judicial power by vesting the parameters of royal
authority solely in the hands of the judges, who in rendering common
law decisions were not obligated to make even formal obeisance to
legislative intent.
The cases involving deprivation of personal liberty, therefore,
illustrated how the warrior judges eagerly pursued their wartime
agenda by inventively interpreting both statutes and the common law
to bestow expansive powers on the government. 249  In these
manifestations of activism, the courts' policies were generally
congruent with the interests of the government if not the intentions
of Parliament. In other respects, however, the government had less
reason to be satisfied with the course of judicial policymaking.
IV. THE FORMAL ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL POWER
In rendering pro-government decisions in the context of personal
liberty, the courts carefully and indeed relentlessly preserved their
formal powers to circumscribe the executive. Scholars have focused
246. Id. at 275.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 278. Forman, following Liebmann, reached the same result that alien
civilians were enemy combatants and prisoner of war. Further, in Forman the court
held that the fact of Forman's alien registration was meaningless; he was nothing but
an alien enemy to whom a temporary indulgence had been granted. R. v. Commandant
of Knockaloe Camp exparte Forman, 87 L.J.K.B. 43, 45 (K.B. 1917).
249. The judges also assisted the war effort in a more directly political manner.
Mr. Justices Younger and Sankey chaired the internment advisory committees; Mr.
Justices Atkin and Younger were members of the Internment Commission; Lord
Pickford was chairman of the Dardanelles Commission and also chaired the Chelsea
military service tribunal; Lord Moulton was Director-General of Explosives in the
Ministry of Munitions; Lord Justice Duke was the first chairman of the Defense of the
Realm Losses Commission; and Lord Reading served as a special ambassador to the
United States. See Scrutton, supra note 41, at 117-18; Note, Judges and Political
Issues, 62 SOLIC. J. & WKLY. REP. 513, 513 (May 11, 1918); see also WILLIAMS, supra
note 69, at 188-89.
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too narrowly on the conflict between the individual and the state,
overlooking the fact that judges did more than merely choose between
one side and the other. They simultaneously pursued another
objective, promoting their own institutional autonomy and authority.
The courts asserted their formal institutional power in four
ways. First, and most significantly, they maintained the vibrancy of
the writ of habeas corpus as a means of reviewing government
conduct. Despite occasional language about deference to the
executive, they determined all issues to be justiciable and
consistently decided habeas petitions on the merits. Second, they
exercised their authority by imposing on the government in selected
areas an objective standard of review, requiring officials to act
"reasonably" rather than merely in good faith. Third, the courts used
their powers not only to manipulate legal standards but to "manage"
the facts as well. Requiring an adequate factual basis for the
government's claims, they both investigated individual factual
situations and took broader notice of "historical" facts to assess
whether empirical realities justified the executive's tactics. Finally,
they applied special scrutiny to the administration when it acted in
what the courts characterized as a "judicial" capacity.
A. Preserving the Vitality of Habeas Corpus
Virtually every wartime challenge to a deprivation of individual
liberty came before the courts in the posture of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Regardless of the substantive result, the courts loudly
asserted their jurisdiction to hear and decide such cases. Further,
during the war they extended habeas jurisdiction to three
nontraditional contexts-alien internment, deportation, and military
service.
The most notable affirmations of the principle of reviewability
appeared in cases involving DORA Regulation 14B. Scholars have
traditionally analyzed these cases, particularly Halliday, in terms of
the substantive assault on individual rights.2 50 This perspective is
critical but nonetheless incomplete. Through the lens of institutional
power, the cases look somewhat different. Counsel for Zadig
announced in his argument that habeas corpus had survived
DORA,2 5 1 and the Lords enthusiastically agreed. Lord Atkinson
extolled the principle that subjects retained "every right to have
tested and determined in a Court of law, by means of a writ of
250. See, e.g., EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 80-90; SIMPSON, supra note 2,
at 15-33; TOWNSHEND, supra note 4, at 65-66; Alexander, supra note 69, at 29; Lowry,
supra note 4, at 52-58.
251. R. v. Halliday exparte Zadig, [1917] A.C. 260, 262 (H.L.).
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Habeas Corpus," the legality of an order keeping them in custody. 252
According to Lord Wrenbury, the judges had authority to determine
both whether the regulation was valid as applied-that is, whether
Zadig was indeed of hostile origins-and whether it was ultra vires
on its face. "If his case were that he had neither hostile origins or
associations," the judge explained, "he could have his writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that that was so, and if he established the fact
he would be discharged. '253 In the case at hand, he continued, the
charge was that the regulation was ultra vires, and if "that were
established he would be discharged. 2
54
Other cases involving Regulation 14B further underscored the
resilience of the writ. For example, in Ex parte Howsin,2 55 a case
involving a British internee, an appellate judge stated
"emphatically"2 56 that his refusal to issue the writ did not derogate in
any way from his power to grant it in proper cases. Indeed, he
declared, had Howsin simply said, "I have been interned and I don't
know why," he might have issued the writ.257 Thus, although as a
practical matter the likelihood of success was minimal, a 14B
internee could impugn the legality of the detention order and obtain
review of the merits of the decision.258
252. Id. at 272. The Lords also made the point that the Habeas Corpus Act had
not been explicitly suspended as in earlier wars. Id. at 270, 308.
253. Id. at 308.
254. Id.
255. 33 T.L.R. 527 (C.A. 1917).
256. Id. at 528 (per Lord Pickford).
257. Id. In that case, however, the court's evaluation of the facts, including
evidence provided by the petitioner herself, indicated that the detention was
reasonable. Id. Habeas review was also routinely offered in cases involving Irish
detainees. In addition to Brady and Foy, after 1920 many persons detained in Ireland
by military tribunals challenged their detentions and received full review in the Irish
courts. See, e.g., R. v. Allen, [1921] 2 I.R. 241 (K.B.); R. (Garde) v. Strickland, [1921] 2
I.R. 317 (K.B.); R. (Ronayne and Mulcahy) v. Strickland, [1921] 2 I.R. 333 (K.B.); R. v.
Clifford & O'Sullivan, [1921] 2 A.C. 570 (H.L.(I.)); Egan v. Macready, [1921] 1 I.R. 265
(Ch.); R. (O'Hanlon) v. Governor of Belfast Prison, 61 Ir. L.T. (K.B. 1922); R. (Childers)
v. Adjutant General, [19231 1 I.R. 5 (Ch.); see Charles Townshend, Martial Law: Legal
and Administrative Problems of Civil Emergency in Britain and the Empire, 1800-1940,
25 HIST. J. 167, 186 (1982).
258. See SHARPE, supra note 2, at 96. Commentators claiming that the case
stood for the propositions of non-justiciability and deference, see, e.g., EWING & GEARTY,
supra note 2, at 87-90; SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 25, have largely seized on the
statement of one judge, Lord Finlay, that no tribunal was "less appropriate" for
investigating the "question of restraint" than a court of law. Halliday, [1917] A.C. at
269. But the "question" he referred to was not the validity of internment policy, but
rather whether the regulation was validly applied to Zadig-that is, "whether there is
ground for suspicion that a particular person may be disposed to help the enemy." Id.
In contrast, Zadig's arguments were oriented to challenging the regulation on its face,
and Lord Finlay did not suggest that the broader issue was non-justiciable. Also, even
the statement about individual cases was immediately followed by this sentence: "The
duty of deciding this question is by the order thrown upon the Secretary of State, and
an advisory committee, presided over by a judge of the High Court, is provided to bring
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Aliens interned under the prerogative could equally challenge
their detentions by means of a habeas petition. The cases involving
aliens were significant because under common law precedent,
prisoners of war-a category that now included alien civilian
internees-were not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.2 59
Nonetheless, the judges during World War I never interpreted this
rule to preclude the right of civilian alien detainees to sue. They
issued orders to show cause to commanders of the camps and
responded fully to internees' arguments as to the invalidity of their
detentions. The courts did not determine that Liebmann and Forman
lacked capacity to apply for the writ; rather, they concluded that a
complete answer to the writ was the applicant's status as a prisoner
of war detained by authority of the Crown.260 Even Lord Finlay
asserted the right of an alien to challenge his detention: "If an alien
be wrongfully arrested, even by order of the Crown, it cannot be
doubted that a writ of habeas corpus is open to him, and it would be
surprising if he has not the right to recover damages from the person
who has wrongfully imprisoned him. '26 1 Again, however unlikely
detainees were to prevail on the merits, the courts ardently upheld
their right to contest their internments by habeas petitions and
afforded them full hearings. Moreover, in denying the writs, the
courts found on the merits that the policy was justified both in
general-because enemy alien civilians were actually enemy
combatants-and also in particular cases because the applicants were
proven enemy aliens.2 62
Strikingly, in the deportation cases the courts upheld the habeas
principle even though the applicable legislation seemingly precluded
it. A regulation promulgated under ARA 2 6 3 expressly stipulated that
before him any grounds for thinking that the order may be properly revoked or varied."
Id. In other words, even for Lord Finlay it was precisely review on the merits by a
judicially led committee that legitimized the internment process.
259. See, e.g., R. v. Schiever, 2 Burr. 765, 97 Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B. 1759); Three
Spanish Sailors' Case, 2 Win. Bl. 1324, 96 Eng. Rep. 775 (K.B. 1779); Furly v.
Newnham, 2 Doug. 419, 99 Eng. Rep. 269 (K.B. 1780) (holding that prisoners of war
interned under the prerogative could not challenge their detentions by means of habeas
corpus).
260. See, e.g., R. v. Superintendent of Vine Street Police Station ex parte
Liebmann, [1916] 1 K.B. 268; R. v. Commandant of Knockaloe Camp ex parte Forman,
34 T.L.R. 4 (K.B. 1917).
261. Johnstone v. Pedlar, [1921] 2 A.C. 262, 273 (H.L.).
262. A third case, Ex parte Weber, [1916] 1 K.B. 280 (C.A.), rejected an
application for habeas from an internee, a London clerk for a poultry merchant, on the
ground that he had discharged his burden of showing that he had completely divested
himself of his German citizenship. Although the formula 'lack of capacity" was uttered,
the court decided the case on the merits, finding that Weber's alien status was a
complete answer to the writ. The House of Lords did not even bother to consider the
standing argument that a prisoner of war was not entitled to sue. See SHARPE, supra
note 2, at 113-14.
263. 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 1.
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a person detained under a deportation order "shall be deemed to be in
legal custody."26 4 Nonetheless, the courts did not consider themselves
barred from deciding whether executive powers had been properly
exercised. Acknowledging that the government enjoyed great
discretion in making deportation decisions, 26 5 the judges nonetheless
consistently maintained that a court on habeas could go behind an
order if the minister acted outside the proper scope of the
legislation.
266
In R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte Sarno,26 7 for
example, the High Court declared that the production of an order
good on its face would not necessarily foreclose habeas review, since
courts indisputably had jurisdiction to deal with situations in which
the government abused its powers. "If we were of opinion that the
powers were being misused," Lord Reading insisted, "we should be
able to deal with the matter."268 Mr. Justice Low employed even more
robust language, stating vehemently that habeas would not
necessarily be precluded by a facially valid order:
I do not agree that if the Executive were to come into this Court and
simply say: "A person is in our custody, and therefore the writ of habeas
corpus does not apply because the custody is at the moment technically
legal," the Court would have no power to consider the matter and, if
necessary, deal with the application for the writ. In my judgment that
answer from the Crown . . . would not be sufficient if this Court were
satisfied that what was really in contemplation was the exercise of an
abuse of power.
2 6 9
In a ringing assertion of the right of a court to curb abuses of power,
he proclaimed that the "arm of the law in this country would have
grown very short, and the power of this Court very feeble, if it were
subject to such a restriction in the exercise of its power to protect the
liberty of the subject."2 70
The Court of Appeal in R. v. Superintendent of Chiswick Police
Station ex parte Sacksteder,27 1 another case involving a French
national deported to France to perform military service, confirmed
Sarno's ruling that a court on habeas could go behind a seemingly
264. Aliens Consolidated Order 1914, art. 12, cl. 2; see R. v. Governor of Brixton
Prison exparte Sarno, [1916] 2 K.B. 742, 744.
265. See, e.g., R. v. Sec'y of State for Home Affairs ex parte Duke of Chateau
Thierry, [1917] 1 K.B. 922, 935 (C.A.); R. v. Home Sec'y ex parte Bressler, 131 L.T.R.
386, 387 (C.A. 1924).
266. See SHARPE, supra note 2, at 118-19.
267. [1916] 2 K.B. 742.
268. Id. at 749. The court would deal with the matter, he stated, even if the case
were not properly before it, which he intimated might be true in Sarno's case. Id.
269. Id. at 752. In the deportation case Chateau Thierry, the Court of Appeal
stated that if "it were intended to do something illegal under a valid order, that would
be good ground for restraining and preventing the illegal act." [1917] 1 K.B. at 930.
270. Sarno, [1916] 2 K.B. at 752.
271. [1918] 1 K.B. 578.
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valid order. Lord Pickford was not prepared to go as far as Mr.
Justice Low in Sarno and pierce a detention order to consider the
state's motives in every case, but he was certainly "not inclined to say
that in no case"2 72 could the court investigate an order that appeared
facially sound: "If that order is, if I may say so, practically a sham, if
the purpose behind it is such as to show that the order is not a
genuine or bona fide order, it seems to me that the Court can go
behind it."'273 Lord Warrington, while finding that the motive for
carrying out the agreement with France was not sufficient to
invalidate the order-the "intention" was the legitimate one of
placing a man on board a ship even if "the motive actuating the
intention" was improperly to land the man in France-nonetheless
agreed that the court might penetrate a legal order for arrest if it
was a mere sham to cover up something which would be illegal."27 4
But in the present case there was "nothing of that sort.
275
In addition to extending habeas jurisdiction during the war to
reach circumstances of internment and deportation, the courts
enlarged it in a third unprecedented way. In R. v. Commanding
Officer of 30th Battalion ex parte Freyberger,276 both the Divisional
Court and the Court of Appeal supported a habeas inquiry by
treating a conscript in the armed forces as being someone in
"detention."2 7 7 Freyberger predicated his habeas action on the claim
that a soldier on active service was a person in "custody. '278 Wholly
unperturbed by the jurisdictional issue, the court entertained the
action on the merits, ruling that Freyberger was indeed required to
serve out his term of "detention. '279 The case, as already noted,
denied the right of a dual national serving in the army to declare
alienage, and, like all the liberty cases, it illustrated how expanding
the right to habeas review did not advance the cause of individual
freedom; rather, it simply allowed judges ill-disposed to personal
liberty to render troubling substantive decisions.
The only case of the entire war in which the courts denied the
availability of habeas review altogether, R. v. Commanding Officer of
272. Id. at 586. Lord Pickford was perhaps influenced by the fact that the
agreement with France had ended: "It is perhaps not unsatisfactory to be told that the
matter really does not arise now because in consequence of other arrangements
between this country and France cases of this kind will not arise again." Id. at 585.
273. Id. at 586-87.
274. Id. at 589.
275. Id. Numerous other cases also fully considered habeas challenges to
deportation orders. See, e.g., R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte Bloom, 124
L.T.R. 375 (K.B. 1920); R. v. Inspector of Leman Street Police Station exparte Venicoff,
[19201 3 K.B. 72; R. v. Home Sec'y exparte Bressler, 131 L.T.R. 386 (C.A. 1924).
276. [1917] 2 K.B. 129.
277. Id. at 139-40.
278. Id. at 129.
279. Id.
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Morn Hill Camp ex parte Ferguson,280 turned out to be an exception
that proved the rule of reviewability. The petitioner was an Irish
resident of Belfast who in 1915 sought temporary employment in
England as a machine ruler. The police arrested him in August 1916
as an absentee under the Military Service Act. 28 ' Determining that
he was "ordinarily resident" in Great Britain, a magistrate at the
Thames Police Court handed him over to the military authorities.
28 2
Once in military custody, Ferguson applied for a writ of habeas,
arguing that the magistrate's order to detain him in the Army was
illegal because he did not "ordinarily" reside in Great Britain.28 3 The
court concluded that the magistrate's decision could not be
questioned by the habeas procedure.2 8 4 Its analysis, however, was not
that military custody was an unreviewable "detention." Rather, it
relied on the proposition that the law provided a sufficient remedy by
allowing the order to be reviewed by a court on ordinary appeal.
28 5 If
there were "no means of questioning a magistrate's order," Lord
Reading observed, there might be some ground for "invoking the
assistance of this Court. ' 28 6 The judges thus treated habeas
challenges to a court order differently from those contesting executive
action, apparently seeking to protect judicial decisions from collateral
attack. Yet they did not find Ferguson's detention itself to be non-
justiciable; on the contrary, their decision placed major reliance on
the availability of another judicial forum to review it. The wartime
liberty cases, therefore, despite favoring the government, contained
repeated and unequivocal assertions of the formal principle of
reviewability.
B. Imposing Selective Reasonableness Review
As has been shown, one strategy that the courts adopted to
promote their belligerent policies was to impose a low standard of
review on the government. In the exclusion and deportation cases, for
example, they required the state to meet only a "good faith" or "bona
fide" test.28 7 The wartime courts did not, however, embrace such a
flabby standard uniformly. Rather, their level of scrutiny varied from
situation to situation, depending on the judges' perceptions of
national security requirements, the importance of the issues raised,
280. [1917] 1 K.B. 176.
281. Id. at 176.
282. Id. at 177.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 179-80.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 179. In dicta the court reached the merits nonetheless, finding that
there was ample material in the affidavits to infer that Ferguson was "ordinarily
resident" in Great Britain. Id. at 181.
287. See supra Parts III.A.3-4.
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the kind of right-liberty or property-being affected, and the moral
character of the litigant.
In Regulation 14B cases, in particular, the courts demanded a
stricter "reasonableness" review. Although they generally found this
higher standard satisfied, their establishment of a more rigorous test
nonetheless demonstrated their power and willingness to demand
more of the government in certain contexts. Scholars have treated
Halliday as the most judicially irresponsible case of the war,28 8 but in
fact the Lords in that case required the government to act reasonably.
Lord Atkinson, most explicit in this regard, upheld detention because
it was "reasonably probable" that a free person of hostile origins or
associations would communicate with the enemy, spread false
reports, or engage in other behavior prejudicial to the national
defense. 28 9 If the regulation had required "something to be done
which could not in any reasonable way aid in securing the public
safety and the defence of the realm," he declared, he would have
found Regulation 14B to be ultra vires and void. 290
Other judges hearing the case, while not proposing an express
"reasonableness" test, suggested that it was still their point of
reference by lacing their pro-government opinions with
pronouncements that internment was a reasonable and indeed
necessary policy for winning the war. According to Lord Dunedin, it
was "obvious" that internment was necessary. 291 Mr. Justice Rowlatt
in the Divisional Court echoed this view: "It seems to me perfectly
obvious that the control of the movements of persons of hostile origin
or associations, and if necessary, the restriction of their liberty, is one
of the most obvious measures which may have to be taken in time of
war for the public safety. '292 Even Lord Finlay, author of the well-
known statement that Parliament could entrust powers to the
government "feeling certain that such powers will be reasonably
exercised,"293 proceeded immediately thereafter to evaluate the
government's actions and judge them to be in fact reasonable. In a
time of "supreme national danger, '294 he remarked, one of the "most
obvious" means of taking precautions against espionage was to
restrict the freedom of persons "whom there may be any reason to
suspect of being disposed to help enemy."29 5 Thus, the Lords in
288. See, e.g., EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 87-90; SHARPE, supra note 2, at
230; SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 25; Lowry, supra note 4, at 53.
289. R. v. Halliday exparte Zadig, [1917] A.C. 260, 275.
290. Id. at 272-73. Preserving his options, he added that although it was "not
necessary to decide this precise point on the present occasion," he desired "to hold
[him]self free to deal with it when it arises." Id. at 273.
291. Id. at 271.
292. R. v. Halliday exparte Zadig, [1916] 1 K.B. 738, 742.
293. Halliday, [19171 A.C. at 269.
294. Id. at 270.
295. Id. at 269.
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Halliday, rather than deciding that the government had
unreviewable discretionary powers, announced that its chosen policy
of internment met their criterion of "reasonableness."
The courts also explicitly employed a "reasonableness" test when
assessing whether Regulation 14B was validly applied in a specific
case. Ex parte Howsin,296 significantly, did not involve a naturalized
British subject but a "genuinely" English person-a natural-born
Englishwoman of "pure English blood,"297 the daughter of a squire,
who at the time of her arrest was living in her father's house in
Yorkshire and nursing wounded soldiers as a Red Cross volunteer.
298
Howsin was interned because of her "hostile associations" with an
Indian friend whom she had known ten years before the war. 299 In
1915 she visited the friend in Switzerland and returned to London
with a message from him to a third party; an intermediary who had
arranged the visit turned out to be a spy.3° ° Howsin was arrested,
and the police found two suspicious pamphlets in her rooms.3 0 1 She
denied knowingly conveying any information, and her case seems
illustrative of the government's admitted practice of resorting to
internment under 14B when it lacked sufficient evidence to prosecute
for violation of DORA regulations. 30 2 At the time her case was heard,
Howsin had been in detention for twenty-two months, and she
remained in prison camps for another two years.
30 3
While declining to release her, the Court of Appeal took seriously
Howsin's argument that it had power to inquire into the sufficiency of
the grounds on which the Home Secretary had acted. The court did
296. Exparte Howsin, 33 T.L.R. 527 (C.A. 1917).
297. See 81 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 23, 1916) 426-27.
298. Howsin, 33 T.L.R. at 528. Her father, a surgeon who was shooting
partridges at the time of her arrest, did not disco-'er her whereabouts for seventeen
days. See 96 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (July 24, 1917) 1093; 97 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th
ser.) (Aug. 9, 1917) 566; 104 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 20, 1918) 1005-06;
SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 22.
299. She may possibly have been targeted because of her sympathies for Indian
nationalism. See SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 22-23.
300. Id. at 528.
301. Id.
302. See 81 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 23, 1916) 427, 450 (Home Secretary
declaring that no charge would ever be made against Howsin because her prevention
was purely precautionary). Speaking of 14B detentions generally, the Home Secretary,
Herbert Samuel, conceded that such cases were "not cases in which any indictment
could be drawn" or legal proceedings "taken with any real hope of success." 80 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 2, 1916) 1249.
303. Howsin, 33 T.L.R. at 528. She was interned in September 1915, see 96
PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1917) 1093, and released in August 1919, see SIMPSON,
supra note 2, at 23. Questions were often raised by supporters about her status in the
House of Commons, but to no avail. See, e.g., 96 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (July 24,
1917) 1093; 97 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Aug. 9, 1917) 566; 104 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th
ser.) (Mar. 20, 1918) 1005-06.
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not reexamine general internment policy3 4-that issue had already
been resolved in Halliday-but it applied a "reasonableness" rather
than good faith standard to the government's detention of Howsin
herself. As Lord Pickford declared, the Home Secretary must
"reasonably" come to the conclusion that the applicant had "hostile
associations." 30 5
There were several likely reasons why the courts imposed a
higher formal legal standard in Regulation 14B detention cases than
Regulation 14 exclusion or ARA deportation cases. The penalty of
internment was more severe than exclusion or deportation, and the
affected persons were not aliens but more appealing natural-born or
naturalized British subjects. Moreover, as far as the exclusion cases
were concerned, the order was not purely preventive. The excluded
person was suspected of already performing "prejudicial acts"-that
is, acts inimical to the public safety-rather than merely of having
"hostile origins or associations," and this might have induced the
courts to be less demanding of the executive. 30 6 The critical point,
however, is that the courts did not adopt a posture of undifferentiated
acquiescence to the government, but were quite comfortable in
applying stricter standards to serve particular priorities.
C. Requiring an Adequate Factual Showing
In addition to manipulating legal standards, the courts also
dealt deftly with facts, claiming the power to examine closely whether
there was an adequate evidentiary basis for the government's
position. They both scrutinized the circumstances of specific cases to
determine whether ministerial orders were warranted and evaluated
304. As to the general right of the government to intern, Lord Pickford stated,
"these Courts have no right to interfere. They might or might not think the power too
wide, but that was not a matter for them." Howsin, 33 T.L.R. at 528. Nonetheless, the
court proceeded immediately to justify the policy: "This was temporary and exceptional
legislation passed for the period of the war. It had been found essential for the
Executive to be armed with certain exceptional powers. It was impossible to go on as in
time of peace." Id.
305. Id.
306. There were other reasons why the exclusion orders merited a lower
standard. First, in exclusion cases the challenge was not to the regulation on its face as
being ultra vires, but only to its interpretation and validity as applied, and the courts
were understandably more disposed to defer to the government in its interpretation of
its own regulation. Second, during oral argument in the exclusion case R. v. Denison,
32 T.L.R. 528, 529 (K.B. 1916), the judges were apprised of the fact that Regulation 14
had replaced an earlier regulation that allowed a removal order only against a person
whose behavior gave "reasonable" grounds of suspicion that he was about to act in a
manner prejudicial to the public safety. The fact that the government found the stricter
standard to be inoperable may have influenced the judges. Third, the exclusion order
issued from a military officer rather than the Home Secretary, and in a national
security situation the courts may have been more amenable to respecting a military
rather than a political judgment.
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whether broader "historical facts" justified larger governmental
policies.
Regardless of whether the standard was "good faith" or
''reasonableness," the courts in individual cases asserted their power
to investigate the sufficiency of the factual evidence. In the exclusion
cases, for example, although the legal standard was minimal, the
courts nonetheless examined the evidence to ensure that it was met.
As Lord Reading declared in Denison, "in a case where the Court
came to the conclusion on the facts before it that the authority could
not suspect," it would assuredly have "power to interfere."30 7
Similarly, in Ronnfeldt the court held a full hearing, with
examination and cross-examination, on rumors about Ronnfeldt's
alleged pro-German sympathies. 30 8 The courts equally assessed the
facts when "reasonableness" was the standard. In Howsin, for
example, Lord Pickford agreed that Halliday gave the court the
power to "inquire into the facts on which the Home Secretary
purposed to make the order. '30 9 If there was no evidence on which he
could reasonably conclude that Howsin had hostile associations, he
stated, he would issue the writ.3 10 Lord Pickford found, however, that
Howsin herself had provided the requisite facts in an affidavit
detailing her "hostile associations."3 11
In addition to conducting inquiries into individual facts, the
courts also took "judicial notice" of the broader historical context to
ascertain whether wartime exigencies truly warranted the
government's measures. In so doing, the courts affirmed that they
had the power to decide threshold factual questions about when the
executive was entitled to exercise its discretionary authority. Such
use of "judicial notice" was apparent both in Regulation 14B and
prerogative internment cases. In Halliday, for example, the Lords
307. Id.
308. Ronnfeldt v. Phillips, 34 T.L.R. 556, 556 (K.B. 1918). In the deportation
cases as well, the courts examined the facts to ascertain that the government was
acting properly. See, e.g., R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte Sarno, [1916] 2 K.B.
742, 750 (finding that Sarno was not a political refugee); R. v. Inspector of Leman
Street Police Station ex parte Venicoff, [1920] 3 K.B. 72, 77 (commenting on Venicoffs
moral "degradation"); R. v. Superintendent of Chiswick Police Station ex parte
Sacksteder, [1918] 1 K.B. 578, 586 (taking evidence to determine whether the Home
Secretary had made an individualized order).
309. Howsin, 33 T.L.R. at 528.
310. Id.
311. Id. The cases are also replete with dicta containing factual observations
unnecessary to the decision at hand. In Ferguson, in which the court formally refused
to consider the merits of an Irish conscript's habeas claim that he was not ordinarily a
British resident, the judges simply could not resist pointing out that there was
sufficient evidence that he was. [1917] 1 K.B. 176, 181. Similarly, the court in Chateau
Thierry concluded that the deportee had not established that he was a political refugee
or medically unfit for the army, although those considerations "ought not to affect the
judgment in the present case." [1917] 1 K.B. 922, 928.
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conditioned support for internment on their own factual assessment
of the national security situation, concluding that the danger to the
public safety was so severe that internment fell within the
government's general regulatory competence. Lords Finlay and
Atkinson cautioned that the existing situation of "supreme national
danger"-the fact that Britain was overrun with German
sympathizers-required "drastic remedies." 3 12 In the same vein, Lord
Dunedin observed that internment was obviously necessary "under
the circumstances of a war like the present. '313 Thus, the Lords
determined independently that factual predicates justified the
government's strategies for winning the war.
Judicial willingness to engage in factual assessments of wartime
necessities also revealed itself in the alien internment cases, in which
the courts upheld government policy only after taking notice of
"notorious" facts about German spying to conclude that enemy
civilians were actually "enemy combatants. '314 Other forms of broad
judicial factfinding occurred in Sarno,3 15 in which the court offered its
view on the relationship between petty crime and the war effort, and
Foy,316 in which the court held that domestic unrest undermined the
struggle against a foreign enemy. In all these contexts, the courts
insisted on their power to make an independent appraisal of the
empirical necessity for executive policy. 317
D. Applying Special Scrutiny to "Judicial"Acts of the Executive
Finally, the courts exercised their power by requiring the
government to conform to stricter standards when it acted in a
"judicial" capacity. Sacksteder,318 like Chateau Thierry,319 involved a
Frenchman seeking to avoid military service, but the former case
addressed not the deportation order but rather the preceding
312. [1917] A.C. 260, 270-71, 275.
313. Id. at 271; see SHARPE, supra note 2, at 94.
314. R. v. Superintendent of Vine Street Police Station ex parte Liebmann,
[19161 1 K.B. 268, 270, 274-75, 277-78; see infra text accompanying notes 243-48.
315. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte Sarno, [1916] 2 K.B. 742, 750; see
supra text accompanying notes 267-70.
316. R. v. Governor of Wormwood Scrubs Prison ex parte Foy, 36 T.L.R. 432, 434
(K.B. 1920); see supra text accompanying notes 214-24.
317. Further, the courts made a factual determination that a "state of war" was
raging in Ireland as a predicate to invoking martial law. See, e.g., R. v. Clifford &
O'Sullivan, [1921] 2 A.C. 570 (H.L.()); R. v. Allen, [1921] 2 I.R. 241 (K.B.); R. (Garde)
v. Strickland, [1921] 2 I.R. 317 (K.B.); R. (Ronayne & Mulcahy) v. Strickland, [1921] 2
I.R. 333 (K.B.); Egan v. Macready, [1921] 1 I.R. 265 (Ch.); R. (Childers) v. Adjutant
General, [1923] 1 I.R. 5 (Ch.).
318. R. v. Superintendent of Chiswick Police Station ex parte Sacksteder, [1918]
1 K.B. 578.
319. R. v. Sec'y of State for Home Affairs ex parte Duke of Chateau Thierry,
[1917] 1 K.B. 922 (C.A.).
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arrest.3 20 In 1917 the police arrested Sacksteder and conveyed him to
Southampton to await a ship bound for France.3 21 The Divisional
Court rejected Sacksteder's application for a habeas writ based on
Chateau Thierry, but the Court of Appeal called attention to a critical
distinction-Chateau Thierry had involved an arrest rather than a
deportation order.3 22 Lord Pickford, who had himself sat in Chateau
Thierry, noted that the earlier case only decided that a court could
not ordinarily review the Home Secretary's deportation decisions; it
was still open to a court to determine whether in conducting an arrest
the government had acted lawfully.3 23 When power was given to a
high officer to restrict the liberty of someone "living under the
protection of our laws," he explained, "it must be done by that high
officer himself" and with regard to the specific circumstances of each
situation.3 24 In this instance, Lord Pickford concluded, the arrest was
legitimate because the Secretary of State had "examined into this
particular case. '325
Lord Scrutton, concurring, claimed to approach the case with
"the anxious care" that judges always accorded the liberty of the
subject, even when the person was merely a foroigner "temporarily
living within the King's protection. '3 26 Since the appellant was a
French subject who desired to avoid helping France, he observed,
there was "not much room for sympathy. '3 2 7 Still, it was necessary for
the court to investigate whether the arrest was legal, since executive
powers with regard to arrest and detention were "of a judicial
character and cannot be delegated. '3 28 If the Secretary of State had
issued a general regulation to arrest all aliens without consideration
of their particular character, he "should have had very serious doubt"
whether the act was within the administration's power. 329 In this
case, however, he agreed with Lord Pickford that the minister had
performed an individualized act.33 0 Thus, the judges demarcated
administrative from judicial acts of the government, revealing
themselves willing in the "judicial" context of arrest to go behind a
seemingly valid order and ensure that the government had
320. Sacksteder, [1918) 1 K.B. at 578.
321. Id. at 581-82.
322. Chateau Thierry, [1917] 1 K.B. at 922.
323. Sacksteder, [1918] 1 K.B. at 584-85.
324. Id. at 585-86.
325. Id. at 586. There was some uncertainty about the facts in the early stages
of the litigation, and the court sua sponte amplified the factual record by requesting an
affidavit from the government on the question whether this particular individual had
been selected for deportation. Id.
326. Id. at 589.
327. Id. at 590.
328. Id. at 591.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 591-92.
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considered the case on a particularized basis.3 31 When the
government acted in a way that implicated judicial norms, in other
words, the courts sought to ensure the integrity of the official
process. 332
During the war, therefore, the courts consistently affirmed their
institutional power by preserving the principle of reviewability,
imposing stricter legal standards on the government in specified
situations, insisting that certain factual predicates be satisfied, and
requiring an individualized process when the government acted in a
"judicial" capacity. Regardless of its substantive rulings, the judiciary
preserved its own authority in a manner hardly compatible with a
charge of undifferentiated obsequiousness to an overbearing
executive.
V. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN PROTECTING PRIVATE PROPERTY
If in liberty cases the courts uniformly produced outcomes
favoring the government, they reacted much differently to executive
attempts-instituted at the same time and under the same general
powers as the internment schemes-to confiscate private property.
The judges in property decisions actually constrained the
government, exercising the powers they so scrupulously but only
formally safeguarded in the context of personal freedom. In the
statutory cases they inverted the norms applied in liberty decisions,
prohibiting executive actions unless they were authorized expressly
by DORA and were both reasonable and necessary to achieve
statutory purposes. In the prerogative cases, rather than enlarging
the authority of the Crown, they struck down administrative acts for
exceeding the scope of permissible common law powers. Whether
considering expropriations of private property under either statute or
prerogative, the courts' sympathies lay with the individual rather
than the state.
331. The distinction between administrative and judicial actions of the executive
was also upheld in R. v. Inspector of Leman Street Police Station ex parte Venicoff,
[1920] 3 K.B. 72, 80, which ruled that for the purpose of issuing deportation orders, the
Home Secretary was acting as an executive rather than a judicial officer and therefore
was not bound to hold an inquiry or give deportees an opportunity to be heard.
332. As long as the process of arrest was individualized, however, the
authorities enjoyed substantial discretion. For example, the King's Bench took a broad
view of police powers in Michaels v. Block, 34 T.L.R. 438 (K.B. 1918), in which an alien
prisoner of war contested his arrest under Regulation 55. The regulation allowed the
police to arrest any person whose behavior gave reasonable grounds for suspecting that
he was about to act contrary to the public safety. DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 27,
at Reg. 55. Mr. Justice Darling concluded that the arresting officer need not himself
witness the questionable behavior but could base it on acts about which he was credibly
informed. Michaels, 34 T.L.R. at 438.
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A. The Framework of Wartime Restrictions on Property Rights
World War I witnessed comprehensive controls not just over
personal freedom but also over economic activity. As the war
progressed, the system of state economic management expanded to
encompass price fixing, import and export regulations, agricultural
subsidies, manpower allocation, and eventually food rationing.
333
Various DORA regulations authorized the government to seize land
and otherwise interfere with private property "to the extent
necessary" to secure the public defense. 334 The government placed
special reliance on Regulation 2B, which empowered it "to take
possession of any war material, food, forage and stores of any
description. '335 Additional regulations vested in the administration
the right to appropriate factories, requisition their output, and
regulate their operations. 3 6r Further, the military authorities enjoyed
"a right of access to any land or buildings or other property
whatsoever." 337
The wide powers of the government relating to property
generally were augmented by special powers relating to the food
supply. The Food Controller could make any orders that appeared to
him "necessary or expedient to maintain the food supply of the
country," including requisitioning items and compensating the owner
with a "reasonable profit" though not necessarily the market value.
338
According to the economist William Beveridge, the regulatory output
of the Food Ministry was "portentous."339 In 1918 the Food Supply
333. See SPENCER C. TUCKER, THE GREAT WAR, 1914-18, at 206 (1998). On the
general restructuring of the economy during wartime, see, for example, KATHLEEN
BURK, WAR AND THE STATE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT, 1914-
1919 (1982); HENRY CARTER, THE CONTROL OF THE DRINK TRADE: A CONTRIBUTION TO
NATIONAL EFFICIENCY, 1915-1917 (1918); SAMUEL J. HURWITZ, STATE INTERVENTION IN
GREAT BRITAIN: A STUDY OF ECONOMIC CONTROL AND SOCIAL RESPONSE, 1914-1919
(1949); E.M.H. LLOYD, EXPERIMENTS IN STATE CONTROL (1924); F.A. MCKENZIE,
BRITISH RAILWAYS AND THE WAR (1917); STATE, SOCIETY AND MOBILIZATION IN EUROPE
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR (John Horne ed., 1997); Peter K. Cline, Reopening the
Case of the Lloyd George Coalition and the Postwar Economic Transition, 1918-1919, 10
J. BRIT. STUD. 162 (1970); R.H. Tawney, The Abolition of Economic Controls, 1918-
1921, 13 EC. HIST. REV. 1, 3 (1943) (noting that by 1918 two-thirds of workers were
engaged in industries subject to wartime controls). Economic controls were instituted
mainly pursuant to DORA Amendment Act 1915, an act containing powers that Bonar
Law declared to be "the most drastic that have ever been put to any House of
Commons." 70 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 10, 1915) 1274; see Rogers, supra note
44, at 34.
334. DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 27, at Reg. 2.
335. Id. at Reg. 2B.
336. Id. at Regs. 7, 8, 8A.
337. Id. at Reg. 3. The government could also use land for military training, id.
at Reg. 4, close roads, id. at Reg. 5, and remove vehicles and equipment, id. at Reg. 6.
338. Id. at Reg. 2F(1), (2).
339. WILLIAM H. BEVERIDGE, BRITISH FOOD CONTROL 69 (James T. Shotwell ed.,
1928).
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Manual, containing the regulations and orders then in force,
comprised a volume of 700 pages. 340 The ministry's orders were
binding law, and during the war government officials initiated sixty-
five thousand prosecutions of merchants, farmers, manufacturers,
and consumers.3 41 Almost ninety-three percent of these prosecutions
were successful.
3 4 2
In addition to utilizing DORA, the government could also
confiscate property pursuant to the prerogative. 343 As will be shown,
the Crown's use of the prerogative in the property context, especially
its denial of a legal obligation to compensate for prerogative takings,
generated significant judicial opposition in the later stages and
aftermath of the war.
B. Requisitioning Private Property: The Judicial Response
The courts actively pursued the protection of private property in
three instances: when the amount of compensation rather than the
taking itself was at issue; when the regulatory scheme effectuated a
tax rather than a complete appropriation; and when the government
interfered with the owner's right to secure property through
litigation.34 4
1. The Compensation Controversy
The major question confronting the courts in the property area
was not whether the government could confiscate property, but what
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 70 n.2. Food control committees, along with the police and inspectors
of weights and measures, brought the prosecutions, yielding £415,000 in fines and
costs. Id. at 70, 234-35.
343. See Tawney, supra note 333, at 5 (noting that early in the war, when the
reach of DORA was uncertain, the Crown relied primarily on its ancient prerogative
powers); see also HURWITZ, supra note 333, at 151-52; LLOYD, supra note 333, at 52.
344. The general question of government authority to impose economic
controls-that is, to regulate as opposed to confiscate-rarely troubled the courts,
particularly with respect to the food supply. Hudson's Bay Co. v. Maclay, 36 T.L.R. 469
(KB. 1920), for example, upheld the right of the Shipping Controller under DORA
Regulation 39BBB to direct the use of ships at fixed rates of freight. The court noted
that the Controller was acting to obtain wheat supplies for the United Kingdom and
thus mitigate the "intolerable burden" of high prices during the war. Id. at 476. It
distinguished the case from a situation of taking property without compensation. Id. at
477; see, e.g., Sainsbury v. Saunders, 35 T.L.R. 140 (K.B. 1918) (permitting the Food
Controller to fix the price of tea); John Robinson & Co. v. The King, 36 T.L.R. 773 (K.B.
1920) (requiring cake manufacturers to accept a maximum price set by the Food
Controller); Fowle v. Monsell, 36 T.L.R. 863 (K.B. 1920) (allowing the Food Controller
to fix a maximum price for whiskey).
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it should pay the owner when it did.3 45 Consistently, government
ministries claimed that they could requisition property under the
prerogative alone and that compensation was a matter of royal grace.
On March 31, 1915, the Crown established a royal commission to
evaluate claims for compensation and award voluntary payments.
346
The other available avenue for appropriating property was pursuant
to various nineteenth-century statutes, but under this option
compensation was mandatory and the amount was determined by the
courts.3 4 7 Wartime property cases often raised questions at the
intersection of prerogative and statutory rights, and the courts
resolved them in a manner distinctively different from their rulings
in the liberty cases. The decisions generally resulted in a victory for
345. At least in the statutory arena, the simple right to requisition property
when no issue of compensation was raised was not controversial, especially early in the
war. Two cases in which such a challenge was mounted led to victories for the
government. In Sheffield Conservative & Unionist Club v. Brighten, 85 L.J.K.B. 1669
(1916), the Army Council took possession of the plaintiffs' private club under DORA
Regulation 2 to serve as offices for the Ministry of Munitions. Mr. Justice Avory held
that such an action might be necessary for the public safety and defense and that the
decision of the military authorities was conclusive, provided they did not act so
unreasonably that there was ground for saying that they did not act bona fide. Id. at
1672. Regulation 2, he ruled, was not limited to operations of a "directly military"
character. Id. at 1671. In Lipton v. Ford, [19171 2 K.B. 647 (Comm. Ct.), the plaintiff
charged that Regulation 2B, which authorized the requisitioning of his crop of
raspberries, was ultra vires. Mr. Justice Atkin saw no reason why a regulation giving
general powers of requisition was not reasonably capable of being a regulation for
securing the public safety and defense. Id. at 654. As for the application of the
regulation to raspberries, he noted that the Army Council could not take possession of
a growing crop because powers of entry, tillage, and gathering were not expressly
authorized by the regulation. In the case at hand, however, the government had merely
given lawful notice of an intention to take possession of the raspberries after they were
gathered. Id. at 655. Although the courts in both cases held for the government, they
found all issues to be justiciable, imposed some sort of "reasonableness" requirement
(albeit a weak one), and refused to infer executive powers from silence. See also
Minister of Munitions v. Chamberlayne, [1918] 2 K.B. 758 (C.A.) (expansively
interpreting the government's right under DORA to acquire property in the national
interest). But at times the courts rejected the government's power to appropriate
property even if it offered adequate compensation. See, e.g., Minister of Munitions v.
Mackrill, [1920] 3 K.B. 513 (Rwy & Canal Comm'n 1920) (holding that the government
may not confiscate land for its resale value even though the owner would receive
compensation, as it was the court's duty to protect the subject against undue exercises
of royal power).
346. See, e.g, LLOYD, supra note 333, at 51. The royal commission awarded
compensation only to individuals who could prove they had suffered special damage
and whose losses were "direct and substantial." DEFENCE OF THE REALM LOSSES ROYAL
COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT, 1916, Cd. 8359, at 4; see HURWITZ, supra note 333, at 152.
The royal commission was not a legal tribunal and its decisions were not subject to
review in the courts. See LESLIE SCOTT & ALFRED HILDESLEY, THE CASE OF
REQUISITION 91 (1920).
347. See SCOTT & HILDESLEY, supra note 346, at 91 ("If the subject claimed a
right enforceable by law his remedy was in the Courts.").
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the owner over the government and a derogation of the prerogative in
favor of applicable statutes.
In re Petition of Right,348 the first case dealing with the right to
compensation, was decided in the early months of the war. The lower
courts sided with the government's prerogative theory, thereby
misleading the public and the administration about the course of
future rulings. The case arose in December 1914 when the War Office
requisitioned an aerodrome in Shoreham from its private owners.
When the aerodrome owners sought a declaration that they were
lawfully entitled to statutory compensation, the Crown responded
that confiscation was lawful under the prerogative as well as under
DORA and that the owners were not entitled to compensation as of
right. 349
On the statutory claim, the trial court and Court of Appeal found
that Regulation 2 of DORA, by conferring on the military authority
an "absolute and unconditional power"35 0 to interfere with private
property, impliedly repealed any right to compensation that might
have existed under Victorian legislation. 35 1 On the prerogative issue,
the courts concluded that the Crown was justified in taking premises
necessary for the public safety and defense. 35 2 As in the alien
internment cases, the judges rendered a broad factual assessment of
military exigencies and revised common law precedent to confer new
powers on the government. Although conceding that under
traditional common law rules only actual invasion triggered
prerogative powers, 353 the courts now found-analogous to their
finding that enemy civilians were as dangerous as soldiers-that the
enemy equally threatened the realm when not actually "at the gates."
Mr. Justice Avory cautioned that under the "changed conditions of
modern warfare," the realm now "requires protection from enemy
aircraft and the long-range guns of enemy ships as in the old days it
required protection from the landing of enemy troops. '35 4 The Court
of Appeal approved this expansion of prerogative powers by taking
"judicial notice" that England's coasts had been attacked by Zeppelins
348. [1915] 3 K.B. 649 (C.A.).
349. Id. at 649-50.
350. Id. at 654 (per Avory, J.).
351. The courts found support for takings without compensation in the
government's right under DORA to remove "restrictions" on its requisitioning powers in
the nineteenth-century Defense Acts. In the courts' view, the "restrictions" that the
government could eliminate included not merely procedural requirements but also the
mandatory compensation provisions. Id. at 654, 660-62.
352. Id. at 653, 659-60, 666.
353. Id. at 653.
354. Id. He also asserted that acts of Parliament could not divest the King of his
prerogative powers without express words. Id. Similarly, Lord Cozens-Hardy in the
Court of Appeal found that the Act of 1842 did not affect the common law prerogative
right, which could not be interfered with except by "plain language" or "necessary
implication." Id. at 660.
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and the enemy fleet: "To postpone action until the enemy has
landed... would, or might, be fatal to the security of the realm.
35 5
In finding that wartime exigencies required a widening of
common law precedent, however, the Court of Appeal expressly
demanded-as it declined to do in the alien prerogative cases-that
the action of the Crown must be reasonable: "So the prerogative
applies to what is reasonably necessary for preventing and repelling
invasion at the present time." 356 Given the attack on English shores,
the invention of gunpowder, and the use of airplanes, the court
reasoned, the authorities "might reasonably come to the conclusion to
which they have in fact arrived. '357 A majority of the judges of the
Court of Appeal thus found the taking justified under both statute
and prerogative; nonetheless, their analysis was significant in
requiring a stronger showing from the government than in non-
property cases. 358
Matters changed abruptly when the case reached the House of
Lords. Foreshadowing the anti-government decisions that would now
follow, the Law Lords took a much dimmer view of the ministry's
position. In July 1916, while the appeal was pending, the Crown
suddenly settled the case in the company's favor. The reason for the
settlement was that the judges had indicated to the law officers of the
Crown that the case would go against them. 359 Indeed, the Lord
Chancellor, who was not sitting in the case, wrote a note to the
Cabinet stating that none of the Law Lords accepted the Crown's
view of the prerogative, and that even if DORA conferred power by
regulation to abolish rights to compensation, no regulation did so in
express terms.360 In situations involving property, in other words, the
Lords required the enabling instrument to confer power explicitly on
the government to intrude on individual rights-a stark contrast
with their willingness to infer restrictions on freedom from silence in
the internment cases.
355. Id. at 659. Lord Warrington added that the circumstances under which the
prerogative power could be exercised "must of necessity vary with the times and the
advance of military science." Id. at 666. In addition to taking "judicial notice" of
military necessities, the Court of Appeal thoroughly investigated the particular facts
regarding the aerodrome. The Master of the Rolls observed that military testimony
about the need to occupy it had not been undermined by cross-examination. Id. at 659.
In other words, the court did not simply defer to military judgment but held a hearing
to determine that military occupation of the premises was indeed necessary.
356. Id. at 660.
357. Id. at 666 (per Warrington, L.J.).
358. Lord Pickford, seemingly more suspicious of the prerogative, preferred to
base his judgment on DORA. Id. at 664.
359. See G.R. RUBIN, PRIVATE PROPERTY, GOVERNMENT REQUISITION, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 1914-27, at 52 (1994).
360. Id.; see LLOYD, supra note 333, at 51 n.2.
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In its first formal decision on the compensation issue, Central
Control Board v. Cannon Brewery,361 the House of Lords adhered to
the approach adumbrated in the Lord Chancellor's note to the
Cabinet in the aerodrome case. As part of the government's efforts to
regulate the liquor trade, which was believed to cause absenteeism
among munitions workers, 362 the Central Control Liquor Board in
1915 appropriated a pub in Middlesex. The owners did not object to
the confiscation per se but rather to having their compensation
assessed by the royal commission; they preferred the judicial
mechanism set forth in a Victorian statute, the Land Clauses Act
1845.363 DORA did not expressly incorporate the Land Clauses Act,
so the legal question was whether the specific forum provided by the
Crown-the 1915 royal commission-trumped DORA's silence on the
method of compensation. The owners argued that if a statute did not
establish a special tribunal, assessment reverted to the courts under
the Land Clauses Act. 364
Two lower court decisions held in favor of the pub owners. In the
Chancery Division,365 the court made clear-in contrast to the
judicial preference in personal liberty cases for construing silence to
enhance governmental power-that the absence of statutory
language was no obstacle to upholding an individual's right against
the government:
I quite agree that it is a difficulty in the plaintiffs' way that the Land
Clauses Act is not specially mentioned, that its application to the case
is not immediately obvious, that its presumed incorporation in the
statute .. .is inconvenient and burdensome. But these difficulties are
not, in my opinion, either separately or together, fatal to the plaintiffs'
contention on this point.
3 6 6
Since the alternative was the "inconceivable" notion that Parliament
did not intend to provide compensation, the plaintiffs were obviously
correct. 367 In the Court of Appeal, Lord Bankes treated the
government equally dismissively, observing that owners who claimed
an enforceable legal right were offered only the possibility of an ex
gratia payment: "Well might the respondents say that they asked for
bread and were given a stone. '368
361. [1919] A.C. 744 (H.L.).
362. Lloyd George stated in the House of Commons upon introducing DORA
Amendment No. 3, which instituted controls over the drink trade: "Drink is doing us
more damage in the War than all the German submarines put together." 71 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Apr. 29, 1915) 868.
363. Land Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 18.
364. Cannon Brewery, [1919] A.C. at 747-48.
365. Cannon Brewery Co. v. Cent. Control Bd., [1918] 2 Ch. 101 (C.A.).
366. Id. at 114.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 129.
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The House of Lords affirmed the judgments below. Lord
Atkinson invoked the traditional canon that the property of a subject
could not be taken away unless Parliament expressed its intention in
"unequivocal language,"36 9 again rejecting in the property context the
rule about inferences from silence that the courts employed so
broadly in the liberty cases. As DORA did not address the issue of
compensation, he declared, such compensation existed as of right,
and the Land Clauses Act provided the normal method of assessing
it. 370 For his part, Lord Parmoor desired to enter "an emphatic
protest" against letting the opinion of royal commissioners replace
"claims made as a matter of right, under the protection of a rule of
law."3 71 Not only did DORA impliedly incorporate the Land Clauses
Act, he announced, but the proposition that an executive body could
claim private property under the prerogative was contrary to a
principle "enshrined in our law" since Magna Charta. 372 Cannon
Brewery thus underscored the judges' distinctive mode of construing
silence in property statutes, their suspicion of the prerogative as a
basis for invading property rights, and their decisive preference for a
judicial rather than administrative tribunal for awarding
compensation. 373
Judicial activism in defense of property rights was again evident
in the most significant property case of the war, Attorney General v.
De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd.3 7 4 In 1916 the Crown took possession of
a hotel for the purpose of housing the headquarters personnel of the
Royal Flying Corps.3 75 A War Office letter informed the hoteliers that
369. Cannon Brewery, [19191 A.C. at 752.
370. Id. at 754-55.
371. Id. at 760.
372. Id.
373. A subsequent case, Newcastle Breweries, Ltd. v. The King, [1920] 1 K.B.
854, came down on the side of compensation as of right even more directly, striking
down a regulation that rejected fair market value as the basis for compensation. In
1917 the Admiralty took possession of 239 puncheons of rum from breweries and wine
merchants in Newcastle, offering the owners a "reasonable profit" of one-third its
market value. Regulation 2B of DORA provided that when the Admiralty confiscated
goods, the price should be determined by the royal commission. In the Divisional Court,
Mr. Justice Salter refused to read DORA as depriving an owner of his statutory right to
fair market value without a clearly expressed intention to do so. Id. at 866. Moreover,
he declared, such a regulation could not fairly be held to be a regulation for securing
the public safety and defense. Id. at 865; see also Commercial & Estates Co. of Egypt v.
Ball, 36 T.L.R. 526 (K.B. 1920) (holding that the terms of Regulation 2B were not clear
enough with respect to neutral countries to authorize the Controller of Timber Supplies
to requisition the property of a neutral without paying full compensation). Before
Newcastle Breweries could be heard on appeal, the Indemnity Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5,
c. 48, retroactively validated this and other executive expropriations during the war.
See LLOYD, supra note 333, at 55 n.1; Cecil T. Carr, Crisis Legislation in Britain, 40
COLUM. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (1940).
374. [1920] A.C. 508 (H.L.).
375. Id. at 508.
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compensation would be ex gratia and strictly limited to monetary
loss.376 The letter seems to have relied on DORA regulations to
support the taking, but the Crown's argument in court was based on
the prerogative. 377 The Lords concluded that the Crown's power to
confiscate property under the prerogative was precluded by the
Defense Act 1842,378 which guaranteed property owners a right to
compensation and provided a judicial mechanism for assessing it.
Engaging in a lengthy discussion of the relationship between
prerogative and statutory powers, the House of Lords rejected In re
Petition of Right,3 79 a decision that granted the two sources of royal
authority equal status in situations covering the same ground, and
held that the statute controlled. Lord Dunedin, for example,
announced that there was "no room for asserting an unrestricted
prerogative right as existing alongside with the statutory powers."
38 0
Another judge, Lord Moulton, took "judicial notice" of important
historical changes that had occurred in the previous two centuries:
In the first place, war has become far more complicated, and
necessitates costly and elaborate preparations in the form of permanent
fortifications, and otherwise, which must be made in times of peace. In
the second place, the cost of war has become too great to be borne by the
Royal Revenues, so that money for it has to come from the people
through the Legislature .... In the third place, the feeling that it was
equitable that burdens borne for the good of the nation should be
distributed over the whole nation and should not be allowed to fall on
particular individuals has grown to be a national sentiment.
3 8 1
In his view, the Defense Act 1842 had rendered the prerogative
unnecessary and indicated unmistakably that "the burden shall not
fall on the individual, but shall be borne by the community."38 2 The
consensus of the court was that neither the public safety nor defense
required "that the Crown should be relieved of a legal liability to pay
for the property it takes from one of its subjects."38 3 Thus, although in
the alien internment cases ARA apparently had not covered the field
sufficiently to pre-empt prerogative control over aliens, in the
property cases a nineteenth-century statute was adequate to preclude
376. Id. at 510.
377. Id. at 514-17, 561; see RUBIN, supra note 359, at 88-89.
378. Defense Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 94. The compensation provisions of the
Defense Act and the Land Clauses Act operated on the same principles. See RUBIN,
supra note 359, at 64, 100. In finding the statute to control, the Lords in De Keyser
never reached the question whether the prerogative itself might require compensation.
See id. at 15-18.
379. [1915] 3 K.B. 649.
380. De Keyser, [1920] A.C. at 528.
381. Id. at 553.
382. Id. at 554.
383. Id. at 542 (per Lord Atkinson); see ScoTT & HILDESLEY, supra note 346, at
79-80 (summarizing the arguments of the suppliants' attorneys, which the House of
Lords accepted).
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royal power over individuals. 38 4 War-related developments, in other
words, necessitated an expansion of the prerogative to restrict the
freedom of aliens while requiring a contraction of those same powers
to spare property owners any "unfair burden.
'385
2. Wartime Taxation Without Representation
A second context in which the courts readily and
unapologetically thwarted executive policies was "taxation," that is,
when the government imposed economic loss without total
expropriation. China Mutual Steam Navigation Co. v. MacLay
38 6
involved a DORA regulation authorizing the Shipping Controller to
requisition ships "in such manner as to make the best use thereof
having regard to the crisis of the time. s3 8 7 The Controller compelled
the owners of a line of British steamships to operate the vessels on
behalf of the government rather than for their own profit. Claiming
that the order was tantamount to a tax, the shippers credited the
profits to their own account. Although Mr. Justice Bailhache declared
the impugned regulation to be permissible, he nevertheless held that
the order directing the shippers to continue their operations was
ultra vires. The government, he observed, had requisitioned three
things: the ships, the owners' services, and the profits. 38 8 The taking
of ships, while valid in itself,38 9 did not include the power to
requisition the services of the owners. Interestingly, by adopting a
theory based on confiscation of services rather than taxation of
384. See also Attorney Gen. v. Brown, [1920] 1 K.B. 773 (construing a Victorian
statute to prohibit the Crown from issuing a proclamation banning the importation of
certain goods).
385. As for the statutory argument, the Lords held that Regulation 2 of DORA
conferred no new powers on the government but merely authorized a taking under the
Defense Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 94, § 16, which required compensation as of right.
Admittedly DORA had suspended certain "restrictions" of that act, but such
restrictions did not include provisions as to compensation, and subjects continued to
enjoy their rights under the old statute. De Keyser, [1920] A.C. at 579; see SCOTT &
HILDESLEY, supra note 346, at 92.
386. [1918] 1 K.B. 33.
387. DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 27, at Reg. 39BBB(3).
388. China Mutual, [1918] 1 K.B. at 40.
389. The decision assumed the right to requisition ships in an emergency under
the prerogative. See W.S. Holdsworth, The Powers of the Crown to Requisition British
Ships in a National Emergency, 35 L.Q. REV. 12 (1919); RUBIN, supra note 359, at 141-
42; see also The Zamora, [1916] 2 A.C. 77 (P.C.) (suggesting in dicta that requisitioning
did not give rise to a right of compensation); The Sarpen, [1916-171 All E.R. 1132 (C.A.)
(assuming general right to requisition); The Broadmayne, 32 T.L.R. 304 (C.A.)
(upholding the common law right of the Crown to requisition). After the establishment
of the Ministry of Shipping in December 1916, the Shipping Controller could also
requisition ships under Regulation 39BBB of DORA. See RUBIN, supra note 359, at 141-
42.
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property per se, 390 the case illustrates the contrast between the
liberty and property cases: the courts were willing to prohibit the
government from infringing on personal freedom only when a
property owner was engaging in economic activity.
Subsequently, however, the House of Lords did not shy away
from invalidating a tax directly. A broad statute enacted in 1916
empowered the government to "make orders regulating or giving
directions with respect to the production, manufacture, treatment,
use, consumption, transport, storage, distribution, supply, sale or
purchase" of any article when it appeared "necessary or expedient"
for the purpose of maintaining the food supply of the country. 391 To
equalize milk prices, the Food Controller ordered wholesale dairies in
Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, and Somerset to pay the government two
pennies per gallon as a condition for receiving a milk license. The
dairy owners challenged the tax as ultra vires the legislation.
Despite the wide enabling language of the Act, the Court of
Appeal in Attorney-General v. Wilts United Dairies392 ruled that the
charge exceeded parliamentary authorization. Lord Atkin concluded
that Parliament had granted no power to tax and indeed "no powers
at all" to the Minister of Food.393 He noted that in light of
Parliament's "complete success" in its historic struggle to gain control
over taxation,
the circumstances would be remarkable indeed which would induce the
Court to believe that the Legislature had sacrificed all the well-known
checks and precautions, and not in express words, but merely by
implication, had entrusted a Minister of the Crown with undefined and
unlimited powers of imposing charges upon the subject.3 94
According to Lord Scrutton, a government official must show in "the
clearest words" that Parliament had authorized a tax; even in
wartime the executive could not by itself exclusively determine
necessity.3 95 Further, he analogized the government's behavior to the
Crown's use of the prerogative in the seventeenth century: "It is true
that the fear in 1689 was that the King by his prerogative would
claim money; but excessive claims by the Executive Government
without grant of Parliament are, at the present time, quite as
dangerous, and require as careful consideration and restriction from
390. By focusing on services, the judge claimed he was not reaching the issue of
taxation, see China Mutual, [1918] 1 K.B. at 40, but the implications were obvious, Mr.
Justice Bailhache then encouraged the owners to make voluntary arrangements with
the Shipping Comptroller. Id. at 41. The owners immediately waived their rights under
the ruling and did so, and other shipping companies followed suit. See RUBIN, supra
note 359, at 144-45.
391. New Ministries and Secretaries Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 68, §§ 3, 4.
392. 37 T.L.R. 884 (C.A. 1921).
393. Id. at 886.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 885.
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the Courts of Justice."3 96 Thus, Lord Scrutton suggested, subjects in
the early twentieth century should be equally fearful of executive
power whether exercised pursuant to prerogative or statute. The
House of Lords, in a shorter opinion, 397 agreed that the imposition
was an unlawful tax. Although a minister enjoyed some freedom of
action, he had no right "to act outside the law, nor could the law be
unduly strained to allow him to do what it might be thought
reasonable that he should do."13 98 In matters of taxation, therefore,
the judges maintained that the government's view of its own
reasonableness was simply not sufficient to render its conduct lawful.
3. Private Property and Judicial Access
The efforts of the courts to protect private property were also
apparent at the point of intersection between the right to property
and the right to judicial access. In Chester v. Bateson39 9 the High
Court invalidated Regulation 2A(2), which provided that no landlord
could sue to eject a munitions worker living in a certain area without
the consent of the Minister of Munitions.40 0 According to Mr. Justice
Darling, the question was whether forbidding a person to sue to
recover possession of a house was a necessary or even reasonable way
to secure public safety. Such an "extreme disability"40 ' could be
inflicted only by direct enactment of the legislature, and an
"elemental right of the subjects of the British Crown cannot be thus
easily taken from them. '40 2 Ironically, in limiting the government to
actions that were "necessary" and "reasonable," Mr. Justice Darling
relied on statements in Halliday, including Lord Atkinson's
observation that a regulation that failed to secure public safety
"reasonably" would be ultra vires.403 Halliday, which was of course a
liberty case, had easily found the government's action to be both
reasonable and "obviously" necessary.
Even more intriguing than Mr. Justice Darling's reliance on the
majority decision in Halliday was Mr. Justice Avory's invocation of
396. Id. at 886.
397. Attorney Gen. v. Wilts United Dairies, 38 T.L.R. 781 (H.L. 1922).
398. Id. at 782. Mr. Justice Salter in Newcastle Breweries Ltd. v. The King,
[1920] 1 K.B. 854, similarly found the government's action to be tantamount to a tax.
He stated that the deprivation of fair market value was a tax by the executive, and if
Parliament had intended DORA to confer such power, it would have employed more
precise language. Id. at 866.
399. [1920] 1 K.B. 829.
400. DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 27, at Reg. 2A(2).
401. Chester, [1920] 1 K.B. at 833.
402. Id. at 834. The regulation also provided that to sue without governmental
permission was a summary offense. Id.
403. Id. at 832-33. Mr. Justice Darling also mentioned Lord Finlay's remark that
"Parliament may entrust great powers to His Majesty in Council, feeling certain that
such powers will be reasonably exercised." Id. at 832.
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Lord Shaw's dissent in the same case, especially Lord Shaw's
warning that there lurked in governmental conduct "the elements of
a transition to arbitrary government" and "grave constitutional and
public danger. '40 4 Following this line of thought, Mr. Justice Avory
considered that as a matter of constitutional law, the eviction
regulation violated Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights. The
judiciary, he declared, must not approach such an executive act "in a
spirit of compliance rather than of independent scrutiny."40 5 Thus, a
decision premised on Halliday turned out to protect individual rights
after all-but rights to own private property and secure it in the
courts rather than rights to mere non-economic personal liberty.
40 6
There could be no greater contrast in wartime jurisprudence than
between the courts' accommodating attitude to property owners and
its disregard of far greater intrusions on individual rights in the
sphere of personal freedom. 40 7
404. Id. at 837.
405. Id. (quoting Lord Shaw). Newcastle Breweries Ltd. v. The King, [1920] 1
K.B. 854, also involved an issue of judicial access. Mr. Justice Salter, relying on
Chester, found that a regulation transferring the adjudication of a property claim from
a court of law to the royal commission removed a subject's right to a judicial decision
and was not reasonably capable of being a regulation for securing the public safety and
defense of the realm. Id. at 865. Similarly, Mr. Justice Greer agreed that a regulation
excluding access to the courts for a civil wrong "shows on its face" that it was not a
regulation for securing the public safety and defense. The regulation was invalid
because it "shut the doors of the Courts to a class of the community." Hudson Bay Co.
v. Maclay, 36 T.L.R. 469, 478 (K.B. 1920).
406. In addition to cases involving compensation, taxation, and legal process,
other property cases also went against the government. For example, two cases
interpreted the orders of the Food Controller not to reach parties challenging their
application. In Hinde v. Allmond, 34 T.L.R. 403 (K.B. 1918), Ellen Hinde was fined fifty
pounds at Chipping Norton Sessions for hoarding tea. The King's Bench rejected the
magistrates' conclusion that tea was an "article of food" within the meaning of the Food
Hoarding Order 1917. In quashing the conviction, Mr. Justice Darling stated that if the
Food Controller had meant to prohibit persons from acquiring large quantities of tea,
he could have said so. No one ate dried tea leaves, and it gave an unnatural meaning to
the word "food" to include such an item. Id.; cf. Sainsbury v. Saunders, 35 L.T.R. 140
(K.B. 1918) (holding that the New Ministries and Secretaries Act, 1916, which referred
to "food supply" rather than "article of food," was broad enough to allow the
government to fix the price of tea). Later that same year the same court held that a
May 16th order of the Food Controller regarding confiscation of beans, which was not
publicized until May 17, came into operation on the latter date. Mr. Justice Bailhache
remarked that unlike statutes, administrative orders were not public before they came
into operation, and the May 16 date therefore afforded insufficient notice. The upshot
of using the later date was that the plaintiff importers of the beans were not subject to
the requisitioning rule, since the contracts for sale had been completed by May 16.
Johnson v. Sargant, [1918] 1 K.B. 101.
407. Apart from the courts' obvious preference for property rights over civil
liberties, it should also be noted that most of the property cases occurred at the end of
or after the war when the needs of national defense were less pressing. Moreover, the
government eventually had its way, albeit through Parliament rather than the courts.
In 1920 Parliament enacted an indemnity bill retroactively awarding compensation for
direct rather than market value loss in accordance with the approach of the royal
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VI. THE MORAL IDEOLOGY OF THE WARTIME JUDICIARY
In earlier sections, this Article has demonstrated that the
general response of the judiciary to executive conduct during the war
was hardly one of indiscriminate compliance. The judges were
activist in three ways: they validated the government's policies to
deprive subjects of personal liberty; they preserved their own
institutional power; and they protected rights of private property. In
accomplishing these objectives they acted unevenly, pursuing some
goals with more vigor than others, using divergent mechanisms and
strategies, and applying varying legal standards and doctrines in
different contexts. Yet another factor-an evolving wartime moral
ideology-complicated their jurisprudence and contributed further to
these inconsistencies.
A. The Hierarchy of Moral Respectability
During the war the courts introduced legal distinctions reflecting
their moral vision, infusing their decisions with a bellicose moral
ideology that merged suppositions about "Englishness" with
conventional Victorian criteria of respectability. Although not evident
in every case, judicial opinions often reflected notions of a moral
hierarchy based on both national origin and traditional concepts of
individual "character." The fact that the judges acted according to
unstated but pervasive views about the worthiness of the parties
appearing before them renders certain judicial rulings explicable that
seem otherwise difficult to decipher. 40 8
Apart from aliens-whose differential treatment in wartime was
to be expected-the hierarchy of national origin placed natural-born
English persons at the apex, followed in descending order by
naturalized subjects and the Irish. Although in theory all British
subjects were entitled to the same judicial treatment, in actuality the
more "English" a detainee, the better he or she was situated. This
phenomenon was especially evident in the internment cases, in which
the degree of judicial scrutiny of the executive correlated to the
applicant's standing in the spectrum of wartime respectability.
Natural-born citizens such as Howsin benefited from an explicit
"reasonableness" review of government conduct, while naturalized
German subjects such as Zadig enjoyed a softer, but not entirely
commission. Indemnity Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 48; see RUBIN, supra note 359, at
ix. Parliament feared that if past administrative actions were not validated, the
government would have to pay 700 million pounds to property owners. See HURWITZ,
supra note 333, at 153.
408. On the pervasiveness of Victorian moral distinctions in judicial rulings, see
Rachel Vorspan, "Rational Recreation" and the Law: The Transformation of Popular
Urban Leisure in Victorian England, 45 McGILL L.J. 891 (2000).
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toothless, test. The Irish fared worse than either of these groups and
generally confronted even greater judicial hostility than enemy
aliens.
In the case of the Irish, the judges brushed off their arguments,
eschewed inquiry into individual claims, engaged in particularly
tortuous reasoning, and rendered patently disingenuous judgments.
Foy,40 9 for example, which upheld the internment of an Irish person
in 1920 as a means of achieving the victory over Germany already
accomplished in 1918, pursued an analysis quite different from the
approach in more "deserving" cases. Deferring wholly to the
executive, the court declined to investigate either the facts of the
individual case or the circumstances of national emergency. It
casually conceded and then disregarded the fact that Foy's denial of
complicity with any "society" in Ireland was uncontradicted at
trial.4 10 As for the larger context, Foy's attorney had contended that
there was no longer a "special military emergency" justifying martial
law. Quite unusually and revealingly, the court renounced the
opportunity to decide whether a state of emergency existed,
consigning that question to executive determination alone. 411 As
previously discussed, the judges in the Irish cases also applied a
strained and contorted reading of the law. Interpreting the term
"Ireland" in ROIA to mean "England," for example, the court in
Brady412 displayed a particularly dubious analysis to expand the
reach of Regulation 14B. In cases involving Irish detentions, it seems,
the courts applied no discernible legal standard to government action
and accepted all ministerial claims, however unsupported or
indefensible.
Not surprisingly, the only wartime case in which a court denied
a habeas petition without considering its merits, Ferguson,413
involved an Irishman called up for military service in the English
army in 1916. Although the judges rejected Ferguson's habeas
petition for various reasons, including his collateral attack on a legal
409. R. v. Governor of Wormwood Scrubs Prison ex parte Foy, 36 T.L.R. 432
(K.B. 1920).
410. Id. at 434.
411. Id. Lord Reading stated:
I must not be taken to mean that the Court cannot examine into the conditions
in which arrest or restriction of personal liberty has been made, but only that
when they have examined these conditions and have come to the conclusion
that the Legislature has taken from the Courts the power of dealing with
certain matters the Court must refuse to deal with them.
Id.
412. R. v. Inspector of Cannon Row Police Station exparte Brady, 37 T.L.R. 854,
855-56 (K.B. 1921).
413. R. v. Commanding Officer of Morn Hill Camp exparte Ferguson, 1 K.B. 176
(1917).
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judgment, the case was still aberrant. It was the only reported
habeas case of the war to find a claim of unlawful detention to be
non-justiciable. The court may well have been influenced by the fact
that Ferguson's arrest canie only a few months after the Easter
Rebellion and that, compounding his disfavored position as an
Irishman, he sought to evade his obligation of military service. 414 The
court's dismissive treatment likely stemmed in part from both
traditional ethnic hostility and the incontrovertible reality that,
although British subjects, some Irish were complicit with the
Germans during the war.4 1 5
In addition to reflecting a hierarchy based on national origin,
judicial decisions also embodied sensitivity to traditional moral
criteria. Intriguingly, the courts often linked objectionable moral
behavior such as criminality or bad character with danger to the
national defense. The connection was most obvious, of course, in the
case of draft resisters, whose perceived cowardice unquestionably
harmed the war effort. This moralistic view explains the apparent
judicial hostility to the litigants in such cases as Parton, Thierry, and
Sacksteder. In Parton,4 16 for example, Mr. Justice Darling proclaimed
during oral argument that the conscientious objector "ought really to
be an outlaw, ought he not?"4 17 Even Lord Scrutton, a judge
relatively attuned to issues of civil liberties, declared in a public
lecture in 1918:
From the point of view of a judge, it is difficult to see how the State can
exist if everybody who conscientiously objects to the law may disobey it,
and then shrieks complaints when he is punished. . . . [A] world in
which an individual recognizes no duties as a citizen, except those
which his conscience approves of, is a world of anarchy.
4 18
414. Id. at 177.
415. See, e.g., R. v. Casement, [1917 1 K.B. 98, 100 (finding an Irishman guilty
of treason for attempting to recruit Irish prisoners of war for the German army); EWING
& GEARTY, supra note 2, at 338 n.39; EDWARD NORMAN, A HISTORY OF MODERN
IRELAND, 1800-1969, at 257-58 (1973); A.J.P. TAYLOR, ENGLISH HISTORY, 1914-45, at
89-90 (1973).
416. R. v. Central Tribunal exparte Parton, 32 T.L.R. 476 (K.B. 1916).
417. Id. at 476. Mr. Justice Darling's moralistic attitudes were hardly subtle. In
presiding over the Oscar Wilde case, he summed up to the jury as follows: "Oscar Wilde
wrote filthy works, as you know: he was guilty of filthy practices .... Well, gentlemen,
it is possible to regard him as a great artiste, but he certainly was a great beast; there
is no doubt about that." Quoted in HYNES, supra note 47, at 228.
418. Scrutton, supra note 41, at 131.
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Indeed, all draft dodgers-whether natural-born British subjects,4 1 9
naturalized subjects, 4 20 alien allies, 421 or dual nationals 42 2-received
short shrift from the courts, and the especially low level of judicial
scrutiny in the deportation cases may have resulted in part from the
fact that many of the petitioners were draft avoiders. 423
The courts also drew connections between moral behavior and
the war effort that were more subtle than the "cowardly" refusal to
fight. Sarno,424 another deportation case, explicitly linked criminality
to national vulnerability in wartime. A Russian with an unsavory
history, Sarno had no regular employment but assisted in keeping a
house for prostitutes and thieves. 425 In challenging his deportation
order, he did not bother to argue that he was not undesirable; rather,
he claimed that his disreputable character posed no danger to the
419. In addition to Parton, another military service case involving a natural-
born Englishman was Fraser v. Military Authorities, 116 L.T.R. 447 (K.B. 1917), in
which the court rejected a claim based on an exemption for officers. In 1914 Fraser had
joined the army as a lieutenant and by 1916 had been promoted to the rank of captain.
He proceeded with his regiment to France but obviously did not acquit himself well, as
he was brought back to England and asked to resign his commission. He was
subsequently drafted for service in the regular forces. His argument was that he came
within the exception for officers because, although he subsequently lost his commission,
he was an officer at the time of the passing of the Military Service Act. The court
cursorily rejected a claim from such an "undeserving" applicant, stating simply that the
applicable date was not the date when the statute was passed but the date he was
called up. Id. In the cases involving dual nationals, of course, the court relied on the
date the Act was passed to restrict the exemption.
420. In a case involving a naturalized Russian draft dodger, for example, the
court construed a penal provision in ARA to apply to naturalized citizens as well as
aliens. Agdeshman v. Hunt, [1916-17] All E.R. 559, 559-60 (K.B.), concerned a
naturalized Russian who falsely claimed to be an alien to avoid serving in the British
army. In 1917 the police charged David Agdeshman under ARA with unlawfully
furnishing to the police false particulars with respect to his nationality. The
defendant's argument, brazenly enough, was that ARA only applied to aliens, and he
was not an alien but a British subject. Regulation 27(2) of ARA stated: "If any person
furnishes or causes to be furnished to a registration officer any false particulars ... he
shall be deemed to have acted in contravention of this order." Id. at 560. Claiming to
give the words their "natural and ordinary meaning," the court held that the provision
against furnishing false particulars was wide enough to apply to British subjects as
well as to aliens. Id. at 561. Although the Act was passed to impose restrictions on
aliens, there was no reason citizens needed to be expressly included. "It was also
intended to make such provisions as are necessary for the purpose of carrying those
restrictions into effect." Id. As in Halliday, the court implied expansive coverage from
silence, this time to ensure that a draft resister would not escape his punishment.
421. See, e.g., R. v. Sec'y of State for Home Affairs ex parte Duke of Chateau
Thierry, [1917] 1 K.B. 922 (C.A.); R. v. Superintendent of Chiswick Police Station ex
parte Sacksteder, [19181 1 K.B. 578.
422. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
423. See Chateau Thierry, [1917] 1 K.B. 922 (C.A.); Sacksteder, [1918] 1 K.B.
578.
424. [1916] 2 K.B. 742.
425. Id. at 743.
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realm.426 The executive, he contended, could not exercise a power
designed to secure public safety in wartime for the purpose of
deporting an undesirable person.42 7 Lord Reading insisted, however,
that criminality undermined national security by draining police
resources:
Although his actual offence may be merely the commission of a crime,
nevertheless in time of war, when all the activities of persons engaged
in police protection and in bringing criminals to justice must
necessarily be restricted because of the demand that has been made
upon persons of military age, the commission of crime may contribute to
endanger the safety of the realm, and in time of war suspicion may
justify action which could not be justified in time of peace.4 28
In judicial eyes, immoral behavior of any type undermined the
successful prosecution of the war.
Other deportation cases also involved morally suspect
individuals. For example, in R. v. Inspector of Leman Street Police
Station ex parte Venicoff 429 the deportee was an undesirable Russian
alien who in the course of divorce proceedings was accused of living
on the immoral earnings of his wife and another woman.430 "If these
statements are true," proclaimed a disgusted Lord Reading in
refusing to review the deportation order, "they disclose as degrading
a charge as can well be imagined. ' 431 Parliament, he declared, had
expressly empowered the Home Secretary to make such orders
unconditionally. 43 2 Again, the minimal standard applied in the
deportation cases seems to have derived at least partially from the
426. Id. at 746.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 750; see TREVOR WILSON, THE MYRIAD FORCES OF WAR: BRITAIN AND
THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1918, at 153-54 (1986) (discussing the wartime burden on the
police).
429. [1920] 3 K.B. 72.
430. Id. at 74.
431. Id. at 77. Venicoff brought a habeas action, claiming that he was entitled to
make representations to the Home Secretary against the charges. Lord Reading
concluded, however, that the Home Secretary need not hold an inquiry. Id. at 79-80.
432. Id. at 78. Another example of substantial judicial deference to the executive
in a case of an "undeserving" person was R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte
Bloom, 124 L.T.R. 375 (K.B. 1920). In 1920 the applicant, a Russian Jew, pleaded
guilty before a metropolitan magistrate to charges of assaulting the police and failing
to notify them of his change of address. The magistrate sentenced him to fourteen days'
imprisonment and recommended him for deportation. Lord Reading restated his earlier
view:
We have no right to sit on appeal from the Home Secretary when he has used
the executive powers conferred upon him provided that he has used them in a
lawful way in accordance with the Act. If he has come to a conclusion from
which we might differ (and there is no ground for suggesting that we should),
we could not interfere.
Id. at 378.
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fact that the deportees were not only aliens but also persons guilty
either of draft dodging, vice, or criminal bohavior. Lord Bankes
implicitly covered all the options when he stated in Chateau Thierry
that it was immaterial whether someone was deported because his
military services were required or because he was undesirable "on
account of his character. '433
The judicial tendency to differentiate morally among litigants
was sharply etched in two prisoner of war exemption cases that
yielded contrary results. Both involved the Military Service Act
1916,434 which contained an exemption from service for any person
"who has at any time since the beginning of the war been a prisoner
of war, captured or interned by the enemy, and has been released or
exchanged. ' 43 5 The first case, Robinson v. Metcalf,436 concerned a
British subject who had left England long before the war and resided
in Germany for twelve years while working as a clerk in a commercial
house. 43 7 Two days after war was declared, Robinson left Hamburg
for Denmark by train, and during the journey he was stopped and
detained twice for a total of two hours.4 38 At one point during the
detention a German officer informed him that he was a prisoner of
war.439 Lord Reading concluded that although Robinson had the
"status" of a prisoner of war while he was detained, he was not a
"prisoner of war, captured or interned" within the meaning of the
statute, as he had only been detained temporarily for purposes of
investigation.4 40  As in the internment cases, the court felt
comfortable offering a definition of the military term "prisoner of
war," and it construed the exemption to exclude a claim from an
Englishman with a longstanding residence in Germany. 441
While the decision in Robinson was unexceptionable, it
contrasted vividly with R. v. Burnham,442 the only case in which an
433. R. v. Sec'y of State for Home Affairs ex parte Duke of Chateau Thierry,
[1917] 1 K.B. 922, 935 (C.A.). There seems to have been particular concern during the
war about the effects on English society of Russian and other Eastern European
immigrants. Sir Edward Troup, Permanent Undersecretary of State in the Home
Office, referred to their "demoralizing habits" and noted that but for the operation of
the immigration laws, "hundreds of thousands of immigrants from Russia and from
Central Europe would have crowded into England; and, if that had happened, certain
goods might have been cheaper, but the whole social conditions of the country would
have been altered substantially for the worse." SIR EDWARD TROUP, THE HOME OFFICE
145 (1925).
434. 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 15.
435. Id. § 8.
436. 33 T.L.R. 542 (K.B. 1917).
437. Id. at 542.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 543.
441. Id.
442. 119 L.T.R. 308 (K.B. 1918).
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applicant prevailed on a claim of military exemption for any reason.
In Burnham the judges strained mightily, using a variety of theories,
to reach a result in the applicant's favor. Predictably, the case
involved a respectable British family caught on holiday in Germany
when the war erupted. Ernest King, his wife, and daughter were in
Germany visiting another daughter when war broke out; they
immediately tried to return home, but all rail and sea travel had been
canceled. 443 Instructed not to leave the city, King took an apartment
in Hamburg, and six weeks later his wife and daughters were allowed
to return to England.444 During the following two months, King
reported to the Hamburg police five or six times, but he otherwise
had full liberty to do as he liked. 44 5 Other British subjects who
attempted to leave during that same period were imprisoned.
446
Eventually King was informed that he could leave if he took an oath
not to take up arms or do anything to assist in the war against
Germany. 447 He was further told that if he broke his word he would
be shot upon capture, and that if he refused to give his word he would
be detained in Germany until the end of the war.448 King signed the
requested document and returned to England.
449
As the Military Service Act 1916 was wending its way through
Parliament, the War Office issued King a letter stating that it would
honor his oath not to bear arms against Germany, and he also
received an exemption from his local military tribunal for being a
released civil prisoner of war on parole. 4 50 Despite these guarantees,
he was called up to service in 1918.451 On the authority of Robinson,
a magistrate found him guilty of being an absentee and ordered him
transferred to military custody.45 2
King appealed his conviction, claiming an exemption under the
"prisoner of war" clause. 4 53 Mr. Justice Darling, who had been a
member of the panel in Robinson, found the case distinguishable. He
could see "no good whatever" in requiring King to serve, since the
appellant had given his word that he would not.
[W]hen we are dealing with an enemy such as Germany, whose plighted
word is not worth anything, we ought ourselves to be very careful not to
give any reason to suppose that we should encourage any Englishman,
443. Id.
444. Id. at 308-09.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.
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soldier or not, to break a solemn undertaking on oath given before an
officer in Germany by which he got an advantage.
4 5 4
Acknowledging that moral attitudes shaped his views, he added that
"[i]t may be that one's judgment in this case is somewhat coloured by
that feeling. '455
The judges' formal reasoning in the case was hardly persuasive.
Mr. Justice Darling's theory was that unlike the temporary train
detentions in Robinson, being prevented from leaving Hamburg was
"really equivalent to imprisonment. '456 It was true that "Hamburg is
a large place," but this was of no consequence since "many prisons are
large. '457 Moreover, it was not necessary that "interned" should mean
confined in a place that was limited or constructed in a particular
way.458 Mr. Justice Bailhache reached the same result on a different,
equally implausible basis. In contrast to his colleague, he thought
that internment must occur in a place "with some definite limits and
set aside for that purpose," but it was not necessary that the captors
go through the form of actually placing the prisoner there "even for
five minutes. '45 9 It was sufficient that King "was told that he would
be so placed. '460 The contorted analysis in both opinions suggests
that the judges were influenced by King's position in the spectrum of
wartime respectability. They went out of their way to give special
consideration to a gentleman who had given his word of honor to the
Germans, was trying to keep it, and had for two years been told by
various authorities in Britain that he would not be required to violate
it.
The courts extended their war-informed moralism to alien
litigants as well. Civilian alien enemy detainees, reconceived as
German enemy combatants, were considered to be dishonorable. As
the court remarked in Liebmann when justifying the government's
detention policy, in a contest with people who consider that "no blow
can be foul," the government need not "wait for proof of an overt act
or for evidence of an evil intent. '4 61 Finding that aliens were German
"combatants" and prisoners of war rather than civilians
"preventively" detained meant in effect that the internees were not
"innocent" civilians but morally deserving of their harsh fate.
454. Id. at 310.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. If he had attempted to leave, the judge continued, he would have been
imprisoned and confined in a smaller place than Hamburg. He was thus "practically
imprisoned" rather than, as in Robinson, merely detained for inquiry. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 311.
460. Id.
461. R. v. Superintendent of Vine Street Police Station ex parte Liebmann,
[1916] 1 K.B. 268, 278.
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Naturalized subjects of alien origin received more discriminating
treatment. Two cases involving naturalized Germans, reaching
opposite conclusions as to the permissibility of discriminating
between naturalized and natural-born citizens, suggested the
influence on the court of the relative respectability of the individuals
before it. In Ernest v. Commissioner of Metropolitan Police,46 2 a
naturalized British subject changed his name in 1915 from Maurice
Ernst to Maurice Ernest, thereby violating a DORA regulation that
prohibited a naturalized person from using any name other than the
name by which he was ordinarily known at the commencement of the
war.4 63 Ernest pointed to the fact that the British Nationality and
Status of Aliens Act 1914464 entitled a naturalized subject to "all
political and other rights, powers, and privileges" of a natural-born
British subject. 465 The court concluded that the Act had been
superseded by the regulation, which had the force of statute and
impliedly repealed any rights conferred under the Act.46 6 In addition,
the court determined that it was not ultra vires for regulations to
discriminate between different classes of citizens, given that
naturalized subjects were "more disposed than others to do acts
injurious to the welfare of the State. '4 67 Mr. Justice Darling was
particularly unsympathetic to Ernest because he had received a prior
warning from the police and chose not to act on it: "There is no
grievance, for the fact that proceedings were taken against the
appellant before the magistrate was his own fault. '4 68
In contrast, however, where a naturalized German was not only
blameless but also an eminent member of the Privy Council, the court
suddenly found it unacceptable to discriminate between naturalized
and natural-born subjects. Sir Edward Speyer had become a
naturalized British subject in 1892 and began serving as a member of
the Privy Council in 1909.469 Highly respected before the war, he was
subsequently attacked in certain quarters for his German origins.4 70
He resigned his privy councillorship and asked the Prime Minister to
revoke his baronetcy, but the King and Prime Minister refused to
accede to his requests.471 Undeterred by this impressive show of
462. 121 L.T.R. 222 (K.B. 1918).
463. Id. at 222.
464. 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 17.
465. Ernest, 121 L.T.R. at 223.
466. Id. at 224.
467. Id. Mr. Justice Darling observed that if naturalized subjects "give up a
name with a German sound, it is more difficult for the police to discover what persons
are doing who may be supposed not to have the best intentions with regard to this
country." Id. at 223.
468. Id. at 224.
469. R. v. Speyer, 115 L.T.R. 89, 92 (C.A. 1916).
470. Id.
471. See GARNER, supra note 56, at 71.
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support for Speyer, the Anti-German League brought legal
proceedings to remove him from the Privy Council. 472 The League
argued that DORA had impliedly revived an old disability in the Act
of Settlement 1700 preventing naturalized subjects from serving as
privy councillors or members of Parliament.
4 73
The Court of Appeal, in an elaborate and meticulous analysis.
inferred the presence of a right to hold the office from statutory
silence on the subject of disability. Lord Swinfen Eady remarked that
it was "incredible," if Parliament intended to keep alive a
disqualification for membership in the Privy Council, that it had not
been mentioned.474 In his view, general words conferring equality on
naturalized subjects in the British Nationality Act 1914 impliedly
overrode the specific disabilities in the Act of 1700. 475 He insisted
that the practice of "repealing earlier enactments by express words
has been by no means universally adopted in our legislation."4 76
Thus, parliamentary silence plus "general language" sufficed to allow
a naturalized German to retain a high position of state, although in
Halliday the same approach to statutory construction had forced
naturalized Germans into internment camps. An eminent German
performing valuable service to the state, held in esteem by King and
Prime Minister, was spared discrimination on the basis of his
naturalized status.
B. Ranking Values: Property Trumps Morality
Perhaps most revealingly, in the property cases the courts
declined to draw any moral distinctions at all, treating all victims of
governmental confiscatory policy as equally "deserving." This
suggests that preserving private property was an even higher value
for the courts than moral discrimination. During the war the courts
protected the property rights not only of British subjects, but even
those of enemy aliens and Irish rebels-two suspect groups whose
claims to rights of personal freedom received coldly dismissive
treatment.
The uniform protection of property rights was strikingly evident
in two House of Lords cases decided at the end of the war, one dealing
with aliens and the other with Irish property. The first, Hugh
Stevenson & Sons v. Aktiengesellschaft Fur Carton-Nagen-
Industrie,4 77 protected German property not just against the Crown
472. Id.
473. Speyer, 115 L.T.R. at 90.
474. Id. at 92.
475. Id. at 93.
476. Id. at 96. Lord Bankes agreed, acknowledging that the language of the 1914
Act was not "happily chosen." Id. at 98.
477. [1918] A.C. 239 (H.L.).
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but also against British citizens. At the outbreak of war the
government did not confiscate enemy assets but liquidated many
enemy businesses, placing their assets in the safekeeping of
government-appointed custodians. Some businesses with enemy
ownership were allowed to remain in operation under the strict
supervision of the Board of Trade. 478 A policy of confiscation of enemy
assets would have met strong opposition within the financial
community, as it would have undermined the confidence of other
countries in the security of private property in Britain.
4 79
Hugh Stevenson involved a German-British partnership
dissolved at the outbreak of war. The British partners continued to
operate the company, and the question was whether they could use
the existing machinery without making an allowance to their former
German partners. 48 0 At the trial level, Mr. Justice Atkin determined
that the Germans could recover their portion as of the outbreak of
war but were not entitled to any subsequent profits or interest.481 In
the Court of Appeal, one judge agreed with Mr. Justice Atkin, while
two others held that the German interest must be respected. 482 The
House of Lords affirmed the majority decision below, concluding that
the British partners carried on the business as trustees for the enemy
partners, who would be entitled at the end of the war to their
proportionate share of the profits.4 83 Firmly rejecting cases in the
United States ruling that no interest could accrue to enemies during
the war, the court insisted that such precedents were not in
conformity with English law. 484 As Lord Finlay declared: "It is
difficult to see on what principle the interest is to be forfeited if
private property is to be respected. ' '485
If Hugh Stevenson preserved the property rights of enemy aliens,
Johnstone v. Pedlar486 extended the property principle to a litigant
who otherwise seemed destined to fail: an alien Irish-born rebel.
478. See Trading with the Enemy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 87, §§ 2-3; Trading
with the Enemy Amendment Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 12; Trading with the Enemy
Amendment Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 79; Trading with the Enemy (Extension of
Powers) Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 98; Trading with the Enemy Amendment Act, 1916,
5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 105; see also BIRD, supra note 56, at 11, 322-23; GARNER, supra note 56,
at 87.
479. BIRD, supra note 56, at 336; see Ronald F. Roxburgh, German Property in
the War and the Peace, 37 L.Q. REV. 46, 46 (1921) (pointing out that German property
was not confiscated but liquidated and retained to pay Germany's reparations).
480. [1917] 1 K.B. 842 (C.A.)
481. [1916] 1 K.B. 763.
482. [1917] 1 K.B. 842 (C.A.).
483. [1918] A.C. 239 (H.L.).
484. Id. at 245, 255-56, 259.
485. Id. at 245. The Lords counseled that the temporary suspension of the
remedy should not be confounded with the permanent loss of the right. Id. at 247, 253-
54, 258.
486. [19211 2 A.C. 262 (H.L.).
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Pedlar had become a naturalized United States citizen, participated
in the Easter rebellion, suffered internment, and upon his release
engaged in illegal military maneuvers in Ireland.48 7 Eventually
rearrested and imprisoned, he sued to recover a sum of £124 that the
police had seized from him at the time of his arrest.
488
The government claimed that the plaintiff was an alien and that
the Crown could ratify seizure of his money as a discretionary act of
state.4 8 9 Rejecting this contention, the Lords held that such a defense
was not available against British subjects; further, an alien friend
residing within the realm with the permission of the Crown was to be
treated in the same manner as a British subject. 490 Pedlar's right to
equality existed, the court ruled, even though he had committed
treason against England. 49 1 As the Crown had not revoked its
allegiance to Pedlar by charging him with treason, he was entitled to
his property. According to Lord Phillimore:
The respondent has indeed no merits. On his own admission, he might
have been tried, convicted and executed for high treason. His conduct
shows evidence of much hostile feeling. He has since been expelled and
rightly expelled from the country. But at the time when his money was
taken from him, he was residing in the country, like any other alien,
with the tacit permission of the King. He owed temporary allegiance to
the King and for that reason could have been tried for high treason; but
he was entitled till his trial to ordinary protection.
4 9 2
His unworthiness, in other words, was irrelevant to his right to
recover his money. 493  Thus, to protect the principle of private
property, the Lords were willing to protect the property even of an
Irish-born alien in open rebellion against the government. Like Hugh
Stevenson, Pedlar underscored the fact that property rights, even of
persons at the bottom of the moral hierarchy, commanded a judicial
sympathy that claims to personal freedom did not.
487. Id. at 269.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 297.
493. As in Chester and Newcastle Breweries, the court in Pedlar was also careful
to maintain rights of judicial access to secure property. If aliens were not placed in the
same position as British subjects with respect to tort claims against the government for
recovery of property, Lord Finlay proclaimed, they would be "at the mercy of any
department entitled to use the name of the Crown." Id. at 273. Such an unfortunate
consequence would have "far-reaching" effects upon aliens in the country as to rights to
person and property. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Historians have criticized the English courts during World War I
as being too deferential to the executive and overly eager to sacrifice
individual rights. The wartime judges, they have insisted, failed to
exercise sufficient oversight of the government or carve out adequate
space for individual liberty. This portrayal, while certainly true on
one level, is nonetheless misleading, and this Article has argued that
historians must view judicial behavior during World War I with a
more nuanced and discriminating eye. The judges' frequent
statements proclaiming deference to the government were ultimately
no more reliable than their repeated vows of commitment to
individual liberty. In dealing with issues of internment, deportation,
conscription, and confiscation of property, the courts in fact pursued
an activist political, institutional, and moral agenda.
First, engaging in a judicial activism that generally coincided
with governmental interests, the judges waged the war in ways that
that went beyond parliamentary intent. They did so through
innovative and inconsistent strategies of statutory interpretation,
sometimes inferring additional powers from silence and at other
times adopting literal interpretations of textual language. They also
manipulated techniques of common law analysis, revealing
themselves particularly agile in expanding prerogative powers over
the alien population.
Second, the courts formally asserted and preserved their own
institutional power. Even in the domain of personal liberty, they
maintained their autonomy and authority to review executive
conduct, especially through the writ of habeas corpus. Regardless of
the substantive results of the cases, the judges found all issues to be
justiciable and rendered decisions on the merits. In addition, they
applied more rigorous legal standards to government conduct in
selected instances, investigated whether there was adequate factual
evidence to support executive actions, and required the government
to adhere to a particular process when it acted in a "judicial"
capacity. The traditional "individual rights" framework that has
permeated scholarly analysis, focusing on substantive results in
conflicts between individuals and the state, obscures the fact that
during the war the courts meticulously safeguarded and indeed
enhanced their institutional authority.
Third, in stark contrast to their approach to issues of liberty, the
judges actively promoted rights of private property, particularly
regarding matters of compensation, taxation, and judicial access. In
statutory cases they struck down governmental regulations and
orders as being unreasonable or unauthorized by Parliament, and in
prerogative cases they restricted the traditional common law power of
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the Crown to expropriate property without paying mandatory
compensation.
Finally, the courts suffused their judgments with moralistic
overtones, rendering decisions that reflected evolving notions of
wartime moral respectability. They expanded conventional Victorian
moral concepts to incorporate a new criterion of worthiness based on
national origin, relegating aliens and the Irish, along with persons of
more traditionally "undeserving" character, to the bottom of the
wartime moral hierarchy. As this Article suggests, a pervasive
moralism, reconfigured to include patriotic criteria, was an important
determinant in judicial outcomes.
The varying moral perspectives and political predilections
informing judicial decisions led to many inconsistencies and
contradictions in wartime jurisprudence. Legal standards and levels
of review varied both according to the substantive right at issue-
liberty or property-as well as the perceived moral status of the
litigant. This absence of uniformity was hardly an attractive feature
of wartime decisionmaking, but it nonetheless substantially qualifies
the notion that the courts during the war demonstrated only
undifferentiated acquiescence to the executive. More forceful and less
flaccid than they have been depicted, the judges pursued with vigor
their chosen substantive and institutional priorities.
Arguably, of course, the judiciary's activism in selected areas
only underscores its failure with respect to civil liberties. That is, the
judges' bold success in other spheres makes their abdication of any
effective role in preserving individual liberty even more indefensible.
Indeed, their position on civil liberties contributed to a persistent
national culture tolerant of infringements on individual freedom.
Despite sanguine expectations in 1914 that suspensions of individual
rights would only be temporary, 494 emergency controls continued long
after the war had ended.4 95 Much less peripheral than usually
pictured, the judges were, as a consequence, far more culpable.
494. In 1915 Lindsay Rogers expressed his belief that emergency measures
would only be temporary. He wrote that "extraordinary situations require
extraordinary remedies, and there is no reason to believe but that the Englishman's
traditional love of liberty, of due process of law, of security, will persist so strongly that
when the war is over there will be a reestablishment of all safeguards, and the
temporary lapse will not afford a binding precedent for similar action, when the times
are not so abnormal." Rogers, supra note 44, at 37; see Clarke, supra note 41, at 41
(stating that after four years of DORA, "people will be glad to feel that their liberty of
action and speech is once again only checked by the ordinary law of the land").
495. A standing power to introduce restrictions was conferred on the
government in the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 55. DORA itself was
not repealed until the Statute Revision Act, 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 42. See INGRAHAM,
supra note 42, at 296 n.24. Many restrictive provisions of DORA were retained in
various statutes. See, e.g., Official Secrets Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 75; Firearms
Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 43; Dangerous Drugs Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 46;
Shops Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 58. ARA, far from being discarded at the end of the
[VOL. 38..261
20051 JUDICIAL POWER IN ENGLAND DURING WORLD WAR I 343
Most important, the World War I experience sharply illustrates
the ability of the judiciary to manipulate concepts, doctrines,
standards, and techniques to achieve its objectives. For judges to
affirm their institutional power to review executive conduct is
critical, but hardly sufficient, to safeguard individual liberty. During
the war the English judiciary used its power and resources to
promote not personal freedom but other substantive priorities such as
military success, property rights, and traditionalist and nationalist
moral values. The historical lesson is that courts do not respond
automatically to events, and they surely do not automatically serve
as guardians of civil liberties. Judicial power must be used to a
purpose. In the current period of "perpetual war," it is to be hoped
that judges will exercise their rights of review in a manner far more
hospitable to individual freedom than did the warrior judges of World
War I.
war, was adapted and strengthened by the ARA Amendment Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5,
c. 92. The deportation provisions introduced during the war survived for decades. See
SHARPE, supra note 2, at 117-18. The Incitement to Disaffection Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo.
5, c. 56, and the Public Order Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 6, also developed from
wartime legislation. See EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 25, 93 ("Here again what
began life as emergency powers to deal with the defence of the realm gradually became
part of the general law.").

